Three Essays on the Formation and Finance of Local Governments by Brien, Spencer T.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Public Management and Policy Dissertations Department of Public Management and Policy
Fall 1-6-2012
Three Essays on the Formation and Finance of
Local Governments
Spencer T. Brien
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Public Management and Policy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public Management and Policy Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brien, Spencer T., "Three Essays on the Formation and Finance of Local Governments." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2012.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss/37
THREE ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION AND FINANCE OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to 
The Academic Faculty 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Spencer T. Brien 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in the 
School of School of Public Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Georgia State University and Georgia Institute of Technology  
December 2011 
 
 
COPYRIGHT 2011 BY SPENCER T. BRIEN
THREE ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION AND FINANCE OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by:   
   
Dr. David Sjoquist, Advisor 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
 Dr. Douglas Noonan 
School of Public Policy 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   
Dr. W. Bartley Hildreth 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
 Dr. Robert J. Eger III 
Askew School of Public 
Administration and Policy  
Florida State University 
   
Dr. Greg Lewis 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
 Dr. Jon Rork 
Department of Economics 
Reed College 
   
  Date Approved:  October 24, 2011 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my wife, Bonnie.  Her support and encouragement made this possible. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 I‘ve been honored to receive the help and support of several great people while 
working on my dissertation.  I first want to thank David Sjoquist for his guidance over 
the past few years and for challenging me to stretch further than ever before. I also owe 
thanks to Bart Hildreth, who gave me very thoughtful and timely feedback that helped me 
figure out the way forward when I was feeling very stuck.  I am very grateful for the 
efforts of the other members of my committee: Robert Eger, Jon Rork, Doug Noonan and 
Greg Lewis who all gave very useful advice on how to refine this work and where to take 
it next.  I‘m especially appreciative of Greg Lewis joining the committee at the very end 
and providing excellent feedback under a short timeframe.  Finally, thanks go to my 
family and friends who have supported me throughout this program.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv 
LIST OF TABLES vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ix 
SUMMARY x 
CHAPTER 
1 Introduction 1 
The Homeowner's Tax Relief Credit 2 
The Residual-Rule Model of Property Tax Determination 3 
The Contract City Model of Municipal Governance 5 
 
2 Do State Funded Property Tax Exemptions Actually Provide Tax Relief? 8 
Introduction 8 
Price Effects Created by Property Tax Relief 10 
Empirical Literature Review 28 
The Georgia Homeowner's Tax Relief Credit 40 
Preliminary Investigation of the HTRC Program 43 
Empirical Strategies 47 
Results 60 
Conclusions 78 
 
3 Mind the Gap: A Model of Property Tax Determination 81 
Introduction 81 
 vi 
Property Tax Stability 86 
The Budgeting Role of the Property Tax 91 
Preliminary Analysis 99 
Empirical Approach 102 
Data 106 
Long and Short Run Elasticity Estimates 109 
Post-Estimation 117 
Final Discussion 121 
 
4 Contract Design for Extreme Outsourcing: A Case Study of Sandy 
Springs, GA 124 
Introduction 124 
The Contract City 126 
Sandy Springs, Georgia 132 
Theoretical Framework  141 
Data and Research Strategy 148 
Key Findings 159 
Discussion 184 
 
REFERENCES 188 
VITA       192 
  
 vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 2.1: Expenditures on State-Funded Homestead Exemptions 9 
Table 2.2: History of HTRC Exemptions and Appropriations 41 
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Level Variables 59 
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics for Differenced Variables 59 
Table 2.5: Fixed Effects Regressions with Clustered Standard Errors 63 
Table 2.6: Goodness of Fit Tests 66 
Table 2.7: Difference Form Equations 68 
Table 2.8: Fixed-Effect Clustered Regressions Using The Grant Size As 
Control For HTRC 69 
Table 2.9: Clustered Regressions Using Difference Form Equations for the 
Counterfactual Grant 70 
Table 2.10: Fixed-Effect Clustered Regression Using Percent Reduction in 
Total Tax Base as HTRC Control 71 
Table 2.11: Regression on the Differenced Log of County Millage Rates 72 
Table 2.12: Post-Estimation For 2007 Data Using Column 6 Estimates 
from Table 2.5 76 
Table 3.1: Effect of the Tax Share (S) on       98 
Table 3.2: Summary of Estimated Income Elasticities 111 
Table 3.3: Long-Run Revenue Income Elasticity Estimates 112 
Table 3.4: Short-Run Revenue Income Elasticity Estimates 113 
Table 3.5: Short-Run Income Elasticity Computations for the Property Tax 
Using the Budget Balancing Rule 115 
Table 3.6: Short-Run Elasticity Estimates for Net Assessed Property Value 116 
Table 3.7: Years of Superior Fit Using the Residual Rule Model, by 
County 118 
 viii 
Table 3.8: Comparison of Projection Accuracies 120 
Table 3.9: Demographics by Model Fit 121 
Table 4.1: Initial Service Production Methods of Sandy Springs, GA 135 
Table 4.2: Contents of the Initial Requests for Proposals by the 
Commission for the City of Sandy Springs 137 
Table 4.3: Classification Categories 153 
 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 2.1: Fiscal Illusion Effect on Public Expenditures 19 
Figure 2.2: Fiscal Illusion Effect on Public Expenditures 19 
Figure 2.3: Political Cost Minimization of the Tax Structure 25 
Figure 2.4: Political Cost Minimization of the Tax Structure 26 
Figure 2.5: Average County Millage Rates 1990-2007 44 
Figure 2.6: Georgia County Millage Rates by Quartile 1990-2007 44 
Figure 2.7: Median Property Taxes Per Capita Georgia Counties 1990-2007 46 
Figure 2.8: Georgia County Revenue Shares 1991-2006 46 
Figure 2.9: Mechanics of Homeowner's Tax Relief Credit 49 
Figure 2.10: Graph of Tax Share Against Log of Per Capita Income 52 
Figure 3.1: The Residual Rule 92 
Figure 3.2: Frequency of Property Tax Rate Changes in Georgia School 
Districts 1999-2007 100 
Figure 3.3: Frequency of Property Tax Rate Changes in Georgia School 
Districts 1999-2007 101 
Figure 3.4: Distribution of Millage Rates for Georgia School Districts in 
2007 108 
Figure 3.5: Georgia County School District Revenue Sources 1999-2007 109 
Figure 3.6: Percent of School District Levies That Were Better Predicted 
With the Residual Rule 119 
Figure 4.1: Data Framework 152 
 
  
 x 
SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation follows a three-essay format.  Each essay evaluates a different 
fiscal institution from a public administration perspective.   
In the first essay I examine whether state-funded property tax exemptions are 
effective in reducing the property taxes.  This class of exemption is characterized by a 
grant from state to local governments that is intended to replace property tax revenue and 
lower property tax payments.  Two separate theories of local fiscal behavior predict that 
that price effects and fiscal illusion will reduce the effectiveness of this type of tax relief.  
I test these predictions using panel regression analysis on county-level data from Georgia.  
I find that only two thirds of the revenue allocated to this program is actually used for tax 
relief. 
In the second essay I test a model of the property tax in which the levy is set to 
balance the difference between budgeted expenditures and expected receipts from all 
other revenue sources.  This model demonstrates how the property tax can be used to 
offset unexpected changes to other revenues given a change in personal income.  This 
model is contrasted with an alternative model in which expenditures are budgeted after 
expected total revenues have been determined.  I will estimate both models for local 
governments in Georgia and test which more accurately describes local fiscal 
performance.  I will also use both to predict changes to the property tax over a period of 
time and measure which model generated the more accurate forecast.   
Unlike the first two papers, which are quantitative analyses of fiscal data, this 
chapter is a case study of the contract city model of governance as implemented in the 
 xi 
newly incorporated city of Sandy Springs, Georgia.  I investigate whether the scope of 
outsourcing in contract cities creates additional challenges for city officials that manage 
contractor performance.  I evaluate the incentive structures in the contract agreements 
that influence the principal-agent relationship using a textual analysis research method.  I 
find that certain combinations of municipal functions in a single public-private 
partnership creates the potential for negative synergies to arise which would increase the 
difficulty of monitoring and managing the private partner.   
.   
 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Fiscal institutions can be studied through a number of academic lenses.  For 
example, an economic approach focuses on efficiency and equity, while a legalistic 
approach examines institutions' interaction with the rule of law.  In this dissertation I 
examine three fiscal institutions from a public administration perspective.  This means 
that I approach taxation and expenditure systems as public policies that can be evaluated 
in terms of their effectiveness and their unintended consequences.  I am interested in how 
public officials respond to intergovernmental fiscal policies.  I also explore how the 
tightly constrained budgetary environment of state and local governments affects fiscal 
policy. 
I have structured this dissertation as three separate manuscripts.  The first two 
essays employ the tools of public economics to evaluate state and local property tax 
policies.  The third is rooted in public financial management and is a case study of the  
principal-agent dynamic in the contract city model of municipal governance.  Despite the 
differences among the essays in their disciplinary background and their research methods, 
these studies are united by their focus on the impact of fiscal policy on the behavior of 
public officials.  This multidisciplinary approach and the focus on public financial 
management helps distinguish my research program from traditional public economics.   
The Homeowner's Tax Relief Credit 
All states have implemented policies intended to provide property tax relief to 
homeowners.  As of 2007, 47 states offer homeowners either a homestead exemption or a 
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credit, 34 states have circuit breakers and 26 states allow deferrals on property taxes 
owed (Baer 2008).  While some of these policies are simply regulations that restrict local 
procedures for calculating the tax for a given property, many tax relief programs transfer 
state funds to local governments to replace property tax revenues.  However, if local 
governments are able to use these grants for purposes other than property tax relief, then 
state-funded relief programs may yield little actual reduction in taxpayer burden and may 
even increase the level of property taxation.   
This essay evaluates one specific type of property tax relief program – a state-
funded homestead exemption.  These programs generally consist of a fixed property tax 
exemption specified by the state that is paired with a grant to local governments to offset 
lost revenue.  Duncombe and Yinger (2001) identified 13 states with some form of state-
reimbursed exemption, though seven of them only funded exemptions to special groups, 
such as residents over 65 years of age or veterans.  For states that fund general homestead 
exemptions for all homeowners, Duncombe and Yinger note that state expenditures can 
become quite large.  In fiscal year 2008-09, California paid out $442.5 million to local 
governments to fund a $7,000 general homestead exemption. 
I examine whether state-funded homestead exemptions provide tax relief to 
homeowners, or whether local officials ‗capture‘ the reimbursement funds by raising 
property tax rates.  Two factors appear to make the latter outcome likely.  First, the 
structure of the relief grant gives local officials an incentive to raise their property tax 
rates because the size of the grant depends on the local millage rate.  Increasing the tax 
rate results in a larger transfer from the state.  Second, because the revenue replacement 
grants are paid directly to local governments, taxpayers may not be fully aware of the 
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amount of funds received.  If taxpayers do not know how much tax relief they should 
receive from the exemption, local officials may be able to capture the grant by raising 
property tax rates and achieve a higher level of overall revenue from the grant and the 
property tax.    The result is that some state funds designated for reducing the property tax 
burden through a homestead exemption instead are used to increase local spending. 
I evaluate the HTRC based on its effectiveness at providing property tax relief.  
Does the grant actually replace property tax revenue or do local governments use 
property tax relief funds to boost spending?  I examine the effects of the grant on the 
level of revenues, the share of revenues derived from the property tax and on the property 
tax rate.  I estimate the effects using a panel of county governments over a 12 year 
period.  The results indicate that approximately a third of HTRC funds are employed by 
local governments to raise local spending.   
The Residual-Rule Model of Property Tax Determination 
In this essay I analyze how the property tax is used by local governments in an 
environment without binding tax limitations.  If local officials are able to use the millage 
rate and assessment practices to achieve a desired property levy, what set of rules or 
behavioral patterns would they follow as they use this power?  One model of property tax 
rate determination is the ‗residual rule‘.  Under this approach the property tax levy fills 
the gap between budgeted expenditures for the year and projected receipts from all other 
available revenue sources.  Local officials set the property tax millage rate so that the tax 
yields just enough revenue to balance the budget.  An implication of adhering to this rule 
is that in the event that other local revenues fall due to a recession the property tax rate 
will need to be raised in order to replace the lost receipts.  This behavior allows the local 
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government to stabilize its overall revenues by increasing the short-term volatility of the 
property tax.  The pursuit of stability for the local government comes at the cost of 
homeowners' ability to predict their annual property tax bills.  
In contrast to the ‗residual rule‘ model, an alternative model of property tax 
growth predicts that receipts will grow in proportion to the property tax base.  This model 
predicts less volatility in the yield of the property tax and no role for the property tax in 
counter-balancing cyclical volatility in the other local revenue sources.   
The research objective of this paper is to compare these two models empirically in order 
to determine which model more accurately describes the pattern of changes to the millage 
rate and variation in the overall property tax levy.  The policy implications for following 
the ‗residual rule‘ approach are significant because it would demonstrate a tradeoff 
between overall stability in the tax structure and the predictability of the property tax.  
Stability is a concern for ensuring the adequacy of local fiscal policy across economic 
cycles, while predictability is a concern for taxpayers who want to know their future tax 
liability and for policymakers interested in the political viability of their tax regime. The 
danger of following the ‗residual rule‘ is that local officials that use the property tax to 
smooth their budget may surprise taxpayers with unexpected changes to the levy and 
incur political costs that threaten the sustainability of financing services through the 
property tax. 
The primary contribution of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the role 
of the property tax in local tax structures during times of economic volatility.  The 
underlying questions asked are how do local policymakers use the property tax to 
promote an adequate and stable fiscal structure and what are the implications of this 
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approach?  The framework outlined in this paper describes an interconnected revenue 
system in which the relative responsiveness of public expenditures and non-property tax 
revenues to changes in personal income, along with the share of revenue provided by 
property taxes, will determine the size of the shift in property levies local tax officials 
will have to impose in order to comply with their budget balancing rule.  This model 
predicts the size and the direction of the changes to the property tax levy local officials 
will make in order to offset shocks to their other revenue sources and stabilize the overall 
revenue stream.   
I test this budget balancing model against an alternative model that assumes that 
the property levy is independent of other revenue sources and is instead determined by 
growth in the tax base.  Policy makers following this alternative model do not use the 
property levy to stabilize their overall revenues in response to short-term economic 
shocks.  I estimate both models using data from Georgia school districts and then 
generate predicted property tax levies to determine which model is able to generate more 
accurate revenue projections.  I find that the budget-balancing model is better able to 
predict property tax revenues for the districts that have higher incomes per capita and 
higher populations as well as those districts that rely on the property tax for a larger share 
of their revenues.   
The Contract City Model of Municipal Governance 
The rise of the contract city as a new form of municipal governance presents 
many thorny issues for the theory and practice of public management.  The contract city 
model is an extreme form of municipal outsourcing in which the city enters into 
comprehensive private partnerships for the production of the majority of municipal 
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functions.  On the practitioner side, cities adopting this model of service delivery see the 
role of the city manager shift from administering public resources to monitoring and 
enforcing contracts (Prager 2008).  For researchers interested in the theory of public 
contract management, this form of government challenges the conventional approach to 
studying internal vs. external production decisions.   The question shifts from whether a 
single service function is a candidate for external production (see for example Levin & 
Tadelis, 2007), to whether a large set of service delivery and managerial functions can be 
outsourced at once.  A key difference between the two models of governance is that 
rather than evaluating the economic merits of outsourcing each function individually, 
contract city managers choose the overall service delivery regime and contract for an 
array of services.  Additionally, limited competition in the market for the private 
production of municipal functions, forces contract city officials to evaluate bids from a 
small set of potential service providers who are willing and able to undertake the 
production of the bulk of municipal functions.   
In this essay I investigate the implications that the contract city model of 
governance has for contract management.  It raises questions such as: does the scope of 
this type of public-private partnership facilitate interactions between outsourced functions 
that create greater contract management problems than would have otherwise existed if 
the services were provided by different partners?  Are there synergies among certain 
municipal functions that when they are outsourced together increase the difficulty of 
contract management by creating the potential for conflicts of interest?  Does the design 
of the actual contracts between contract cities and their private partners reflect the unique 
managerial challenges that could arise with this scale of outsourcing? 
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I investigate these questions through a case study of the initial contracts signed by 
the city of Sandy Springs, Georgia with its primary contractor, the private firm CH2M 
Hill.  I identify three key categories of municipal functions that are interrelated and, when 
outsourced to a single private partner, create the potential for a conflict of interest.  These 
three functional categories are: 1) the production of direct services, 2) the creation of 
managerial and financial information and 3) administrative and control functions.  My 
analysis of the contract documents indicates that combining this broad scope of services 
in a single public-private partnership creates the potential for ―negative synergies‖ which 
raise the cost of monitoring and managing contractor performance above what would be 
required if the functions were individually outsourced to separate contractors.  I also 
identify beneficial structures that can counteract some of the adverse incentives created 
by the scope of the contracts.  These features would not be present in the contracts 
associated with traditional municipal public-private partnerships that do not exhibit the 
same scope of outsourcing.  The identification of these interrelationships between 
municipal functions can inform the design of contracts, especially when determining how 
contract cities should allocate functions across various private partners.   
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CHAPTER II  
DO STATE-FUNDED PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS ACTUALLY 
PROVIDE TAX RELIEF?  
“While the [grant program] had great motives initially – to reduce the local tax burden – 
it has not worked out that way.” Governor Sonny Perdue (Salzer, 2008) 
 
Introduction 
 
All states have implemented policies intended to provide property tax relief to 
homeowners.  As of 2007, 47 states offer homeowners either a homestead exemption or a 
credit, 34 states have circuit breakers and 26 states allow deferrals on property taxes 
owed (Baer 2008).  While some of these policies are simply regulations that restrict local 
procedures for calculating the tax for a given property, many tax relief programs transfer 
state funds to local governments to replace property tax revenues.  However, if local 
governments are able to use these grants for purposes other than property tax relief, then 
state-funded relief programs may yield little actual reduction in taxpayer burden and may 
even increase the level of property taxation.   
This essay evaluates one specific type of property tax relief program – a state-
funded homestead exemption.  These programs generally consist of a fixed property tax 
exemption specified by the state that is paired with a grant to local governments to offset 
lost revenue.  Duncombe and Yinger (2001) identified 13 states with some form of state-
reimbursed exemption, though seven of them only funded exemptions to special groups, 
such as residents over 65 years of age or veterans.  For states that fund general homestead 
exemptions for all homeowners, Duncombe and Yinger note that state expenditures can 
become quite large.  In fiscal year 2008-09, California paid out $442.5 million to local 
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governments to fund a $7,000 general homestead exemption.  Table 2.1 shows state 
expenditures for five state funded exemptions.  
Table 2.1  Expenditures on State-Funded Homestead Exemptions
1
 
State Fiscal Year Expenditure 
(in millions) 
New York 2009/10 $3,249 
California 2008/09 $442 
Georgia 2007/08 $432 
Indiana  2008/09 $140 
Iowa 2009 $99 
 
I examine whether state-funded homestead exemptions provide tax relief to 
homeowners, or whether local officials ‗capture‘ the reimbursement funds by raising 
property tax rates.  Two factors appear to make the latter outcome likely.  First, the 
structure of the relief grant gives local officials an incentive to raise their property tax 
rates because the size of the grant depends on the local millage rate.  Increasing the tax 
rate results in a larger transfer from the state.  Second, because the revenue replacement 
grants are paid directly to local governments, taxpayers may not be fully aware of the 
amount of funds received.  If taxpayers do not know how much tax relief they should 
receive from the exemption, local officials may be able to capture the grant by raising 
property tax rates and achieve a higher level of overall revenue from the grant and the 
property tax.    The result is that some state funds designated for reducing the property tax 
burden through a homestead exemption instead are used to increase local spending.   
 
                                                 
 
 
1
 See New York State, Executive Budget Briefing Book – STAR (New York State, Division of the Budget 
2008); California Governor‘s Proposed Budget (State of California 2008); Georgia Law 2007 HB 95 made 
an Act pp. 223; Iowa Detailed Budget Book Fiscal Year 2009 – Associated Financial Statements (State of 
Iowa 2009, p. 159); Indiana Appropriation HB 1001 (State of Indiana 2008) 
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I explore these issues by investigating Georgia‘s experience with the state-funded 
Homeowner‘s Tax Relief Grant (HTRC).  HTRC was adopted in 1999 during a period of 
state budget surpluses to return excess state funds to taxpayers.  It initially gave all 
homeowners a homestead exemption of $2,000 of assessed property value, but the 
exemption increased and decreased multiple times between 1999 and 2008, and was 
$8,000 when it was eliminated in 2008.   
I evaluate the HTRC based on its effectiveness at providing property tax relief.  
Does the grant actually replace property tax revenue or do local governments use 
property tax relief funds to boost spending?  I examine the effects of the grant on the 
level of revenues, the share of revenues derived from the property tax and on the property 
tax rate.  I estimate the effects using a panel of county governments over a 12 year 
period.  The results indicate that approximately a third of HTRC funds are employed by 
local governments to raise local spending.   
This essay is structured as follows: The next section uses the existing literature on 
the impact of intergovernmental grants on the local public sector to develop a theoretical.  
Section 3 briefly reviews the empirical literature on approaches to measuring these 
impacts, while Section 4 provides greater detail on the Georgia Homeowner‘s Tax Relief 
Grant.  I then cover the empirical strategy and discuss the data that I employ.  In Section 
6 I present my results; some concluding thoughts are provided in the final section.   
Price Effects Created by Property Tax Relief 
 
The median voter model assumes that the government selects the outcome 
preferred by the voter with the median preference, which are largely determined by how 
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the government‘s spending and taxing affect him/her.  Holcombe (1989) provides a 
theoretical history of the median voter.   
Initial Conditions Before The Exemption 
Consider a local community with n households, where each household i receives 
an income of Yi which is split between private consumption (Xi) and a publicly provided 
good (Gi) that is private in the sense of excludability and competitive consumption.
2
  Z 
represents a vector of environmental and taste parameters.  Taking X as a numeraire 
good, each household‘s preferred G is obtained by solving the following problem: 
     
       
                  (2.1) 
                        
  represents the preferred level of G for the i
th
 person, and   is the marginal cost (which, 
for simplicity, is assumed to be constant and equal to one) of producing a unit of  .  The 
public good is not purchased directly by households, but is funded through taxation.  The  
   term represents household i’s share of the total tax revenue required to fund total 
government spending, given by    .  We assume that the property tax is the only source 
of public funds.  Household i‘s share of total property tax revenue is determined by its 
share of all property held in the community.  This is defined as     , where    is the 
value of household i‘s property and   is the total value of all local property.    is 
comprised of both homestead and non-homestead property. 
                                                 
 
 
2
 This presentation of the median voter model follows the notation used in Tresch, Richard W. Public 
Finance: A Normative Theory.  Boston, MA: Academic Press, 2002.  See Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994) 
for tests of the Median Voter Model‘s validity when applied to local governments. 
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Because the local government is required by law to maintain a balanced budget, 
expenditures on   must equal total revenues.  A government with  the property tax as its 
sole source of revenue balances its budget by choosing a property tax rate     such that 
total property tax receipts (  ) equals total government expenditures (  ).  I assume that 
  and    are given and do not depend on  .  Following the assumption that the marginal 
cost of producing the public good is constant and equal to unity (i.e., q=1)
3
 the 
government‘s budget constraint can be presented in a simplified form which omits q.  
This is displayed in equation (2.2).   
           (2.2) 
The homeowner pays     in property taxes.  Multiplying the numerator and denominator 
of     by   shows the homeowner‘s tax payment in terms of a share of the total tax 
burden born by the community: 
               (2.3) 
By substituting (2.3) into (2.2) we obtain expression (2.4), which shows that 
homeowner i‘s tax payment is its share of the total cost of the publically provided good.   
       
  
 
    (2.4) 
                                                 
 
 
3
 There are two positions on whether to use this simplification in the literature with the main distinction 
being the research objective of the study.  Authors focusing on the effect of intergovernmental transfers on 
the level of government expenditures or taxation have assumed unitary production costs, while those 
examining impacts on production efficiency, especially in the public education, have explicitly modeled 
how the marginal cost of   can change.  As an example of the former category, Filimon, Romer and 
Rosenthal (1982) frame their discussion in terms of government expenditure and do not address the actual 
production of the public good in their theoretical model.  Alternatively, in their studies of the impact of 
New York‘s state-funded homestead exemption on the efficiency of public schools, Duncombe, Miner, and 
Ruggiero (1997),  Eom, Duncombe, and Yinger (2005), and Eom and Rubenstein (2006)  have each modeled 
the production cost.  The objectives of this paper align more closely with the former category.   
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The homeowner‘s tax price is the increase in property taxes associated with a 
marginal increase in public production.  Taking the first difference of the right-hand side 
of (2.4) with respect to G shows that the tax payment will increase at the rate of the tax 
share.   Because the marginal cost of production for G is assumed to be a constant rate of 
q, the marginal tax price will also be the average price.  Therefore the tax price of local 
services for household i can also be obtained by dividing both sides of (2.4) by G.  This is 
displayed in equation (2.5).  This shows that the    term from equation (1) is also the 
homeowner‘s tax price.   
     
   
 
 
  
 
     (2.5) 
Effect of State-Funded Homestead Exemption  
 When the state implements a fully-funded homestead exemption, the taxable 
value of the homeowner‘s property is reduced by the value of the exemption ( ) and the 
property owner‘s new tax payment is determined by applying the millage rate to this 
reduced value.  To compensate the locality for the loss of revenue due to the exemption, 
the state government provides a grant that is equal to    , where   is the number of 
recipient homesteads.   
The revenue replacement grant enters into the local government‘s budget 
constraint as a direct match for the taxes that the locality would have collected on the 
exempted property value.  This relationship is depicted in equation (2.6).  If the entirety 
of the state grant is applied to tax relief, then the local government does not change its 
property tax rate or level of spending.   
               (2.6) 
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or,        (2.7) 
The replacement grant reduces the share   that must be financed through the 
property tax.  If we represent the homeowner‘s tax payment as a share of the revenue 
required to fund  , similarly to equation (2.4), we see that the exemption also reduces the 
individual homeowner's proportionate tax burden.  The new individual tax share is the 
ratio between the taxable value of the homeowner‘s property after the exemption        
relative to the sum of the total taxable value of the property base and the total property 
tax exemption            , because the replacement grant compensates local 
government for the reduction in their tax base due to the property tax exemption.    
Equation (2.8) shows this relationship between the homeowner‘s new property tax 
payment        , and the new tax share. 
           
       
       
    
       
 
     (2.8) 
There are at least two factors that may induce local governments to change the 
property tax rate in response to the homestead exemption.  First, the exemption changes 
the tax price of local public services and would induce a substitution response on the part 
of the median voter.  Dividing equation (2.8) by   yields the post-exemption tax price   , 
shown in equation (2.9), which is less than initial tax price   .   
    
       
 
 
       
 
    (2.9) 
I use the standard assumption that the median voter is also the owner of the median value 
home for a given jurisdiction.  Thus, the median voter, facing a reduced price for public 
services provided by the local government, will prefer a higher share of public goods in 
her consumption bundle, the magnitude of the change being determined by the price 
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elasticity of demand for the public good.  This increase in G will require an increase in t.   
Note that the percentage change in the tax price depends on  , in particular it equals 
    .  
Second, local officials may raise property tax rates because a fiscal illusion effect 
hides the true level of taxation from the median voter.  Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal 
(1982)  develop this argument with a grant illusion model in which taxpayers have 
imperfect information regarding the true value of the transfers their government receives 
and officials exploit this ignorance to pursue a budget maximizing strategy.  In their 
model, local taxpayers base their voting behavior on perceived aid    and perceived 
government spending   , rather than the actual values, which are denoted A and G.  In 
their model Filimon et al. frame the relationship between real and perceived aid as a 
proportion determined by a fiscal illusion parameter    
               (2.10) 
The   term is a measure of the degree of fiscal illusion associated with 
intergovernmental transfers.  I deviate from their approach, in which government aid is a 
lump-sum transfer, by adapting it to the case of a state-funded homestead exemption.  In 
this case, the taxpayer will respond to a tax price based on her perception of the 
exemption amount.  I follow the notation of Filimon et al. by denoting the perceived 
exemption    as a share  of the true exemption.  
              (2.11) 
Substituting    into equation (9) results in a new tax price,   
  , that is less than     , for  
     
   
  
         
 
   (2.12) 
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For the case where     then the perceived post-exemption tax price,   
  , is 
equal to   , the true post-exemption price
 4
.   If    , the taxpayer will undervalue the 
homestead exemption,  allowing the government to increase G.  One possible cause for 
this form of fiscal illusion is if taxpayers are only attentive to the actual tax payment that 
they must make and ignore the property tax rate.  Officials could then raise the property 
tax rate when E is set without increasing the taxpayer‘s tax payment relative to the pre-
exemption levy, and thus capture the unobserved portion of E.   
At least two studies within the public choice literature find that taxpayers have 
imperfect information regarding the property tax.  In a survey of residents of three cities, 
Ordeshook (1979) found that citizens were significantly more accurate in estimating the 
amount they paid in property tax the previous year than the amount their tax bill would 
increase if their property tax rate increased by 5 mills.   Lankford (1986) found that 
taxpayers voting on a property tax referendum in one school district believed the tax cost 
of services were higher than the true cost¸ which may have induced them to oppose the 
referendum more than they would have in the absence of fiscal illusion.   
To see this how this type of fiscal illusion can be expressed in a model, consider 
the extreme case in which the taxpayer is completely unaware of the exemption, i.e., 
   .  In this case the taxpayer‘s perceived tax price for the publically provided good 
will be equal to the initial pre-exemption price    
 
    
    .  Thus, the median voter‘s 
preferred level of   will remain unchanged when E is set and the property tax bill for that 
                                                 
 
 
4
 For the sake of clarity in distinguishing among different perceived tax prices, I denote the perceived tax 
price with     as  
 
 
    
 and perceived tax prices at other levels of   similarly. 
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year will also remain constant.  The household‘s property tax base, however, has been 
reduced to     .  Given    , local officials can raise the tax rate from the original 
rate,  , to a higher rate,    , in order to maintain a constant tax levy, as depicted in 
equation (2.13).   
      
          (2.13) 
At this higher rate of    total revenue (15) will be the sum of the original property tax levy 
plus the revenue replacement grant     .  The entire grant would be dedicated to 
expanding public expenditures rather than replacing property tax revenue, as seen in 
(2.14). 
     
                 (2.14) 
Taxpayers‘ perceived level of spending,      , will remain at the initial pre-
exemption level of spending,   , because their perception is based on the actual property 
tax bill, which has remained unchanged
5
.  By rearranging terms of equation (2.13) it is 
possible to express the increase in the rate associated with the fiscal illusion effect, as 
seen in (2.15). 
 
  
 
 
  
      
   
 
      
     (2.15)  
I depict the two extreme scenarios of perfect information       and complete 
fiscal illusion       in Figure 2.1.  The initial public supply line is S1 as seen from the 
median voter‘s perception. S1 is horizontal given the constant marginal cost of the public 
expenditure function, reflecting that it costs the government one dollar of tax revenue to 
                                                 
 
 
5
 Within this framework taxpayers would not notice any increase in services associated with the higher true 
level of spending.   
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finance one dollar of public expenditures, and the median voter‘s tax share is constant.  
D1 is the median voter‘s initial demand for the level of public services.  At the initial pre-
exemption tax price    the median voter selects     as the preferred public supply.  With 
perfect information       the exemption causes the tax price to decline to   , reflecting 
that with the grant revenue the government can finance a dollar of expenditures with less 
than a dollar of tax revenue.  In this case the actual tax price is equal to the perceived tax 
price at full information       
 
    
 .  Voters, aware of the state subsidies to their 
consumption of public services, demand a new level of expenditures,    , which lies 
further along their initial demand curve, D1.  With full fiscal illusion,       , taxpayers 
believe that they bear the full cost of funding public expenditures and the perceived tax 
price therefore remains equal to the pre-exemption price       
 
    
 .  The government, 
however, is able to capture the grant and raise spending to   .  I depict the budget-
maximizing bureaucrat‘s behavior as an outward shift in the demand curve, with the 
bureau as an additional consumer of public spending.   
 
The graphical representation given in Figure 2.1 of the grant‘s effect allows for a 
refinement of the distinction between the rational price effect and the full flypaper effect.  
The segment AC represents the flypaper effect.  The extent to which    exceeds     
represents the spending in excess of what the median voter would have preferred to spend 
given full information of the true price       
 
    
  and given her income elasticity of 
demand for public consumption. This spending in excess of what would have been spent 
under full information is what I define as the net flypaper effect.  The difference between 
    and    represents the total spending captured by the government due to the median 
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voter‘s ignorance of the replacement grant.  This is equal to the sum of the rational price 
effect and the net flypaper effect.  
Figure 2.1 Fiscal Illusion Effect on Public Expenditures 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Fiscal Illusion Effect on Public Expenditures 
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Partial awareness of the grant results in a combination of both the price and fiscal 
illusion effects.  I depict this outcome in Figure 2.2.  The median voter perceives that the 
homestead exemption has lowered the price for public expenditures to   
 
      
 and, 
assuming that public services are normal, will demand an increased level of service along 
the original demand curve to    .  The full exemption has been granted, however, and the 
government‘s true cost of public expenditures remains   .  The government is able to 
capture the unobserved portion of the grant by raising the rate to     and achieve spending 
level   , where: 
      
               (2.16) 
The difference between    and    , or segment EG, represents the full flypaper 
effect, while the difference between    and    , or segment FG, is the net flypaper effect.  
To model how the flypaper effect is expressed through the tax rate in the partial illusion 
case, consider a hypothetical tax rate      that would fund     if applied to the unexempted 
tax base and to the replacement grant.  This would be the rate that produces the perceived 
level of revenue. 
      
                           (2.17) 
The taxpayers only recognize part of the exemption, but the government must still 
exempt the entire value of nE from the base.  It can choose    , however, such that the 
revenue derived from the true taxable base        is equal to the revenue that would be 
raised from the perceived base taxed at rate        This is depicted in (2.18) and is the same 
concept as given in (2.13) for the initial case of complete illusion. 
                             (2.18) 
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Rearranging the terms of (2.18) yields for any value of   the change in the tax rate 
a government could enact to capture the entire unperceived portion of the replacement 
grant.     
  
   
    
 
           
      
    
   
    
   (2.19) 
The ratio within the parentheses on the right-hand side of equation (2.19) compares the 
unobserved exemption to the taxable property base.  This ratio depicts the percentage 
increase in the property tax rate enacted by the public officials to capture the unobserved 
portion of the grant.  That term also describes the percentage increase in government 
expenditures caused by the fiscal illusion effect. 
Because the value of the exemption, E, is set at the state level and is uniform 
across jurisdictions, the exemption will exclude a larger proportion of assessed value in 
localities with lower property values.  While this means that the grant is progressively 
distributed, it also suggests that lower income jurisdictions may also be subject to a larger 
flypaper effect, given equal degrees of fiscal illusion     across all jurisdictions.   
The median voter price effect and the fiscal illusion effect both operate to place 
upward pressure on property tax rates and the level of local public expenditures.  These 
effects reduce the degree of tax relief achieved through a state-funded homestead 
exemption.   The objective of this study, however, is to evaluate whether this class of 
exemption effectively delivers tax relief.  While shifting the vertical alignment of the 
responsibility for generating revenues from local governments to the state can be a valid 
policy objective, the states that have implemented state-funded exemptions did so to 
relieve the property tax burden for the existing level of spending, not to subsidize further 
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public expenditures
67
.  If state funded exemptions fail to meet their intended policy 
objectives, then states may be better off pursing alternative relief programs
8
. 
Other Impacts of State Funded Exemptions on Fiscal Structure 
State funded exemptions may impact local fiscal structure in other ways.  Several 
authors have explored the determinants of the mix of revenues that local governments 
use, looking particularly at the factors which drive dependence on the property tax (e.g. 
Sjoquist  1981).  Hettich and Winer (1984) propose a political cost model which depends 
on the median voter to determine the preferred level of expenditures, but which leaves the 
choice of revenue structure to rational officials that seek to minimize the political and 
administrative costs associated with generating revenue.  Gade and Adkins (1990) apply 
this strategy in their analysis of state fiscal structures.  State-funded exemptions may 
change the political cost of generating revenue through the property tax and thus induce 
officials to alter the tax structure.   
The term ―revenue structure‖ conveys two meanings in a political cost model.  
First, it applies to the specific characteristics of each individual source, such as its yield, 
political visibility, and administrative costs.  Second, the tax structure refers to the 
                                                 
 
 
6
 In his 2001 State of the State address Governor Roy Barnes advocated for expansion of the HTRC, ―Last, 
but certaintly not least we must continue to cut the taxes that Georgians pay, by increasing the homestead 
exemption on homes and family farms.‖ (Barnes 2001)  The language Barnes uses emphases that the goal 
of the policy was to reduce actual property tax payments.   
7
 It has been suggested by a reviewer that the taxpayer may notice the additional state taxes that are 
required to cover the cost of the exemption.  I assume that this is not a significant factor for this analysis for 
a few reasons.  First, it would require a greater degree of price sensitivity to respond to a second-order price 
effect like this.  Second, the argument assumes that if the grant went away that state taxes would be reduced 
accordingly.  Rather, I assume that the grant is an allocation of state funds that would otherwise be spent on 
state programs or a different form of intergovernmental aid.     
8
 One alternative policy would have been to create a state income tax credit for property tax payments.  
This was proposed by Jerry Griffin, the executive of the Association of County Commissioners of Georgia.  
(Smith, 1999) 
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features of the overall system of different revenue sources.  This includes the economies 
of scale in administering a larger and more complex tax system.  It also refers to the 
cross-correlations in yield  of different revenue sources across macro-economic cycles 
that reduce the overall variability in total revenues (Misiolek and Perdue 1987b; White 
1983b). 
The cost minimization process that political officials pursue can be expressed in 
the following fashion: 
                            (2.20) 
               
 
   
   
where C is a cost function inclusive of all political and administrative costs associated 
with generating total revenue R.  The cost function is dependent upon the revenue shares 
obtained from each individual source   .  The X term is a vector of exogenous factors 
that will determine the political costs associated with a given tax structure.  Hettich and 
Winer (1984)  include in this term the size of the potential tax bases, the costs to 
taxpayers in organizing opposition to the tax regime and the scale of the public sector.   
Government officials pursue their cost minimization objective by adjusting the 
revenue shares until the marginal political cost of obtaining an additional dollar of 
revenue is equalized across all sources.  The optimal revenue shares are defined as those 
which minimize total political cost for a given level of total revenue.  Hettich and Winer 
do not specify an explicit cost function, but instead provide a reduced-form equation 
(2.21) in which the optimal shares, denoted with an asterisk, are influenced by the 
exogenous environmental factors.  The authors then proceed to develop several 
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hypotheses about the direction of the effect of the various elements of the vector X on the 
optimal tax structure. 
         
        (2.21) 
It may be useful to provide a graphical description for this optimization procedure 
and how it can relate theoretically to intergovernmental tax policy.  For the purposes of 
simplicity, define two revenue sources, the property tax (P) and an aggregate revenue 
source composed of all other taxes, charges and transfers (O).  Let the cost function C 
shown in equation (20) describe a cost curve for a given level of expenditures.  Following 
Hettich and Winer‘s hypotheses about political costs, the marginal costs associated with a 
given revenue source will increase as the proportion of revenues to the total revenue 
rises.  This assumption will give the isocost curves the necessary concave shape.   
The slope at any point along this curve represents the ratio of marginal political 
costs between the property tax (MCP) and the other revenues (MCO).  Define this ratio to 
be the Marginal Rate of Revenue Substitution. 
              (2.22) 
Now denote    and     as the tax prices for the two revenue sources.  These prices 
represent the amount of revenue that must be generated from a given source in order to 
fund an additional dollar of public expenditure.  In the absence of any matching 
intergovernmental grants , one dollar of tax revenue is necessary to fund one dollar of 
expenditure and thus the price ratio (     ) will equal unity.  The ratio of the revenue 
prices is the slope of the revenue isoquant for a given level of total revenue.  This revenue 
isoquant reflects the government‘s budget constraint in which all spending must be 
financed through the two sources.  To minimize the cost of financing a given level of 
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expenditures, the government will choose the revenue structure in which the MRRS is 
equal to the slope of the revenue price isoquant for the current level of total revenues (R).  
This structure is depicted in Figure 2.3 as tax structure        .  Note that political costs 
decrease as one moves toward the origin. 
Figure 2.3 Political Cost Minimization of the Tax Structure 
 
 
 
A state-funded homestead exemption will reduce the revenue price for the 
property tax because the replacement grant allows the government to obtain a dollar of 
revenue with less than a dollar of local taxation
9
.    To focus the analysis, I impose a 
                                                 
 
 
9
 It should be noted that this framework for analyzing the supply side of public revenues could be extended 
to policies that raise the revenue price.  One example would be revenue sharing policies in which the 
locality must rebate some revenues to the state for redistribution to less wealthy regions.  This model 
predicts that this would lead the locality to reduce its reliance on that source.  A question for future research 
that follows is whether governments that are subject to such price distortions have inefficiently designed 
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constraint that the overall level of revenues will remain constant and only the revenue 
structure will change.  The reduction in the property tax‘s revenue price will change the 
slope of the revenue isoquant to -     , where      . As a result of this change, local 
officials seeking to minimize political cost will rebalance their revenue portfolio.  From 
their local perspective, the impact of the grant is to reduce the amount of revenue that 
must be generated from local taxes to achieve a total revenue level of R.  This puts the 
government on a lower political cost curve.   
Figure 2.4.  Political Cost Minimization of the Tax Structure 
 
 
Figure 2.4 depicts the effect of the exemption on local officials‘ cost minimization 
strategy.  The government chooses revenue structure        , which is the new point of 
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tangency between the lower revenue isoquant and the political isocost curve.  The grant is 
the vertical distance between the two isorevenue lines.  At the original equilibrium, the 
grant would equal      .  But given that the state funded homestead exemption will 
change the political cost minimizing tax composition, the grant in the new equilibrium is 
     .  The effect of the homestead on the tax structure, therefore, is to increase the 
proportional use of the property tax. 
Note that total property taxes in the new equilibrium,   , are less than in the 
original equilibrium, P1.  (It is possible to draw the isocost lines such that the new 
equilibrium would result in higher property taxes than in the original equilibirum.)  
However, property taxes in the new equilibrium are greater than the property taxes that 
would have been paid if the grant had been just used to reduce property taxes.  In that 
case property taxes would have fallen to   , which is less than   .  
In sum, state-funded homestead exemptions create changes in local fiscal 
structures across two different dimensions: the level of revenues and the mix of revenue 
sources.  Both a median voter analysis and a political cost model predict that local 
governments will increase total expenditures and the property tax rate.  Property taxes 
may fall but not by the full amount of the grant calculated at the original property tax 
rate.  These effects would frustrate the intended purposes of providing tax relief that 
motivated states to adopt this type of program.  In the remainder of this paper I test 
empirically whether these predicted outcomes hold for the case of a state-funded 
homestead exemption in Georgia. 
 
 
 28 
Empirical Literature Review 
 
In this section I review several empirical papers that address how to measure the 
impact of state and federal policies similar to the state-funded homestead exemption on 
local fiscal behavior.   
Initial Empirical Studies 
Two early efforts examined the effects of a property tax circuit breaker in 
Michigan.  The state income tax credit offset a percent of property taxes that exceeded 
3.5% of personal income, up to a maximum credit of $1,200.  The percent of taxes offset 
by the credit (aij) was age dependent, with 100% being abated for the elderly and 60% for 
the rest of the population.    This lowers the marginal tax price of local services to (1-aij) 
for individuals paying above 3.5% of their personal income, up to the maximum credit 
level, after which the tax price returns to 1.   
Fisher and Rasche (1984) explore the incentive effects of property tax relief by 
measuring the degree to which the program reduced the marginal tax price.  As presented 
above, the marginal tax price for a given individual is (1-aij).  Using a 1% sample of all 
state income tax returns from 1976, 1977, and 1978, the authors computed an average 
marginal tax price by county and by income class weighted by the share of individuals in 
each group at each value of aij.  The statewide average reduction in the marginal tax price 
was 24%.  Fisher and Rasche argue that this large change in the marginal tax price 
creates the potential for a significant incentive for local governments to raise property 
taxes.  The effect on the level of the property tax is estimated analytically by reasoning 
that the new level of the property tax is determined by the percent change in the tax price 
and the price elasticity of demand for the property tax.   
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                    (2.24) 
 Where: 
   is the pre-credit level of the tax 
   is the post-credit level of the tax 
      is the percent change in the net tax price 
  is the price elasticity of demand for the property tax 
 
If C is the average amount of tax reduction from the credit, then the change in the level of 
the tax price can be described as: 
  
         
   
 
                  
   
                  (2.25) 
Because the amount of the credit is capped at $1,200, the value of C was found by Fisher 
and Rasche to be 0.9.  Using the calculated average change in the net tax price of 24% 
and test values for   of 0.5 and 0.25, the authors predict modest changes in the level of 
the property tax, ranging from a 1% increase to a 5% reduction.   
The Fisher and Rasche (1984) paper uses individual tax return data to look at how 
the Michigan circuit breaker changed the marginal tax price and created the incentive for 
potentially higher property taxes.  Their study does not, however, test their predictions by 
comparing the calculated average post-credit tax prices with actual property tax receipts.  
That next step is taken in a later paper by Fisher (1988) with the primary objective of 
testing for a tax price effect.  Fisher applies the median voter model to measure the effect 
of property tax relief on the indirect demand for local property taxes.  He models this 
demand as a function of per capita income, the tax price of services and a vector of 
environmental and other preference factors.  The effect of the credit is captured by using 
the average marginal tax price measure developed in the earlier Fisher and Rasche (1984) 
study.  The indirect demand function is expressed in log-linear form in equation (2.26). 
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                         (2.26) 
Where  
T t  =log of property tax in year t 
Yt   =log of per capita personal income in year T 
Pt   =log of marginal per capita property tax price 
Zjt  =log of a set of j taste and cost factors in year t 
    =the error term in year t 
Fisher differences equation (25) over time in order to focus the analysis on how 
the tax price effects the change in the property tax.  This comparison is made across two 
years of data, 1974 and 1976.  Although there was some amount of credit offered in 
1975, the magnitude of the credit was increased significantly in 1976 and remained 
afterwards at that higher level.  By comparing these two years, Fisher argues that he 
captures the effect of the full credit as it was ultimately implemented. Doing so also 
removes any community-specific fixed effects that would influence property taxes.  This 
form is expressed by (27) 
                                                        (2.27) 
The cost and preference factors are implemented by using the annual number of students 
enrolled in public schools within the county and county population.       
In order to provide a counterfactual for estimating the impact of the homestead 
credit, Fisher estimates a model of the predictors for the average county marginal tax 
price for three years after the credit had been implemented (1976, 1977, 1978) and then 
uses the resulting specification to forecast what the tax price would have been in each 
locality in 1974.  The resulting prediction of the 1974 tax price is then used in the 
property tax demand function to calculate the predicted property tax level for 1974.  This 
allows Fisher to estimate the differential change in the property tax from 1974 to 1976 
due to the adoption of the tax credit.   
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Fisher estimates that the credit increased local property taxes between 1 and 8 
percent.  This finding suggests that a portion of the tax relief the credit offered was 
transferred to higher levels of local public spending.  In terms of how the credit 
influenced the incidence of the property tax, Fisher argues that ―residential taxpayers who 
did not receive a credit and nonresidential (except agricultural) property owners‖ 
experienced an increase in their share of the burden.  This redistribution effect would also 
apply to state-funded homestead exemptions in states that apply uniform tax rates across 
all classes of property within a given jurisdiction.  This point is reiterated indirectly by 
Eom and Rubenstein (2006) who note that the New York state-funded property tax 
exemption will cause ―no change in the incidence of property tax in a school district, 
assuming tax rates stay the same.‖  By that logic, there will be a shift in burden towards 
property classes not eligible for the exemption if localities respond to state tax relief 
policies by raising their millage rates.     
New York School Tax Relief Program (STAR)  
The New York School Tax Relief Program (STAR) has been the subject of a 
series of papers that examine its impact on the level of property taxation and that have 
also focused on the impact of intergovernmental aid on the efficiency of local service 
production.  These papers are of key interest because the STAR program is structured as 
a state-funded homestead exemption and the methods applied previously to measure its 
impact can be instructive to this and future studies.  
In one of the earliest studies of the impact of STAR on local taxation policy, 
Duncome and Yinger (2001) focus on the distribution of reimbursement grants across 
jurisdictions by property value.  A distinguishing feature of the STAR program is its 
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―sales price differential factor‖, which gives high-property value jurisdictions higher 
exemption amounts per household.  Duncombe and Yinger compare the distribution of 
benefits from the exemption with a power equalization grant
10
 by simulating the grants 
that school districts would receive under each program.  A standard homestead 
exemption with uniform exemption amounts across the state has the potential for 
increasing the progressivity of the property tax.  Duncombe and Yinger found, however, 
that the sales price differential factor in the STAR program increased the regressivity of 
property taxes across New York school districts by targeting aid to wealthier school 
districts. 
Eom, Duncombe and Yinger‘s (2005) paper also explores the impact of the STAR 
on local governments, with the specific objective of measuring the program‘s effect on 
the efficiency of local service production.  The authors test an earlier hypothesis posited 
by Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1997) that state aid, by lowering the tax price of 
services, reduces local taxpayers‘ incentive to monitor the efficiency of local service 
production.  Eom et al. test this hypothesis by measuring the degree to which the STAR 
program‘s effect on the tax price impacted two measures of efficiency for local school 
districts.  In the course of developing their theoretical model they also model the 
relationship between the tax price and the property tax rate.  They employ a 2SLS panel 
data model to estimate the determinants of district expenditures per pupil, treating the 
determinants of production cost as endogenous variables.  Using the results of their 
estimates for the impact of the STAR tax price on school efficiency, they perform 
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 A power equalization grant provides each school district with a minimum tax base per-pupil.  The state 
sets a minimum tax base per pupil These grants lower the tax price of services.  
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simulations to obtain a measure of how much the tax price influenced the property tax 
rate.  These simulated results indicate that the STAR program resulted in an increase in 
the property tax rate of approximately 21.33% for the average county in New York.  This 
result is interesting for this analysis because increasing the rate in response to a tax relief 
program confounds the goal of lowering the property tax burden.   
One empirical challenge that Eom et al. faced was that the estimates of the cost 
drivers were statistically insignificant in the fixed effects version of their model.  Because 
these cost terms were necessary for the estimation of their demand equation, they re-
estimated the model using random effects.  While this approach yielded statistically 
significant estimates for the cost drivers, a Hausman specification test for fixed vs. 
random effects rejected the random effects model.  This indicates that there is a 
statistically-significant degree of correlation between the jurisdiction-level random 
effects and the other regressors, potentially leading to inconsistency of the estimates.   
In a subsequent paper, Eom and Rubenstein (2006) return to the issue of 
estimating the effects of the STAR program on school efficiency, but in this paper they 
employ the data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique to estimate the determinants of 
school efficiency, rather than the 2SLS panel regression approach used in the earlier 
paper by Eom, Duncombe and Yinger (2005).  This DEA technique allowed them to 
obtain a direct measure of elasticity and so they did not need to estimate the STAR 
program‘s effect on the rate of the tax or on the level of property taxation.   
The takeaway from these papers is that there hasn‘t been a reliable estimate of the 
tax price elasticity of a state funded homestead exemption in any of the papers evaluating 
the STAR program.   
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Tax Rate Analysis 
The property tax rate has been another focus in the study of how 
intergovernmental policies influence local fiscal behavior.  One paper of particular 
interest is Holtz-Eaken and Rosen‘s (1990) investigation into the mechanism through 
which local governments respond to the federal income tax deduction for property taxes.  
Specifically, they ask whether governments respond to deductibility by changing the tax 
rate.  The authors develop a model with two types of actors: voters which maximize 
utility through consumption of private goods and public services and elected officials 
which set the property tax rates to maximize their expected votes.  Their analysis gives 
evidence that federal deductions for property tax payments reduce the average tax price 
and result in increases to the average property tax rate, property tax revenues and local 
spending on public services.  They achieve this result using a model of rate determination 
in which the property tax rate is a function of the average tax price in the jurisdiction, 
individual income, population, federal grants and other environmental factors.  The tax 
price parameter controls for the effect of the federal income tax deduction for property 
taxes.  This function is displayed below in equation (2.28). 
                                                
 
           (2.28) 
 Where: 
 is the effective tax rate 
P is the tax price 
Y is income per capita 
G is external government aid 
N is population 
X is a vector of j environmental controls 
c represents communities 
t represents time periods 
   is a vector of fixed community-specific effects 
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Holtz-Eaken and Rosen difference (2.28) across time in order to estimate the 
effect of changes in the tax price variable on changes in the property tax rate.  This 
approach has the benefit of eliminating the community-specific fixed effects.  It also 
focuses the analysis on community-level responses to changes in the tax price rather than 
cross-sectional differences in price and rate.   
The authors obtain an estimate for the price elasticity of -2.67 which they convert 
to the average change in the millage rate associated with federal deductibility.  They do 
this by taking the mean change in the tax price due to federal deductibility, -7.9%, and 
multiplying it by their elasticity estimate to obtain the average percent increase in the 
property tax rate: 21.1%.  This translates to a 7.15 mill increase in the average property 
tax rate associated with the federal deductibility of property taxes.   
An earlier analysis of how property tax rates can be affected by intergovernmental 
fiscal policies is found in Strauss‘ (1974) study of federal block grants.  In that study, 
Strauss develops a system of equations to model simultaneously the grants‘ effects on 
local expenditures and property tax rates.  The structural forms of these equations are 
given in (2.29) and (2.30). 
    
                                         (2.29) 
                    (2.30) 
Where: 
   gives localities 
   gives time periods 
    is Expenditure demand 
Y is income 
P is population  
Trans is block grant revenue 
   is the property tax rate 
W is the property tax base 
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R is total local revenue 
Strauss‘s model does not explicitly reference the political processes that guide 
public a 
llocation decisions.  His paper was published just one year after Bergstrom and 
Goodman‘s (1973) development of the empirical median voter model.    Consequently, 
the concept of a tax price and an analysis of how block grants affect the demand price of 
public goods are not expressed in Strauss‘ equations.   The value of the transfers instead 
appears in the equations directly.     
Strauss obtains the reduced form versions of the structural equations and 
estimates the tax rate model using OLS and the expenditure demand equation using a 
non-linear Gaussian method.  The data used for his analysis consist of a one-year cross-
section of Wisconsin counties.  His results therefore emphasize inter-jurisdictional 
differences rather than within district responses to changes in intergovernmental aid.  
Strauss estimates that a 1-percent increase in the block transfers were associated with a 
0.06% to 0.32% increase in the property tax rate and a 0.55% to 0.82% increase in overall 
local expenditures.   
Revenue Structure Effects 
 
In addition to affecting the level and the rate of the property tax, 
intergovernmental aid programs can also influence the mix of revenue sources in the 
local fiscal structure.  The determinants of local revenue structure have been a topic of 
public finance research for several years (see for example Hettich and Winer‘s (1984) 
application of the political cost model and Sjoquist‘s (1981) use of the median voter 
model).  While the focus of this study is to determine whether tax relief policies had an 
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impact on the level of the tax, accounting for changes in the revenue structure becomes a 
concern if the endogenous relationship between total receipts and tax structure biases 
measures of the level effect.  Unfortunately, there have been no studies to my knowledge 
that have examined local fiscal behavior using a simultaneous model that captured how 
both the level and the mix of revenues were affected by state or federal tax policies.  Both 
Sjoquist (1981) and Hettich and Winer (1984) make the simplifying assumption of fixed 
revenue levels in their studies of revenue structure.  Conversely, existing studies of how 
the level and rate of the property tax are influenced by state and federal policies do not 
control for revenue mix effects.  For example, Eom and Rubenstein‘s (2006) study of the 
New York STAR program is based on an explicit assumption of fixed revenue shares. 
Gade and Adkins (1990) examines the impact of federal income tax deductibility 
rules for state revenue structures by employing a system of equations that allow both the 
level and the mix of revenue to be affected.  They apply Hettich and Weiner‘s (1984) 
framework by using a political cost model to understand the determinants of the mix of 
revenues used in state tax structures and a median voter model to determine the level of 
total state taxation.  This framework is implemented in their study by specifying a system 
of seven equations with six of them each modeling the determinants of the share of state 
revenue obtained from a given source and the seventh modeling the determinants of total 
state receipts. 
The revenue share equations are derived from a political cost framework in which 
the local officials seek to minimize the cost of generating revenue.  Gade and Adkins 
predict that tax exportation capacity, vertical fiscal balance and the manufacturing and 
mining sectors of the economy would be key environmental factors that would impact the 
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political cost of local revenues.  They argued that the share of manufacturing activity and 
the share of natural resource extraction in the state economy both have a positive 
relationship to the state‘s ability to export taxes to non-residents.  States with significant 
tourism industries were also predicted by the authors to have a greater capacity to export 
sales and excises taxes and would therefore rely on them more heavily.   
They test their hypotheses on the impact of federal income tax deductibility by 
creating tax prices for state income, sales and motor fuels taxes and including these prices 
in the revenue share equations.  These tax prices consist of weights for the state-average 
marginal federal income tax rate that are based on the ratio of the total state deductions 
for state-income, sales and motor fuels taxes relative to the ACIR estimates of state-
capacity for each of those revenue sources.  The authors use these weights as a measure 
of the relative cost of using each revenue source and should therefore perform in the 
estimating equations as a measure of the tax price.  In addition, each revenue share 
equation also includes the total per-capita state revenue as an endogenous variable which 
is intended to capture the effect of the scale of the public sector on the revenue structure.   
 The seventh equation uses per-capita revenue as the dependent variable and 
includes the tax shares from the revenue categories as endogenous variables.  The authors 
use median household income and real dollar federal aid per family as instrumental 
variables to measure the median voter‘s preferences.   Interestingly, they do not include 
their tax price variables in the second equation for the scale of the public sector.  They 
were therefore unable to comment on the impact of their price terms on the level of state 
spending.  The full system of equations used by Gade and Adkins is displayed below in 
(2.31) and (2.32). 
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Revenue Share Equations        (2.31) 
i=1…50 states 
t=1…5 years 
                                
                                
                                   
                                 
                                
                           
   
Each dependent variable is the share of total state revenues derived from that source. 
X is a vector of the following:  
 manufacturing added value share 
 mining added value share 
 tax price of state income tax 
 tax price of state general sales tax 
 tax price of state motor fuels tax 
 ratio of state share of national retail sales to state share of national 
population 
 state share of total state and local revenue 
TX is total revenue per capita in the state i in year t 
 
 
 
 
Total Revenue Level Equation       (2.32) 
                               
Where: 
 Y is a vector of 5 of the 6 revenue shares (Other omitted) 
INC =median family income 
Z=Real federal aid to state government per family 
 
The authors estimate this system using 3SLS.  They obtain statistically significant 
price elasticities and cross-price elasticities with respect to the set of revenue sources and 
found results that met their expectations of revenue substitution.  They find an own-price 
elasticity for the share of state income tax funds of  -1.131 and cross-price share 
elasticities with general sales and motor fuels of 0.613 and 0.209, respectively.  These 
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findings depict a pattern of significant revenue substitution of sales taxes in place of state 
income taxes as a result of federal deductibility.   
The empirical approach applied by Gade and Adkins to study state tax structures 
could be applied to local governments for the purpose of analyzing the impact of state-
level policies.  At this point, no other author has attempted to perform a simultaneous 
approach to examining the impact of property tax relief programs on both the level and 
the mix of local revenues.  One issue with that methodology, however, is that the level 
equation estimates the impact on total local revenues, rather revenues derived from a 
single source.  That distinction makes Gade and Adkins‘ approach less precise for 
determining whether tax relief policies had an unintended effect on the level of property 
taxes.   
The Georgia Homeowner’s Tax Relief Credit 
 
Georgia adopted The Homeowner‘s Tax Relief Credit (HTRC) in 1999 as a 
means of reducing the burden of property taxes on homeowners.  At the time, the state 
government was experiencing a budget surplus due to rising assessed property values 
and, subsequently, property tax payments.  Governor Roy Barnes supported the creation 
of a state funded homestead exemption to transfer surplus state funds to local 
governments to offset rising property taxes (Tilley 1999). 
The Homeowner‘s Tax Relief Credit exempts a fixed amount of the assessed 
value of qualified owner-occupied residential property from local property taxes.  
Homeowners receive a credit on their property tax bill equal to the property tax rate times 
the homestead exemption.  The size of the homestead exemption is specified annually in 
the General Appropriations Act for the state budget.  At the time of its initial enactment, 
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the grant provided a tax credit equal to the reduction in taxes from an exemption of 
$2,000 for each eligible homestead.   The size of the funded exemption has been 
regularly changed and was set in 2008 at a value of $8,000 per homestead.  In 2009, due 
a state budget shortfall the grant was eliminated.   
Several other features of the way the property tax is administered in Georgia 
affect the administration of the HTRC.  Local governments in Georgia apply a 40% 
assessment ratio.  This makes an $8,000 property exemption against assessed value 
equivalent to an exemption of $20,000 of the property‘s market value.  The credit is non-
refundable; that is, the credit cannot exceed the tax liability after all other homestead 
exemptions have been accounted for. 
Table 2.2  History of HTRC Exemptions and Appropriations
11
 
Year Statutory Exemption 
Value  
State Appropriation 
for HTRC Grants (in 
millions)   
2007 $8,000 $432.3 
2006 $10,000 ($12,750
12
) $567.7 
2005 $10,000 $432.3 
2004 $10,000 $380 
2003 $10,000 $380 
2002 $8,000 $353 
2001 $6,000 $249 
2000 $4,000 $166 
1999 $2,000 $83 
 
                                                 
 
 
11
 See Georgia Law 2000 pp. 323, 1769; Georgia Law 2001 pp. 661; Georgia Law 2002 pp. 709; Georgia 
Law 2003 pp. 748; Georgia Law 2004 pp. 1028; Georgia Law 2005 pp. 1400; Georgia Law 2006 pp. 145; 
Georgia Law 2007 HB 95 made an Act pp. 223 
12
 Amended.  The FY 06 allowable exemption was initially set at $10,000 and the appropriation was 
$432,209,501. It was subsequently amended to provide a one-time increase to the exemption in order to 
return surplus FY07 funds to taxpayers.  See amendment to Appropriations in HB 94.  Ga. Law 2007 pp. 
119 
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 Table 2.2 presents a history of the allowable exemption amounts and the annual 
state appropriation for funding the grant.  Initially, the grants only funded exemptions for 
county and school governments, but in 2002 the HTRC was amended to cover municipal 
property taxes .   
The exemption is administered by local governments.  The statements mailed to 
each homeowner indicates the amount of tax savings they receive through the HTRC 
program.  The state provides a grant to each jurisdiction to offset the revenue local 
governments forgo as a consequence of providing the exemption.     
Consider the following example for a homestead with a market value of $250,000.  
Because of the 40% assessment ratio, its assessed value would be $100,000.  If in 2008 
the home was located in unincorporated Cobb County, Georgia, it was taxed by the 
county at a rate of 6.82 mills and by the school district at a rate of 18.9 mills.  Cobb 
County provides its own standard exemption of $10,000 against both county and school 
district property taxes.  This reduces the taxable value to $90,000.  Therefore, the initial 
combined property tax liability before the HTRC is applied is $2,314.80.  In 2008 the 
State of Georgia set the allowable HTRC exemption at $8,000.  The homeowner would 
get credits of $54.56 for county taxes and $151.20 for school taxes for a total credit of 
$205.76
13
.  The credit has the same effect as a $8,000 homestead exemption, which 
would reduce the taxable value of the property to $82,000 and lower the total tax 
payment to $2,109.04, a reduction of $205.76.  The HTRC law requires that the state 
provide a grant to the local government equal to the revenue lost from the credit.  If there 
                                                 
 
 
13
 Credit = (.00682 + .0189)*($8,000)=$205.76 
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were 5,000 properties in that county that received the credit then the grant from the state 
would be equal to $1,028,800.  This grant would be allocated across the county 
government and the school district in proportion to their millage rates. 
Preliminary Investigation of the HTRC Program 
 
The theoretical models predict that a state-funded homestead exemption will 
induce substitution effects that increase the property tax rate and the level of property 
taxation.  A graphical examination of trends in average property tax rates and per-capita 
property tax receipts across Georgia counties suggests that the HTRC may have had such 
an impact.  Figures 2.5 and 2.6 compare the allowable state funded exemption with the 
aggregate
14
 property tax rates in Georgia counties.  Figure 2.5 presents the average 
aggregate county millage rates for all counties from 1990 through 2007.  Figure 2.6 
breaks the millage rates into quartiles that are recomputed annually.  Figure 2.5 shows an 
overall trend in which average millage rates increased during the early 1990‘s and then 
leveled off around the middle of the decade.  Then in 2000, a year after the HTRC was 
first implemented, average rates began to climb again.  Figure 2.6 shows the overall 
pattern of rising average millage rates is present across all millage rate quartiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
14
 For the purposes of this example, these rates are the combined rates levied by the county governments, 
the school districts and any special purpose service districts, but exclude municipal tax rates. 
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Figure 2.5
15
 
 
 
Figure 2.6
16
 
 
                                                 
 
 
15
 Source: Georgia Department of Revenue 
16
 Ibid. 
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Figure 2.7 depicts the trend in property tax revenues per capita, net of the HTRC 
credit, between 1990 and 2007.  This figure is based on a subset of 156
17
 out of the 159 
counties in Georgia.  The amounts have been converted to real dollars using the Southern 
urban consumption CPI from the BLS.  This period exhibits an overall upward trend in 
per capita property taxes, but the rate of growth increases in the years following the 
introduction of the HTRC.  This finding is interesting because, while the predicted effect 
of a state-funded homestead exemption is upward pressure on the property tax rates, the 
effect on gross property tax receipts, net of the credit, is ambiguous.  The substitution 
effects should unambiguously raise the combined revenue from the property tax plus the 
replacement grant, but it would be a sign of a large combined effect for property tax 
receipts alone to increase as a result of the grant.  For property tax revenue alone to rise 
as a result of the HTRC the effect would have to more than compensate for the property 
tax revenue lost due to the exemption.   
Figure 2.8 shows that the share of total revenues derived from the property tax 
declined from 1991 through 1998 .  This trend appears to halt in 1999 and from that point 
the property tax share even exhibits some slight gains.  This is consistent with the 
prediction made by the graphical analysis shown in Figure 2.4 and its corresponding 
discussion.  The property tax revenue share would be expected to increase following the 
implementation of the grant program. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
17
 The consolidated city-county governments of Clarke/Athens, Richmond/Augusta and 
Cusetta/Chattahoochee were not included in this table due to limited availability of their property tax data.   
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Figure 2.7
18
 
 
 
Figure 2.8.
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18
 Georgia Department of Community Affairs.  Report on Local Government Finance 
19
 Ibid. 
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The graphical analyses suggest that the HTRC may have increased both property 
taxes and millage rates .   the share of revenue derived from the property tax rose 
modestly when the HTRC was implemented.  This initial look at the data, however, does 
not control for other factors that could also influence revenue patterns over this period.  
The preliminary evidence warrants further investigation with more sophisticated models 
and methods.  
Empirical Strategies 
 
My research objective is to evaluate degree of tax relief provided by a state-
funded homestead exemption.  If the sum of property tax revenue and the replacement 
grant is greater than the level of property tax revenue that would be collected if the grant 
did not exist then that is evidence that some of the grant is being used to increase local 
spending.  Another indication that the HTRC is increasing local revenue is local officials 
respond to it by increasing their property tax rates.  I confine this empirical exercise to 
testing for an impact on the level of property revenues and on the property tax rate.  I do 
not consider the possible effect on non-property tax revenue. 
One of the challenges of evaluating the effect of a state-funded homestead 
exemption is the difficulty in using tax price elasticity estimates to assess the effect of the 
grant on the level of property taxes.  If property taxes are determined by the median voter 
and voter behavior is based on the tax price given by 
       
 
, then the coefficient on the 
tax price can be used to measure the effect of the HTRC program on property taxes.  
However, our supposition is that the effect of the HTRC program on property taxes may 
not conform to the theory as described. 
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The grant affects property tax receipts in two ways: by changing the median 
voter‘s tax price, and thus inducing a price substitution effect, and by shrinking the 
taxable base through the exemption.  Observe Figure 2.9 in which I depict three potential 
outcomes of a state-funded homestead exemption.  The top row contains pie charts which 
illustrate the taxable share of the property tax base, the middle row indicates the tax rate 
and the third row depicts the combined revenue from the property tax and the 
replacement grant.  The first column, A, depicts the pre-exemption situation in which the 
entire property base is taxed at an initial rate denoted as   .  Column B depicts the 
politically intended outcome from the exemption in which the rate remains at    and total 
revenue remains constant, with the funds from the grant merely replacing a share of the 
local revenue.  Total combined revenue from the tax and the replacement grant remains 
equal to the initial property levy depicted in Column A.  The bar graph in the 3
rd
 row of 
Column B shows that the property tax exemption reduces the property tax dollar for 
dollar of the grant.  In this case, the tax price elasticity with respect to the property tax 
grant program would be zero.   
 
Column C depicts a degree of price substitution, but the increase in the tax rate 
from    to     is small enough that the locally-obtained property tax revenue remains less 
than the original level depicted in A.  Combined revenue from the tax and the 
replacement grant does, however, exceed the initial level of revenue in Columns A and B.   
The tax price-revenue elasticity would also be positive in this case, the substitution effect 
being overwhelmed by the revenue loss from the exemption.  Only in Column D, in 
which the tax rate,     , becomes high enough to make the level of property tax revenues 
derived from the smaller base exceed even the initial property tax levy, would the 
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exemption price-revenue elasticity be expected to show the negative sign that is 
consistent with predictions from the median voter model of tax demand.  
Figure 2.9.  Mechanics of the Homeowner's Tax Relief Credit 
 
 
This line of argument suggests two alternative empirical approaches.  The first 
would be to use the sum of property tax receipts and the replacement grant as the 
dependent variable and estimate the combined revenue-price elasticity.  The second 
would be to use the tax rate as the dependent variable in order to measure the change in 
the rate in response to changes in the tax price.  I shall employ both approaches.  They are 
developed in the remainder of this section.   
Approach I: Sum of Property Taxes and Replacement Grant Per Capita 
My first empirical approach employs the sum of property taxes and the 
replacement grant revenue as the dependent variable.  I estimate several variants of 
different models with this structure in order to explore the sensitivity of my findings to 
 
Base 
Rate 
Revenue 
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the model design.  I begin with an estimation strategy similar to that taken by Fisher 
(1988), but with some adjustments to reflect the longer time period spanned by my data.   
Following Fisher, I model the demand for local revenue as a function of personal 
income, the local tax price and other environmental taste parameters.  The demand for 
property tax revenue is derived from the public‘s demand for public and private goods, 
depicted in (1), and is expressed as equation (2.33).  The null hypothesis for this analysis 
is that local governments do not change their fiscal behavior in response to the tax relief 
program.  That is the outcome described by Column B in Figure 8 in which the tax rate 
remains at    and total revenues remain at the pre-exemption level.  If that were the case 
then the exemption tax price would not have a significant association with the dependent 
variable because the replacement grant is merely replacing property tax receipts without a 
net impact on total revenue.  On the other hand, if there is a tax price substitution effect 
that foils the revenue-neutral intent of the policy, then it would be expected that the 
exemption price elasticity with respect to the sum of property tax revenue and the 
replacement grant would be negative.  However, the coefficient on tax price could be 
negative because of variation in 
     
 
 and have the same value if tax price is measured as 
       
 
. 
Expressing the demand for combined property and replacement grant revenue as a 
log-linear relationship yields equation (2.33).   
                                  (2.33) 
Where  
    =log of the sum of property tax and replacement 
grant revenue per capita for county    in year   
Yit = log of per capita personal income for county   
in year   
Pit = log of tax price in county     in year   
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Zjt = set of j taste and cost factors for county   in 
year   
     an error term more clearly defined as: 
             
 
I operationalize the tax price using the perfect-information median voter approach 
discussed in the previous sections.  I test three different versions of the tax price (   ) and 
compare their impacts on combined revenues per capita.   
In the first version I use the general tax price with no control for the state-funded 
homestead exemption, following the structure given in equation (2.5):  
    
   
   
   
             (2.34) 
 Where: 
   
  is the General Tax Share 
  it is the value of the median value home for county 
i in year t 
Vit is the total assessed property value for county in 
year t 
 
In the second specification I introduce the effect of the homestead exemption 
using the same tax price form given in equation (2.9).  This specification uses one price 
variable that combines the effect of the HTRC exemption and other changes to the tax 
price driven by economic conditions.   
    
    
      
   
      (2.35) 
 Where: 
   
   is the Post-Exemption Tax Share 
Et is the allowable state-funded exemption per 
household in year t 
 
Because the value of the allowable exemption changes several times over the period of 
analysis, the value of the tax price varies both within cross-sections across counties and 
within individual counties over time.  To illustrate the impact of the exemption on the tax 
price, Figure 2.10 compares the general tax share with the post-exemption tax share for 
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the year 2005.  These tax shares are graphed against the log of county income per capita.  
In this year the size of the state-funded homestead exemption was $10,000.  In this figure 
I observe that the effect of the exemption was to generally reduce the tax share, with the 
largest changes in tax price occurring among the lowest income counties.   
Figure 2.10 Graph of Tax Share against Log of Per Capita Income 
 
 
The third specification includes two measures of the tax price so that the effect of 
the homestead exemption on combined revenues is estimated separately from the effect 
of other economic factors which would alter the tax price.  The new measure of the 
HTRC program‘s effect, rather than being structured as a tax price, is the percent change 
in the median voter‘s tax share caused by the homestead exemption.  This term is 
structured by taking the ratio of the median voter‘s allowable exemption (which is the 
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same amount for all taxpayers in year t) with the tax base and dividing that by the median 
voter‘s tax share.     
      
 
      
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
  
   
    (2.36) 
The coefficient on this term should measure the effect of a percent reduction in 
the median voter‘s tax share due to the homestead exemption on dependent variable. 
I test several specifications of (2.33) in order to compare their goodness-of-fit to 
the data.  These specifications vary in form that P takes and the approaches used to 
control for confounding factors. Using multiple approaches to testing the model reveals 
how sensitive the results are to the features of a given specification.  I conduct the first set 
of estimates of (2.34) using a fixed-effect panel regression model and with county-level 
clustered standard errors.  I test this model using each of the three price structures 
separately.   
 
For my second set of specifications I difference equation (2.34) over time by one 
year.  This approach highlights the effect of within-county changes in the tax price on 
changes in combined property-tax and replacement grant revenue.  The structure of these 
specifications is shown by equation (2.37).  I test each of the three price variable 
structures using this differenced approach.  I estimate these equations using clustered-
standard errors regression.  
                                     (2.37) 
 
The third approach that I take abandons the tax price variables and replaces them 
with the actual replacement grant revenue received through the HTRC program on a per-
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capita basis.  This approach tests for a significant relationship between a dollar of grant 
revenue per-capita and a dollar of combined property tax and replacement grant revenue.  
If, as the null hypothesis maintains, there is no price effect then the replacement grant 
revenue would replace property tax receipts on a dollar-per-dollar basis and there should 
not be a significant relationship between grant receipts and combined revenue.  On the 
other hand, a positive significant relationship between the two would be consistent with a 
price effect.   
Unfortunately, using the revenue from the grant as an explanatory variable is 
problematic because it is endogenous with the dependent variable.  Both the level of 
revenue from the property tax and the size of the replacement grant are determined in part 
by the jurisdiction‘s property tax rate.  The simultaneous determination of the two 
variables would cause the value of the grant to be correlated with the error term in the 
estimating equation.  Because of this relationship between the two variables I present an 
additional model which instruments for the amount of the grant by replacing it with what 
the grant would have been if the prior year‘s millage rate had been maintained at the 
same level.  This gives a measure of what the grant would have been if the rate were not 
changed in response to the current year‘s homestead exemption.   
The next set of equations combines the second and third approaches by using the 
instrument for the size of the grant in a differenced model design.  This model highlights 
how changes in the level of the predicted grant are associated with changes in combined 
property tax and replacement grant revenue. 
The final set of equations abandons the median voter approach and examines how 
the HTRC program changes the total taxable value in the jurisdiction.  Instead of the 
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median voter‘s tax price, this set of equations uses the ratio of the net taxable property 
base to the gross property tax base, depicted in equation (2.38).  Although this empirical 
approach lacks the theoretical connection between the median voter‘s preferences and the 
public choice mechanism, it reflects the magnitude of the overall exemption relative to 
the tax base.   
    
    
       
   
      (2.38) 
  Approach II: Property Tax Rate  
The second approach I take to measure the impact of the state-funded exemption 
uses the millage rate as the dependent variable.  Following the approach used by Holtz-
Eaken and Rosen (1990), this strategy will seek to measure the substitution effect directly 
on the chief policy instrument that local officials use to control the size of the property 
levy
20
.  An increase in the property tax rate in response to the exemption would be the 
predicted local response if the replacement grant is used to raise local expenditures as 
opposed to reducing the property tax burden.  This strategy shares with Approach I the 
strength that measurements of changes to the rate in response to the exemption would not 
be confounded by reductions to the tax base.  Referring back to Figure 8, the tax price 
coefficient for the millage rate regressions would be expected to be statistically 
insignificant if Column B were the case and negative for the cases of C and D.  Similarly, 
                                                 
 
 
20
 There is the potential for officials to change assessment practices to capture the grant, 
but because the level of the exemption was changed on almost an annual basis over this 
period it is unlikely that local officials would have employed that strategy.   
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the expected coefficient of the      variable would be positive if there is a significant 
substitution effect.   
I follow Holtz-Eaken and Rosen‘s (1990) empirical approach in which the tax rate 
is a function of personal income, the tax price, population, other intergovernmental aid 
and other environmental controls.  I also difference the data across time in order to 
eliminate the effect of fixed county-level factors that would influence the rate and to 
focus the analysis on the determinants of changes in the millage rate over time.  The 
equation for the tax rate in levels is given in (2.39) and the differenced model that will be 
estimated is given in (2.40).   I employ the same structures for the tax price as I presented 
for Approach I.   
  
                                 (2.39) 
Where  
     = log of the property tax milllage rate for county    in year   
Yit  = log of per capita personal income for county   in year   
Pit  = log of tax price in county     in year   
Zjt  = set of j taste and cost factors for county   in year   
   = the error term in year   
and             
 
                                       (2.40) 
I estimate equation (2.40) using a clustered standard error panel regression model.   
Data 
I perform this analysis using data on Georgia county governments.  All data used 
are taken at the county level.  The property tax revenue data for the dependent variables 
come from the Report on Local Government Finances collected by the Georgia 
Department of Community Affairs. This is an annual report completed by local 
governments in Georgia that collects detailed information on revenues and expenditure 
 57 
data.  I also rely on tax digest data collected from the Georgia Department of Revenue. 
Economic indicators on the components of the local economy come from the Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  County level 
personal income comes from the Bureau of Economic Accounts Local Area Personal 
Income tables.  Of the 159 counties in Georgia, I possess complete data for 137 counties 
over the 12-year period of 1996 to 2007 and adequate partial data for another 21 counties.  
The one county I have excluded is the consolidated city-county government of Cusseta-
Chattahoochee which did not participate in the RLGF survey until 2004. 
I follow the standard assumption that the median voter in a given locality also 
owns the median value home.  By using the median home value in the various tax price 
equations I have presented, my estimates represent the median voter‘s tax price.  Median 
home value at the county level is not readily available except for the decennial census 
year.  I approximate median home values for the rest of my panel by weighting the 2000 
median home value from the US Census by annual growth in the residential tax base, per 
capita.  This value is used as the     term in each of the tax price specifications. 
I use several measures of the environmental and demographic characteristics that 
control for other determinants of the indirect demand for property taxes.  I include 
population density as a measure of demand under the expectation that more concentrated 
populations will have a higher per-capita demand for public services.  Population is also 
included in the equation as a control for scale effects on cost of public services.  I also 
control for the share of county wages derived from agriculture and from the service sector 
in order to measure any impact that the local economy would have on fiscal structure.  To 
control for other county-level features of the tax structure on the level of property tax I 
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include measures of transfer revenue from the state and national government and the 
value of other property tax exemptions provided by the state and local government.  I also 
include the aggregate rate for the county sales tax.  This rate is the sum of all local-option 
type sales taxes that voters in the county have approved at that time.  Counties adding 
local option sales taxes in Georgia for certain purposes have been required to offset the 
additional sales tax revenue with reductions in property tax levies.  Measuring the 
aggregate sales tax rate is a means of controlling for this behavior.  I also include the 
share of the property tax base that consists of residential property.  Summary statistics for 
the variables included in the models are displayed in Table 2.3.  The first-difference 
forms of the same variables are displayed in Table 2.4.   
The difference in logs over time can be interpreted as the average annual growth 
rate across counties.  The figures given in Table 4 indicate that from 1996 through 2007 
county property tax millage rates increased at an average rate of 1.3% per year, while 
median tax shares declined on average by 1.9% annually.  The standard deviations of the 
growth rates, however, are larger than the means, indicating that the high degree of 
variability across counties and across time in the changes in these variables.  Another 
feature of the data revealed in the summary tables is the significantly greater degree of 
variation in the tax share after the effect of the exemption has been taken into effect.  The 
naïve tax share exhibits a mean annual reduction of 1.9%, while taking the tax share into 
account yields a tax share declines on average by 4% annually.  This effect is even more 
pronounced when looking at some of the lowest property value counties rather than at the 
central tendency of the sample.  In 2006, the median home value at market price for 
Calhoun County, after converting to real 1983-1984 dollars was $24,448.67.  After 
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applying the 40% assessment ratio, this becomes $9,779.47.  The value of the HTRC 
exemption in that year, converted to real dollars is $6,548.54.  The exemption therefore  
Table 2.3  Summary Statistics  for Level Variables 
 
Mean Std Dev 
Log of Property Tax and Replacement Grant Revenue Per Capita 4.873 0.379 
Log of tax share -9.699 1.023 
Post-Exemption Tax Share -9.891 1.002 
Percent Reduction in Tax Share Due to Exemption 16.326 13.516 
Log of Median Home Value 9.892 0.363 
Log of Income Per Capita 9.441 0.175 
Log of Population 10.092 1.124 
Density - 100 people per Square Mile 1.712 3.486 
Aggregate Sales Tax Rate 6.636 0.554 
Log of Other Transfer Revenue Per Capita 3.202 0.759 
Service Sector Share of Local Wages 0.414 0.14 
Agriculture Sector Share of Local Wages 0.021 0.055 
Residential Share of Property Tax Base 0.346 0.135 
Number of Records 1,859   
 
Table 2.4  Summary Statistics for Differenced Values 
 
Mean Std Dev 
Change in Log of Property Tax and Replacement Grant Revenue 
Per Capita 
0.035 0.163 
Change in Log of Millage Rate 0.013 0.159 
Change in Log of Tax Share -0.019 0.061 
Change in Log of Post-Exemption Tax Share -0.040 0.106 
Change in Percent Reduction in Tax Share Due to Exemption 1.811 6.178 
Change in Log of Median Home Value 0.029 0.097 
Change In Log of Income Per Capita 0.007 0.026 
Change in Log of Population 0.015 0.019 
Change in Population Density: 100 per square mile 0.037 0.094 
Change in Aggregate Sales Tax Rate 0.101 0.347 
Change in Log of Transfer Revenue Per Capita 0.020 0.653 
Change in Service Sector Share of Local Wages 0.004 0.029 
Change in Agricultural Sector Share of Local Wages 0.000 0.015 
Change in Residential Share of Property Tax Base 0.006 0.024 
Number of Records 1693   
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reduces the taxable value of the median property valued parcel in that county by nearly 
70%.  In that year the tax share, without accounting for the exemption, declined by 3.3%, 
while the post-exemption tax share declined by 41%.  The magnitude of the change in the 
tax price suggests that there may be a non-linear relationship between the exemption and 
the level of revenue.  I address this by testing a model in which the percent reduction in 
the tax share due to the exemption (     ) is paired with a squared term.    
Results 
Approach I: Property Taxes and Replacement Grant Revenues Per Capita 
I use the sum of property tax receipts and replacement grant revenue per capita as 
the dependent variable in several different estimating equations.    The first set of 
estimates comes from a fixed-effects panel regression model using standard errors that 
are clustered at the county level.  I display two sets of equations in Table 5 which are 
identical in structure except that the second set includes county-level median home value 
as an additional control for the effect of wealth on revenues.   Columns 1 and 4 of Table 
2.5 depict a naïve model which measures the effect of the homeowner‘s tax share,    
 , 
without controlling for the HTRC program.   Columns 2 and 5 use the    
   measure of the 
tax price which reflects the tax share after the exemption has been taken into account.  
Columns 3 and 6 separate the exemption‘s effect on the tax share from other factors that 
influence the share by including both     
   and the percent change in the share caused by 
the exemption,     .   
The coefficient of    
  can be interpreted as the general tax-price revenue elasticity.  
The estimates of this elasticity found in Columns 1 and 3 range between -0.263 and -
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0.295, but they are not statistically significant.  The elasticity estimates in Columns 4 and 
6 range between -0.375 and -0.474 and are both statistically significant.    These results 
can be interpreted to indicate that, ceteris paribus, a one percent reduction in the tax 
share for reasons other than the state-funded exemption would yield an increase in 
combined property tax and replacement grant revenue somewhere between 0.38% and 
0.47%.  These estimates are similar to Bergstrom, Rubenfeld and Shapiro‘s (1982) 
estimates of price elasticities for local school expenditures which ranged from -.43 to -
.57, and also fall within the range of the several single-state estimates performed by 
Bergrstrom and Goodman (1973) for general municipal expenditures.   
Columns 2 and 5 display the elasticity estimates of the post-exemption tax price, 
   
  , and combined revenues.  Both estimates are statistically significant and their values 
alternate between -0.128 without the control for median home value and -0.222 with it.   
Comparing the tax price estimates of Columns 1 and 2 is difficult because the 
naïve model‘s coefficient is not statistically significant.  Both elasticities are significant 
in Columns 4 and 5 and comparing the two point estimates indicates that controlling for 
the exemption‘s effect reduces the tax price elasticity.  The 95% confidence intervals, 
however, reveal that the difference between the two variables is not statistically 
significant.   
Columns 3 and 6 separate the post-exemption tax price into two components, the 
median homeowner‘s tax share before the exemption and the percent change in the tax 
price due to the HTRC program.  The measure of the exemption‘s effect is significant in 
both equations and the value of its coefficient alternates between -0.133 without the 
median home value control and -0.253 with it.  This indicates that a 10% reduction in tax 
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share due to the HTRC program is associated with an increase in aggregate property tax 
and replacement grant revenue per capita somewhere between 1.3 and 2.5%.  This 
finding is evidence that there is significant ‗capture‘ of the tax relief grant by local 
governments.  If the program were ‗revenue neutral‘ as the program was advertised then 
there should have been no statistically significant effect.   
Several other parameter estimates are interesting.  Coefficients for the log of 
median home value in Columns 4-6 range from 0.180 to 0.235.  This indicates that, 
controlling for all other factors, a 10% increase in median home value would be 
associated with approximately a 2% increase in combined property tax and replacement 
grant revenue per capita.  Surprisingly, the income per-capita term was not statistically 
significant in these and several other specifications that I examined.  Median home value 
is likely capturing the level of wealth in the county, which may have a stronger tie to 
fiscal behavior than income.  Income per capita fails to achieve significance even when 
the median home value term is dropped.   
The population density term is significant in all four equations and ranges from -
0.052 to -0.064.  This term is the raw value rather than the natural log so the coefficient 
must also be multiplied by 100 to interpret it in terms of percent changes.  The estimate 
indicates that an additional one hundred people per square mile is associated with 
approximately a 6% reduction in property-based revenue per capita, ceteris paribus.  This 
appears to indicate that the dense urban areas of the Atlanta metropolitan region are able 
to rely more heavily on alternative revenue sources, while the lower-income agricultural 
counties have a higher level of property taxation.   
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Table 2.5  Fixed Effects Regression with Clustered Standard Errors  
 
Column 
1 Column 2 
Column 
3 
 
Column 
4 Column 5 
Column 
6 
 Dependent Variable: Aggregate Revenue per capita Naïve 
Combined 
Post-
Exemption 
Price 
Separated 
Price 
Variables   Naïve 
Combined 
Post-
Exemption 
Price 
Separated 
Price 
Variables 
Log of Pre-Exemption Tax Share -0.263   -0.295   -0.375**   -0.474** 
  (-1.441)   (-1.611)   (-1.986)   (-2.503) 
Log of Post-Exemption Tax Share   -0.128**       -0.222*   
    (-2.171)       (-3.313)   
Percent Change in Tax Share From Exemption^     -0.133+       -0.253* 
      (-1.936)       (-3.503) 
Log of Median Home Value         0.180* 0.205* 0.241* 
          (3.233) (4.134) (4.191) 
Log of Income Per Capita 0.107 0.143 0.116   -0.016 0.026 -0.040 
  (0.836) (1.104) (0.890)   (-0.123) (0.197) (-0.300) 
Log of Population -0.041 0.142 -0.032   -0.224 0.007 -0.269 
  (-0.214) (1.225) (-0.169)   (-1.077) (0.056) (-1.321) 
Population density (100/sqmi) -0.067* -0.060* -0.066*   -0.064* -0.052* -0.060* 
  (-3.825) (-3.513) (-3.754)   (-3.659) (-3.029) (-3.449) 
Aggregate Sales Tax Rate -0.011 -0.020 -0.015   -0.008 -0.022+ -0.015 
  (-0.865) (-1.557) (-1.170)   (-0.617) (-1.664) (-1.151) 
Log of Other Transfer revenue Per Capita -0.007 -0.007 -0.007   -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
  (-0.816) (-0.812) (-0.755)   (-0.867) (-0.833) (-0.761) 
Service Sector Share of Local Wages -0.047 -0.056 -0.055   -0.064 -0.082 -0.085 
  (-0.336) (-0.393) (-0.396)   (-0.457) (-0.587) (-0.618) 
Agricultural Sector Share of Local Wages 0.350 0.270 0.304   0.418 0.297 0.354 
  (1.068) (0.815) (0.907)   (1.294) (0.905) (1.063) 
Residential Share of Tax Base 0.383 0.171 0.493   0.353 0.113 0.553 
  (0.948) (0.779) (1.205)   (0.945) (0.516) (1.431) 
Time Trend 0.035* 0.032* 0.030*   0.031* 0.024* 0.020* 
  (7.889) (7.749) (6.426)   (6.415) (5.092) (3.653) 
Constant 1.594 0.839 1.113   1.743 0.439 0.875 
  (1.044) (0.533) (0.712)   (1.184) (0.287) (0.580) 
Observations 1,859 1,859 1,859   1,859 1,859 1,859 
R-squared 0.475 0.474 0.477   0.483 0.483 0.489 
Number of id 158 158 158   158 158 158 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses               
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1               
County-Level Fixed Effects Included in all equations               
Residual Sum of Squares 35.57 35.668 35.447   35.077 35.081 34.662 
^Already scaled by 100 to convert to elasticity                
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The only other term that is statistically significant is the time trend, which enters 
into all six equations.  Its estimates range from 0.02 to 0.034.  Holding all else constant, 
combined property tax and replacement grant revenues per capita were increasing at a 
rate of approximately 2 to 3 percent annually.   
I also test whether adding the control for the HTRC program improves the fit of 
the model to the data.  I perform a set of goodness-of-fit tests in order to measure whether 
controlling for the state-funded homestead exemption significantly improves the fit of the 
model.   The key determinant in selecting which goodness-of-fit test to use is whether the 
initial model is nested within the alternative models.  If it can be shown that the models 
are nested then traditional hypothesis testing methods can be used; otherwise more 
advanced econometric techniques are necessary (Cameron and Trivedi 2005).  The 
following discussion shows that the models are in fact nested and that a standard F-test 
can be used to test the goodness of fit.   
Although it is apparent that the equation of Column 1 of Table 2.5 is nested 
within the equations for Column 3, it is not obvious whether Column 1 is nested within 
Column 2.  The key issue is that the price variable in Column 1,    
 , is replaced by the 
post-exemption tax price,    
  .  A simple algebraic transformation of    
   shows, 
however, that in this log-linear model the equations are nested.   
    
                 
         
  
          
  
   
   
   
  
         (2.41) 
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Equation (41) shows that the post-exemption tax price is equal to the product of the initial 
homeowner‘s tax share,    
  
   
   
, and the term           .  This latter portion of (2.41) 
is reduction in the homeowner‘s tax share caused by the state-funded homestead 
exemption.  Eom and Rubenstein (2006) perform this same transformation in their 
analysis of the New York STAR program, another example of a state-funded homestead 
exemption.  Another feature of Equation (2.41) is that it highlights the relationship 
between Column 2 and Column 3 in Table 5.   The enclosed term in (2.41) is simply one 
minus the tax price variable used in Column 3        
  
     .  Although there is a 
difference in the arrangement of the terms, the same information is present in both 
equations.   
Because the equations are nested a simple F-test for goodness-of-fit is appropriate 
for comparing the models.  Unfortunately, the Residual Sum of Squares in Column 2 is 
larger than the RSS from Column 1, suggesting that the post-exemption tax price may 
actually worsen the fit to the data.  One possible explanation for this outcome is that the 
HTRC program causes much greater changes in the tax share than other economic 
determinants of tax price and that there are different price responses to the different 
factors.  Using one variable to measure both factors may cause a loss of information.   
I find more supportive results when I separate the HTRC‘s effect from the tax 
share.  An F-test comparing Columns 1 and 3 indicates that Column 3 yields a 
significantly better fit to the data than the naïve model.  Similarly, Column 6 is a 
significant improvement over Column 4.  I also perform a test comparing Columns 3 and 
6 to test for the improvement to the fit generated by the median home value parameter.  
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This test indicates that the 6 is a better fit than 3.  The results of these tests are displayed 
in Table 6. 
Table 7 shows the second set of estimates which are obtained from differenced 
model displayed in equation (2.37).  The estimates from this set of equations were 
obtained using OLS with clustered standard errors.  The difference-over-time estimates 
fail to provide any additional evidence that the HTRC program is associated with a price 
effect that increases the total level of revenues.  The only variable that is statistically 
significant in any of the equations is the population density term.  Also the F-test for joint 
significance of all the coefficients fails to reject the null hypothesis that any of the 
estimates are significantly different from zero.   
Table 2.6.   Goodness of Fit Tests 
  Test1: Column 1 vs. Column 3 
A RSS1-RSS3 0.123   F-statistic 
B # of parameters 1   (A/B)/(C/D) 
C RSS3 35.45   5.87 
D 1859-(11+157) 1691     
          
  Test2: Column 4 vs. Column 6 
A RSS4-RSS6 0.415   F-statistic 
B # of parameters 1   (A/B)/(C/D) 
C RSS3 34.66   20.23 
D 1859-(12+157) 1690     
          
  Test3: Column 3 vs. Column 6 
A RSS3-RSS6 0.785   F-statistic 
B # of parameters 1   (A/B)/(C/D) 
C RSS3 34.66   38.27 
D 1859-(12+157) 1690     
The next set of estimates use the revenue derived from the replacement grant to 
control for the HTRC program‘s effect on the dependent variable.  Table 2.8 provides the 
outcomes of these estimates.  No naïve-model estimates are included in this table because 
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they would be identical to Columns 1 and 4 of Table 2.5.  Column 1 of Table 2.8 uses the 
actual revenue from the replacement grant as a control for the HTRC program, while the 
Column 2 uses a counterfactual level of grant revenue that is calculated using the HTRC 
exemption from year  , but the millage rate from year    .     
The estimates in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.8 are very similar to each other.  The 
coefficient on the general tax share in both cases is approximately -0.36.  This elasticity 
estimate is within the ranges of the price elasticity estimates found in Table 5.  The 
coefficients on the population density and the time trend variables are of similar 
magnitude and statistical significance to the previous models‘ estimates.  The 
replacement grant revenue variables are statistically significant in both Columns 1 and 2.  
The coefficient on the revenue coefficient from Column 1 is interpreted to indicate that a 
one percent increase in replacement grant revenue per capita is associated with a 0.056 
percent increase in combined property tax and replacement grant revenue.  Similarly, the 
counterfactual revenue coefficient indicates that a one percent increase in grant revenue is 
accompanied by a 0.062 percent increase in combined revenue.  These values can be put 
into greater context by considering the share of combined revenue obtained from the 
replacement grant. Across all counties in the dataset, the mean proportion ranged from 
1.9% in the first year the program, when the exemption was set at $2,000, to 6.8% of 
revenues in 2003, when the exemption was raised to its all-time high of $10,000.  If the 
elasticity between the replacement grant revenue and combined revenues approaches the 
average proportion of revenues derived from the replacement grant then it suggests that 
on average, the level of combined revenues are increasing by nearly the entire amount of 
the replacement grant.   
 68 
Table2. 7 Difference Form Equations 
  Naive 
Combined 
Post-
Exemption 
Price 
Separated 
Price 
Variables Naive 
Combined 
Post-
Exemption 
Price 
Separated 
Price 
Variables 
              
Change in Log of Pre-Exemption 
Tax Share -0.018   -0.025 -0.000   -0.029 
  (-0.231)   (-0.330) (-0.001)   (-0.318) 
Change in Log of Post-Exemption 
Tax Share   -0.043     -0.043   
    (-0.826)     (-0.682)   
Change in Log of Percent Change 
in Tax Share from Exemption     0.001     0.001 
      (1.296)     (1.180) 
Change in Log of Income Per 
Capita -0.219 -0.210 -0.209 -0.216 -0.210 -0.210 
  (-1.411) (-1.354) (-1.350) (-1.391) (-1.356) (-1.354) 
Change in Log of Population -0.040 -0.054 -0.036 -0.024 -0.054 -0.039 
  (-0.202) (-0.270) (-0.179) (-0.109) (-0.260) (-0.179) 
Change in Population Density -0.061* -0.061* -0.059** -0.061* -0.061* -0.059** 
  (-2.687) (-2.722) (-2.586) (-2.690) (-2.694) (-2.594) 
Change in Sales Tax Rate -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 
  (-0.950) (-0.982) (-1.000) (-0.945) (-0.986) (-1.004) 
Change in Transfers Per Capita -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
  (-0.775) (-0.740) (-0.728) (-0.775) (-0.739) (-0.725) 
Change in Service Sector Share of 
Local Wages 0.008 0.004 -0.001 0.009 0.004 -0.001 
  (0.058) (0.028) (-0.006) (0.060) (0.028) (-0.008) 
Change in Agricultural Share of 
Local Wages 0.001 -0.007 -0.009 -0.000 -0.007 -0.009 
  (0.005) (-0.031) (-0.043) (-0.000) (-0.031) (-0.043) 
Change in Residential Share of 
the Tax Base 0.194 0.227 0.201 0.177 0.227 0.204 
  (1.211) (1.603) (1.286) (1.103) (1.586) (1.241) 
Change in the Log of the Median 
Home Value       -0.019 0.000 0.003 
        (-0.467) (0.007) (0.073) 
Constant 0.039* 0.038* 0.037* 0.040* 0.038* 0.037* 
  (11.608) (9.500) (9.236) (11.411) (8.033) (7.835) 
              
Observations 1,692 1,692 1,692 1,692 1,692 1,692 
R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.006 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses             
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1             
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Table 2.8  Fixed-Effect Clustered Regressions Using The Grant Size As Control For 
HTRC 
  
Actual Grant 
Amount 
Counterfactual 
Grant Amount 
      
Log of Pre-Exemption Tax Share -0.362** -0.365** 
  (-2.016) (-2.034) 
Log of Weighted Replacement Grant 
Revenue Per Capita 0.056*   
  (5.308)   
Log of Counterfactual Replacement 
Grant Revenue Per Capita   0.062* 
    (5.691) 
Log of Income Per Capita -0.044 -0.056 
  (-0.324) (-0.408) 
Log of Population -0.149 -0.151 
  (-0.772) (-0.784) 
Population density (100/sqmi) -0.069* -0.069* 
  (-3.798) (-3.755) 
Aggregate Sales Tax Rate -0.029** -0.030** 
  (-2.254) (-2.321) 
Log of Other Transfer revenue Per Capita -0.007 -0.007 
  (-0.833) (-0.888) 
Service Sector Share of Local Wages -0.032 -0.026 
  (-0.234) (-0.196) 
Agricultural Sector Share of Local 
Wages 0.252 0.235 
  (0.755) (0.708) 
Residential Share of Tax Base 0.625 0.641 
  (1.477) (1.508) 
Time Trend 0.022* 0.021* 
  (4.185) (3.933) 
Constant 3.181+ 3.279** 
  (1.967) (2.035) 
      
Observations 1,859 1,858 
R-squared 0.491 0.494 
Number of id 158 158 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses     
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1     
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Table 2.9  Clustered Regressions Using Differenced Form Equations on the 
Counterfactual Grant 
  
Differenced 
Counterfactual 
    
Change in Log of Pre-Exemption 
Tax Share -0.081 
  (-1.069) 
Change in Log of Counterfactual 
Grant Revenue Per Capita 0.079* 
  (6.074) 
Change in Log of Income Per 
Capita -0.365** 
  (-2.270) 
Change in Log of Population -0.141 
  (-0.674) 
Change in Population Density -0.053** 
  (-2.186) 
Change in Sales Tax Rate -0.006 
  (-0.681) 
Change in Transfers Per Capita -0.006 
  (-0.646) 
Change in Service Sector Share of 
Local Wages -0.013 
  (-0.091) 
Change in Agricultural Share of 
Local Wages -0.055 
  (-0.252) 
Change in Residential Share of the 
Tax Base 0.252 
  (1.581) 
Constant 0.024* 
  (6.040) 
    
Observations 1,691 
R-squared 0.034 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses   
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1   
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Table 2.10  Fixed-Effect Clustered Regression Using Percent Reduction in Total Tax 
Base as HTRC Control 
 
    
VARIABLES Average 
    
Log of Pre-Exemption Tax Share -0.330+ 
  (-1.789) 
Percent Reduction in Total Tax Base 
Due to HTRC -0.011* 
  (-2.860) 
Log of Income Per Capita 0.063 
  (0.468) 
Log of Population -0.097 
  (-0.498) 
Population density (100/sqmi) -0.066* 
  (-3.825) 
Aggregate Sales Tax Rate -0.021 
  (-1.581) 
Log of Other Transfer revenue Per 
Capita -0.007 
  (-0.794) 
Service Sector Share of Local Wages -0.038 
  (-0.282) 
Agricultural Sector Share of Local 
Wages 0.291 
  (0.837) 
Residential Share of Tax Base 0.516 
  (1.244) 
Time Trend 0.028* 
  (5.050) 
Constant 3.073+ 
  (1.816) 
    
Observations 1,859 
Number of id 158 
R-squared 0.482 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses   
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1   
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Table 2.11.  Regression on the Differenced Log of County Millage Rates 
Dependent Variable is the Change in Millage Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Change in Log of Pre-Exemption Tax Share 0.552*  0.493* 0.496* 
  (4.304)  (4.014) (4.011) 
Change in Log of Post-Exemption Tax 
Share  -0.048   
   (-1.526)   
Change in Percent Reduction in Tax Share 
Due to Exemption   0.002* 0.0036* 
    (4.818) (3.349) 
Change in Square of Percent Reduction in 
Tax Share    -0.000 
     (-1.529) 
Change in Log of Median Home Value -0.625* -0.478* -0.579* -0.580* 
  (-11.672) (-8.935) (-10.819) (-10.833) 
Change in Log of Income Per Capita 0.165 0.171 0.178 0.163 
  (1.081) (1.100) (1.165) (1.061) 
Change in Log of Population 0.361+ -0.142 0.330+ 0.325+ 
  (1.878) (-0.966) (1.750) (1.707) 
Change in Population Density (100/sqmi) 0.032 0.015 0.036 0.037 
  (1.229) (0.581) (1.363) (1.431) 
Change in Aggregate Sales Tax Rate -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
  (-0.195) (-0.155) (-0.244) (-0.231) 
Change in Log of Transfer Revenue Per 
Capita -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (-1.219) (-0.923) (-1.038) (-1.019) 
Change in Service Sector Share of Local 
Wages -0.005 0.010 -0.025 -0.026 
  (-0.044) (0.088) (-0.251) (-0.257) 
Change in Agricultural Share of Local 
Wages 0.216 0.178 0.197 0.195 
  (1.267) (0.902) (1.131) (1.120) 
Change in Residential Share of Property 
Tax Base -0.530 0.281 -0.475 -0.474 
  (-1.334) (1.060) (-1.241) (-1.229) 
Constant 0.037* 0.024* 0.031* 0.030* 
  (8.899) (7.362) (7.426) (7.036) 
Observations 1,692 1,692 1,692 1,692 
Number of id 158 158 158 158 
R-squared 0.155 0.126 0.163 0.163 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
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Combining both the differenced model approach with the counterfactual grant 
revenue as a control from the HTRC program performs better than the previous 
differenced model approaches that used the tax price.  These results are displayed in 
Column 1 of Table 2.9.  While the tax share variable still fails to reach statistical 
significance, the grant revenue term, income per capita and population density are all 
statistically significant in this model.  The value of the grant revenue estimate is 0.079, 
indicating that a one percent increase in grant revenue over time is associated with a 
0.079 percent increase in combined revenues.   
For the final approach to measuring the effect of the HTRC program on combined 
property tax and grant revenues I employ an alternate measure of the exemption‘s effect 
on the county tax base.  Rather than looking at the effect of the grant on the median 
voter‘s tax price, I measure the proportion of the entire county tax base that becomes 
exempt from the property tax.  I still use the ratio of the median value home to the county 
tax base to capture the median voter‘s share of spending. Column 1 of Table 2.10 
contains the results of this modeling approach.  I have already adjusted the coefficients to 
reflect that the dependent variable is log-transformed while the key explanatory variable 
is a raw percent.  The estimate can be interpreted to indicate that a one percent reduction 
in the post-exemption share of the tax base due to the HTRC would be associated with a 
0.01 percent increase in combined revenues.   
Approach II: Difference in Log of Property Tax Rate 
The results from the second set of equations, which use the first difference in the 
log of the property tax millage rate as the dependent variable, are displayed in Table 2.11.  
I include fixed effects in the equations, despite taking the first differences of the 
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variables, to control for factors that do not change over time that might have a consistent 
effect on how much millage rates change from year to year.  These factors would be 
county characteristics that influence the responsiveness of local government to changing 
economic conditions.  One example may be variation in property tax assessment practices 
based on the technical capacity of the local government.   
The equations in Table 2.11 are ordered by their controls for the tax share.  
Column 1 displays a naïve model that includes the change in the log general tax share 
    
  and does not measure the effect of the replacement grant.  Column 2 uses the change 
in the log of the post-exemption tax price     
   as the primary explanatory variable, 
while Column 7 includes both     
  and the differenced percent change in the tax share 
due to the homestead exemption       , and Column 8 adds a square term of        to 
the structure of Column 7. 
The most striking aspect of this set of estimates is that the sign on the pre-
exemption tax share variables shown in Columns 1,3 and 4 are all positive.  This is the 
opposite of the expected sign for a tax price.  A positive elasticity estimate indicates that, 
holding all other factors constant, growth in the tax share is associated with increasing 
millage rates.  It would be expected, instead, that as the tax price increases the median 
voter would prefer lower taxes and a lower level of public services.  One likely cause for 
this result is the relationship between the explanatory variables.  Median home value 
enters into these equations in three places: through the numerator of the general tax share, 
the denominator of the percent reduction in tax share due to the homestead exemption, 
and as a scale variable on its own.  A marginal increase in the general tax share while 
holding the median home value constant would require a reduction in the gross tax base.  
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The positive sign on the general tax share variables may therefore be due to smaller-tax-
base counties relying more heavily on the property tax.  The significant and negative sign 
on the change in the median home value variables appears to support this interaction 
between the elements of the estimated model. 
In contrast, the estimates of the homestead exemption‘s effect on the millage rate 
are consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model.  From Column 4 of Table 
2.11, a one percent reduction in      is associated with a 0.36 percent increase in the 
millage rate.  The statistically significant relationship between changes in the tax rate and 
      suggests that local officials raised the property tax rates in order to shift some of 
the tax relief grant to increase local expenditures.   This result adds to the findings from 
the first empirical approach because it emphasizes the responses of individual counties to 
changes in the tax price over time.        
Post-Estimation 
Both empirical approaches rejected the null hypothesis that the exemption would 
be ‗revenue neutral‘ and simply provide tax relief without any impact on revenues or on 
the millage rate.  At least a portion of the replacement grant appears to have been 
diverted to increasing local revenue per capita.  A more concrete measure of how much 
of the grant was dedicated to this purpose may be obtained by applying the coefficient 
estimates towards post-estimation.  I first calculate the predicted value of the aggregate 
property and replacement grant revenue, per capita for the 2007 year.  I then compute a 
second set of predicted values generated using the same coefficients, except that I replace 
the estimate of the homestead exemption‘s effect on the tax price with the null hypothesis 
value of 0.  This quantity represents the predicted sum of property tax and replacement 
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grant revenue if there had been no substitution effect associated with the state-funded 
exemption.  After computing both sets of predicted values
21
 for the log of aggregate 
property tax and replacement grant revenue per capita, I reverse transform the values to 
real dollar amounts by exponentiation and multiplying by county population.  I perform 
this procedure using the coefficients from Column 6 of Table 5.   
 
Table 2.12  Post-Estimation For 2007 Data Using Column 6 Estimates from Table 
2.5 
Aggregate Predicted Revenue $1,416,445,442 
Null Hypothesis Predicted Revenue 1,367,984,384 
Difference 48,461,058 
Total HTRC Payments To Counties - 2007 $133,331,498 
Percent  36.35% 
Data from 149 Counties was used for this 
Procedure   
 
 
After generating the predicted values and reverse transforming them, I aggregated 
the values across all counties.  The results of this post-estimation procedure are displayed 
in Table 2.12.  149 counties had complete data for the 2007 year.  Total HTRC payments 
to all 159 county governments in that year amounted to $137.6 million; the 149 counties 
present for the post-estimation received $133.3 million of that total.  The sum across 
counties of the reverse-transformed predicted value of property and replacement grant 
revenues is $1,416,445,442, while the predicted value generated with the null-hypothesis 
value for the homestead exemption‘s effect is $1,367,984,384, a difference of $48.5 
million.  These results suggest that the substitution effected associated with the HTRC 
                                                 
 
 
21
 I corrected for the distribution of the error term when I generated the predicted values. 
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program raised aggregate revenues from the property tax and the replacement grant by 
nearly $48.5 million and that approximately 36.3% of the replacement grant revenue is 
shifted from reducing the tax burden to funding additional county expenditures.  I 
performed this analysis using the results from Column 4 of Table 5 and obtained similar 
results.  Extrapolating these findings to the HTRC grants provided to the other forms of 
local government in Georgia would suggest that, in 2007, approximately $156.8 million 
of state funds intended for tax relief were redirected to increase local spending. 
Fiscal Illusion 
The key issue in estimating the impact of fiscal illusion on the local response to 
the exemption is determining how much of the shift was due to the median voter‘s 
informed price response and how much can be attributed to local officials capturing the 
unobserved portion of the grant.  I argued above that if the price response to changes in 
tax share caused by the exemption is greater than the price response to changes due to 
other factors, then there is evidence of fiscal illusion.  This is because local officials 
would be expected to engage in budget maximizing behavior and spend the entire 
unobserved portion of the grant that they have captured.  Alternatively, the median voter 
would support higher spending in accordance with the price elasticity of demand for 
public goods.  There is no room in the model for a public official that chooses to raise 
revenues net of an unobserved grant at the same ratio as the median voter would have 
chosen were she aware of the funds.  This is because the key assumption of the model is 
that the public official seeks to maximize their budget.  Empirically, however, this latter 
scenario cannot be distinguished from an outcome driven by a fully informed median 
voter.   
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The point estimates of the coefficients on Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2.5 for the 
HTRC‘s effect on tax price are smaller than the coefficients on the general tax share and 
it therefore does not appear that Georgia county governments are raising revenues at a 
greater rate than could be explained by the informed median voter price effect.  If the 
coefficients on the exemption‘s price effect had been larger than the general share‘s 
effect, then an estimate of the magnitude of fiscal illusion could have been generated by 
performing a post-estimation procedure similar to the one implemented above.   This 
would be performed by generating predicted values where the general tax share‘s 
estimated coefficient is applied to the exemption‘s effect on the tax share.  This predicted 
value could then be compared to the predicted values from the actual coefficients to 
obtain a ratio that represents the share of the substitution effect that exceeds the median 
voter‘s price response.  The empirical findings from this analysis, however, find no 
evidence that fiscal illusion is a significant determinant of the substitution effect created 
by the HTRC program.   
Conclusions 
This study evaluated the effectiveness of state-funded homestead exemptions in 
providing property tax relief.  In Georgia, a state-funded exemption increased revenues 
by more than a third of the amount of the state transfer.  The goal of the program was to 
shift part of the cost of funding local services to the state.  The increase in net property 
tax revenue is an unintended consequence of the program .  Judging this policy by the 
criteria of providing property tax relief, the increase in net revenue represents a failure of 
the policy to achieve its intended goal and a misallocation of funds.   
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Other states such as New York and California may also need to consider whether 
their own state-funded homestead exemptions are similarly failing to achieve their 
intended purpose of reducing the property tax burden.  Given the level of state funds 
allocated to this type of program, these programs should be prime targets for policy 
reform that would replace state-funded exemptions with more effective types of tax 
relief.  Georgia has already eliminated funding for the HTRC, though there is some talk 
of restoring it when the state budget situation improves.  Instead of returning to this 
ineffective policy, it may be more effective to select an alternative form of providing 
local tax relief.   
The portion of the substitution effect that originates from the median voter‘s 
informed preference for a higher level of services due to the lower tax price may be a 
rational choice that improves taxpayers‘ welfare.  From the standpoint of policy analysis, 
however, this argument may be insufficient to support the use of a state-funded 
homestead exemption.  Facilitating additional local spending is a separate state policy 
objective that could be pursued through other means that more effectively align with state 
policy-makers‘ objectives.  Rather than funding general local spending, state-officials are 
likely to prefer specific local programs that provide benefits either regionally or at the 
state level.  These services can be more effectively target through restricted matching 
grants that align with state-level budgetary preferences.     
Within a context of limited state resources, expensive state programs that fail to 
achieve their intended effect should be targets for reassessment and possible elimination.  
This paper has provided some evidence that a significant share of revenue dedicated to 
tax relief instead acts as a matching grant to local governments.  Although the political 
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objective may be to simply demonstrate that state officials are doing something to 
appease voters on the issue of excessive property tax burden, there are many other means 
of providing tax relief that have greater potential for actually producing the intended 
results.   
Circuit breakers may be more effective in ensuring that the burden of the tax does 
not exceed a specific threshold for individual homeowners.  Exemptions provide no such 
qualification.  It is also possible better target the aid to lower and moderate income 
homeowners so that wealthier homeowners that are relatively in less need of state 
assistance are not swept into the group of recipients.  This would lower the cost of 
providing tax relief.  Another benefit of providing tax relief through a circuit breaker is 
that by administering the tax relief through the state income tax system local government 
is circumvented and the potential for a flypaper effect is eliminated.   By removing a 
middle agent between the originators of the policy and its intended beneficiaries the 
policy may become more visible to taxpayers.  As opposed to the conventional norm in 
tax policymaking, increasing the visibility of this type of program may actually align with 
policy-makers interests.   
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CHAPTER III  
MIND THE GAP: A MODEL OF PROPERTY TAX 
DETERMINATION 
 
   
Introduction 
 One of the challenges in developing a theoretical understanding of 
volatility for the property tax is incorporating the degree of control that local officials 
have to change the rate or the base for the tax on an annual basis.  There is a fundamental 
difference in the role the property tax plays in the fiscal structure of local governments 
able to control the size of their annual levy versus those governments that are subject to 
binding tax limitations
22
.  In the first case the property tax can serve as the marginal 
dollar of revenue that the locality raises and it is possible to offset cyclical reductions in 
other revenue sources with compensating changes to the levy.  Where tax limitations are 
present the property tax is more likely to serve as an initial foundation for the annual 
budget.   In that case the levy is often set to the maximum allowed each year and other 
sources such as sales receipts or revenue from fees and charges will serve as the marginal 
tax dollar.  There are, therefore, depending on the institutional framework of the state, at 
least two different behavioral patterns that describe how local officials determine the size 
of the property tax levy.    
                                                 
 
 
22
 Joyce and Mullins (1991) define binding tax limitations as those that either limit the growth of the actual 
levy or limit both the rate and the assessed value.  All other forms of tax limitation can be circumvented. 
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In this essay I analyze how the property tax is used by local governments in an 
environment without binding tax limitations.  If local officials are able to use the millage 
rate and assessment practices to achieve a desired property levy, what set of rules or 
behavioral patterns would they follow as they use this power?  One model of property tax 
rate determination is the ‗residual rule‘.  Under this approach the property tax levy fills 
the gap between budgeted expenditures for the year and projected receipts from all other 
available revenue sources.  Local officials set the property tax millage rate so that the tax 
yields just enough revenue to balance the budget.  An implication of adhering to this rule 
is that in the event that other local revenues fall due to a recession the property tax rate 
will need to be raised in order to replace the lost receipts.  This behavior allows the local 
government to stabilize its overall revenues by increasing the short-term volatility of the 
property tax.  The pursuit of stability for the local government comes at the cost of 
homeowners' ability to predict their annual property tax bills.  
In contrast to the ‗residual rule‘ model, an alternative model of property tax 
growth predicts that receipts will grow in proportion to the property tax base.  This model 
predicts less volatility in the yield of the property tax and no role for the property tax in 
counter-balancing cyclical volatility in the other local revenue sources.   
The research objective of this paper is to compare these two models empirically in 
order to determine which model more accurately describes the pattern of changes to the 
millage rate and variation in the overall property tax levy.  The policy implications for 
following the ‗residual rule‘ approach are significant because it would demonstrate a 
tradeoff between overall stability in the tax structure and the predictability of the property 
tax.  Stability is a concern for ensuring the adequacy of local fiscal policy across 
 83 
economic cycles, while predictability is a concern for taxpayers who want to know their 
future tax liability and for policymakers interested in the political viability of their tax 
regime. The danger of following the ‗residual rule‘ is that local officials that use the 
property tax to smooth their budget may surprise taxpayers with unexpected changes to 
the levy and incur political costs that threaten the sustainability of financing services 
through the property tax. 
In this essay I focus on the volatility of the level of revenues derived from the 
property tax as opposed to changes in the tax base.  This differs from the traditional focus 
of research into local public finance, but it is appropriate for two reasons.  First, revenue 
volatility is a relevant policy issue inasmuch as it becomes a source of fiscal stress during 
recessions.  Local control over the millage rate provides governments with a means to 
compensate for cyclical drops in other revenue sources with more income elastic tax 
bases.  Long-term average universal assessment practices also contribute to stabilizing 
local budgets by shielding the property tax base from short-term volatility in market 
property values.  Because the tax is only applied to the assessed value of property, the 
impact of immediate spikes or drops in market values have only a muted impact on the 
recognized tax base.  If local officials are truly free to set any millage rate in order to 
meet their budget balancing rule, then the primary consequence of a change in the base 
would be a compensating change in the nominal millage rate, not a change in the level of 
revenue.   
A second reason to focus on the actual revenues and not the base is the issue of 
tax predictability.  Predictability refers to taxpayers‘ perception of how much the 
property tax levy changes from year to year and is a central factor in political opposition 
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to the property tax.  In Nordlinger vs. Hahn  (1992), the Supreme Court case upheld 
California‘s property tax because provides homeowners with greater predictability in 
regards to their future property tax liability.  A focus on the base would ignore the 
changes to the millage rate and the levy that a budget-balancing role for the property tax 
mandates.  This omission consequently misses an important aspect of the tax that impacts 
its long-term political feasibility.  
The primary contribution of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the role 
of the property tax in local tax structures during times of economic volatility.  The 
underlying questions asked are how do local policymakers use the property tax to 
promote an adequate and stable fiscal structure and what are the implications of this 
approach?  The framework outlined in this paper describes an interconnected revenue 
system in which the relative responsiveness of public expenditures and non-property tax 
revenues to changes in personal income, along with the share of revenue provided by 
property taxes, will determine the size of the shift in property levies local tax officials 
will have to impose in order to comply with their budget balancing rule.  This model 
predicts the size and the direction of the changes to the property tax levy local officials 
will make in order to offset shocks to their other revenue sources and stabilize the overall 
revenue stream.   
I test this budget balancing model against an alternative model that assumes that 
the property levy is independent of other revenue sources and is instead determined by 
growth in the tax base.  Policy makers following this alternative model do not use the 
property levy to stabilize their overall revenues in response to short-term economic 
shocks.  I estimate both models using data from Georgia school districts and then 
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generate predicted property tax levies to determine which model is able to generate more 
accurate revenue projections.  I find that the budget-balancing model is better able to 
predict property tax revenues for the districts that have higher incomes per capita and 
higher populations as well as those districts that rely on the property tax for a larger share 
of their revenues.   
The findings of this paper will be of interest to local tax officials because it 
reveals the interrelationship and possibly a tradeoff between the pursuit of stability for 
the overall revenue structure and the predictability of the property tax levy.  For a local 
government considering rebalancing its revenue portfolio (e.g. replacing some property 
tax revenue with a sales tax) in order to pursue increased stability, this framework 
provides insight into how this change will affect the future predictability of the property 
tax.  Voters considering such a change to the tax structure could use this information to 
be better informed about the implications of the policy change on future swings in their 
levies.  This additional information can improve local tax design in order to better pursue 
the goals of revenue adequacy and political sustainability. 
Section II of this paper reviews the literature on property tax stability.  Section III 
develops a model of the budget-balancing role of the property tax.  Section IV provides a 
preliminary analysis of the pattern of property tax rate changes among counties and 
school districts in the state of Georgia.   Section V describes the empirical approach taken 
to estimate the parameters of the framework and to test for an impact of revenue 
diversification on property tax predictability.  Section VI introduces the data used in the 
analysis.  The results of this estimation are then presented in Section VII and the post-
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estimation forecasts are discussed in Section VIII.  The paper then concludes with a 
discussion of future directions for this line of research.     
 
Property Tax Stability  
 
Several studies of the stability of state and local revenues have addressed the 
property tax.  The seminal paper in the stability literature is Groves and Kahn (1952), in 
which the authors obtain some of the first estimates of the long-run relationship between 
state revenues and personal income.  The authors estimate income elasticities for various 
sources of state revenue including two that are property tax related.  Using Wisconsin 
data, Groves and Kahn estimate the income elasticity of the general property tax base, as 
well as the income elasticity of actual receipts from the property tax on utilities.  The 
authors report an income elasticity of .22 for the assessed values of general property and 
.08 for utility property tax receipts.  The authors ascribe these extremely low values to 
two factors.  First, they argue that changes in the value of the property tax base are due to 
other causes such as population growth.  Second, they argue that the effect of income on 
property values will be lagged due to either deficient assessment methods or to legal 
requirements that property be assessed ―at the full value which could ordinarily be 
obtained therefor at private sale.‖ 23  Adherence to such laws may lead assessors to 
normalize their valuations of property and reduce the impact of market volatility on the 
property tax base.  Their results, however, were obtained using a simple log-transformed 
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 Wisconsin Statues 70.31 (1). Online: https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/70/32 
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bi-variate regression model and no statistics on the statistical significance of these 
estimates were reported.   
Another early study of the stability of the property tax is found in Wilford (1965).  
The author uses a regression model similar to Groves and Kahn‘s to estimate revenue-
income elasticities, but employs a multivariate equation that controls for personal income 
and the tax rate, rather than Groves and Kahn‘s bi-variate approach that regressed 
revenues on income alone.  Wilford obtains a revenue-income elasticity of 1.01 for state 
property tax revenue in Texas over a period from 1947 to 1960.  He also estimates 
revenue elasticities with respect to per capita income.  He finds that these elasticity 
estimates for all the revenue sources examined are generally higher than those for 
revenue alone.  The property tax revenue elasticity estimate increases to 1.61 when 
measured using income per capita.  Wilford interprets this to indicate that ―during short-
run periods when population is relatively stable and per capita income fluctuates, the tax 
structure of Texas is much less stable than one would conclude by using traditional 
methods of determining stability.‖ (p. 312)   Comparing Wilford‘s results with those of 
Groves and Kahn shows conflicting results on the stability of the state property tax 
relative to personal income.  Both studies were limited by the econometric techniques 
available at the time, however, and neither set of results can really satisfy our current 
questions regarding the characteristics of property taxes. 
Following Groves and Kahn and Wilford, there have been many advances in the 
study of stability that focused on other revenue sources.  Among these are as the 
development of separate measures for short and long run income-revenue elasticities 
(Williams et al. 1973; Dye and McGuire 1991), the refinement of elasticity estimation to 
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account for serial correlation and asymmetric deviations from the long run equilibrium 
(Sobel and Holcombe 1996; Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle 2006), and the development of a 
portfolio approach to conceptualizing the overall growth/stability tradeoff of a revenue 
structure (White 1983a; Misiolek and Perdue 1987a).  Also important is the approach 
conceptualizing revenue stability that abandons the revenue-income elasticity approach 
and instead looks at the deviation of actual revenues from forecasted receipts over time 
(See Dye and Merriman, 2004).  The empirical content of these more recent analyses 
focuses almost entirely on state-level revenue sources, particularly in determining the 
relative stability of state sales and income taxes and evaluating the overall stability of the 
state tax structure.  These advances have not, however, been applied to examining how 
overall growth and immediate shocks influence the yield of the property tax.   
Multiple factors explain the relative lack of attention to the stability of the 
property tax.  One reason is that the frameworks used to understand revenue volatility for 
sales, income and other taxes cannot be easily extended to the property tax.  Gentry and 
Ladd (1994) discuss this difficulty in their effort to apply the portfolio approach to 
measuring the stability of alternative state and local tax structures.  In their discussion of 
why they exclude North Carolina‘s property tax from their analysis, they argue that 
 ―[b]ecause local property tax revenues, especially in North Carolina, are 
driven almost exclusively by the growth in local spending, our approach to 
measuring growth and stability is not readily extended to local taxes.  In 
the context of local property taxes, the approach would yield something 
close to the growth and instability of local spending rather than the growth 
and instability of the tax.  This link between spending growth and tax 
growth presents less of a problem for state taxes…‖(p. 766) 
 
In this statement the authors recognize one of the key features of the property tax that 
distinguishes it from other local revenue sources – that in many states the tax rate on local 
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property is actively changed from year to year in order to meet budgetary targets.  One 
way that this is done is to set the levy to be the difference between planned expenditures 
for the year and expected receipts from other revenue sources.  The property tax is the 
revenue source that local officials have the most control over, so as expenditures grow 
the property levy becomes the marginal revenue dollar used to pay for the additional 
spending.  The stability of the property tax cannot be accurately studied without 
accounting for way that local officials use the tax to balance their budgets. 
Williams et al. (1973) discuss the property tax in their analysis of non-income 
determinants of tax yield and their impact on revenue stability.  They observe that in 
many jurisdictions millage rates are changed almost annually.  The authors argue that 
there are two alternatives ways to view such a pattern of changes within the context of 
stability.  One approach is to eliminate the impacts of changes to the rate or the base on 
the yield of a tax because they are discretionary policy changes.  This view narrowly 
defines stability as the variability in the yield of a fixed tax instrument with a given rate 
and base with respect to income.  An alternative view considers the variability of the 
revenue stream without adjusting for rate changes.  They observe ―that rate change may 
be a frequent, acceptable practice which permits yield growth from a lagging base, 
though it may cause instability. …  Hence, a tax which requires frequent rate increase 
ought not be judged a priori stable or slow growing if in practice such rate changes are a 
regular feature of its history.‖    They support this by showing how the long-run growth 
rate of tobacco and alcohol taxes was primarily the consequence of regular increases in 
the respective tax rates. The essential point is that the authors recognize that for many 
revenue sources, including the property tax, an analysis which only considers the base 
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misses key policy-related factors that influence the stability of the ultimate yield of the 
tax.   
The use of millage rate changes to compensate for slow growth in the assessed 
property base is also discussed within the tax and expenditure limitation (TEL) 
Literature.  Some states place legal limits on the annual rate of growth for assessed 
property values.  Joyce and Mullins (1991) show that local officials can circumvent such 
statues by regularly increasing the property tax rate. For this reason, they classify 
assessment limits without accompanying limits on the millage rate or the overall levy as 
non-binding constraints.  Changes to the millage rate can be used to compensate for a 
limited tax base, either because its growth is capped through a legal limitation or because 
the income elasticity of the base is low.  On the other hand, in jurisdictions with binding 
tax limitations, those that either directly cap the levy or limit both the rate and the 
assessed base of the tax, it is not possible for officials to adjust the millage rate to 
compensate for inadequate revenues or slow growth of the tax base
24
.     
This review of the stability literature reveals a gap in our understanding of how 
the predictability of the property tax is influenced by policies which change the rate of 
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 It may be necessary to use two different behavioral frameworks for viewing the stability of the property 
tax based on whether the jurisdiction is subject to binding tax limitations.  Whether or not a given 
jurisdiction is subject to a TEL would determine whether public officials treat the property tax as their 
marginal revenue dollar in their fiscal structure.  A binding tax limitation, by design, leaves public officials 
with little control over the yield of the tax.  This lack of control would prevent local officials from 
following the residual rule of levy setting.  Instead, property tax revenue would be an initial ‗foundation‘ 
level of revenue that functions as a fixed asset in each year‘s budget.  In contrast, jurisdictions that are not 
subject to TELs are able to exert control over the size of the property levy each year.  The opportunity to 
change the millage rate annually makes the property tax the revenue source that the locality has the greatest 
degree of control over and therefore causes it to become the marginal revenue dollar in local fiscal 
planning.   
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the tax in response to receipts from other revenues.  Existing methods for measuring 
revenue-income elasticities do not take this type of policy into account.     
The Budgeting Role of the Property Tax 
 
In this section I propose a model of local revenue growth that explicitly 
recognizes the potential for local officials to set the property tax rate and the overall levy 
in response to receipts from other revenues.  I describe this behavior as adherence to the 
‗residual rule‘ or the ‗budget-balancing‘ rule.  As mentioned earlier, this framework 
applies only to those localities that are not constrained by TEL‘s that bind the rate or the 
overall property levy.  The objective of this model is to depict how a change in personal 
income will affect expenditures, non-property tax revenues and how the residual rule 
policy then leads to a change in the property tax levy.  The end result of the model is an 
alternative representation of the short-run income elasticity of property tax revenue that 
encompasses the pattern of rate changes that adherence to the residual rule requires. 
Within this framework of property tax determination, the property levy functions 
as the marginal revenue dollar used to balance the budget.  Local property tax rates are 
chosen so that the levy will be equal to the difference between the budgeted local 
expenditures and the expected receipts from all other sources.  This relationship is 
depicted in Figure 1.  This practice makes property tax growth relative to income 
dependent on three factors: growth of the property tax base, the level of budgeted 
expenditures, and the yield of other revenue sources. 
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Figure 3.1 The Residual Rule 
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The first element of Figure 3.1 is budgeted expenditures. I assume that the 
budgeted level of expenditures selected by public officials is derived from an expression 
of the demand for local government expenditures.  The demand for local public spending 
has been analyzed in the public finance literature, most notably by Borcherding and 
Deacon (1972).  Personal income was one of the determinants of demand they examined 
and the authors reported income-elasticities for local public spending within the range of 
0.2 and 1.0.  These estimates indicate that local expenditures are a normal good and that 
higher incomes will result in higher per-capita public spending.   
The second factor in determining the budgeted property tax levy, the expected 
revenues from all other sources, is also influenced by changes in real income.  Local 
governments with their own income and sales taxes are exposed to the revenue-income 
elasticities for those sources.  Intergovernmental transfers that are based on a shared and 
fixed proportion of tax receipts will also vary according to these elasticities over both the 
long and short run.  Transfers that are determined as a local aid line item in state budgets 
may be even more volatile than the overall state tax structure if local aid becomes less of 
a state spending priority during periods of fiscal stress.  
The difference between budgeted expenditures and expected receipts from non-
property tax revenue sources is the budgetary gap that the property tax levy will need to 
fill in order for the jurisdiction to balance its budget.  The relative short-run income 
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elasticities of expenditures and non-property revenue will determine how the size of the 
gap changes in response to a shock to personal income.  If a recession causes income to 
drop and non-property revenues fall faster than the budgeted level of public spending 
then the gap will widen and the property tax levy will need to be increases in order to 
provide the necessary funding.   
The right-hand side of Figure 1 displays the two determinants of the property 
levy: the assessed property value and the property tax rate.  Local officials can change 
either of these two elements in order to alter the levy in response to an income shock.  
Reassessing the base is an unlikely approach to respond to a short-run drop in revenue, 
however, because the technical constraints of reassessing property values will take too 
long to address the immediate and temporary shock to non-property tax revenues.  
Another way to change the property assessment would be to alter the assessment ratio, if 
the jurisdiction is legally allowed to do so under state law.  An assessment ratio sets the 
taxable value of a given property at a certain percentage of the market value.  Changing 
the ratio would be an extreme measure that would likely require a local referendum and 
would likely take too long to be a suitable policy option for responding to short-run 
shocks.  Since the focus of the budget balancing model is on the short-run revenue 
elasticity I assume for the sake of simplicity that income-driven adjustments to the tax 
base occur beyond the time-horizon of the analysis. 
Under the residual rule of property tax determination, the budgeted levy is the 
difference between budgeted expenditures       and non-property tax revenue     .  
This is depicted in Equation (3.1) as a balanced budget identity.  The underlying 
assumption of this model is that, in a given time period, both     and     are assumed to 
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be functions of income      and they are independent of the property tax levy      .  
After local officials have chosen their level of expenditures and have finalized their 
projections of    , a millage rate is chosen that determines what the level of property 
taxation will be.  The short-run stability of the property tax will depend upon the relative 
magnitudes of the short-run income elasticities of    and    and the resulting variation 
in the budget gap.   
                   (3.1) 
Where: 
    is the Property Tax Levy in period t 
    is Budgeted Expenditures in period t 
    is Non-Property Tax Revenue in period t   
In contrast to the budget balancing rule of property tax determination, the 
alternative model that I use for comparison assumes that revenues from all sources are 
determined first and then expenditures are set given the available funds.  The only cause 
for changing the property tax rate would be to compensate for a low long-run revenue-
income elasticity of the base in order to maintain a near constant proportion of overall 
revenues generated by the property tax.  Local officials would not, however, adjust the 
rate in response to short-term shocks to revenues.  Instead they would keep the rate 
constant and the short-run stability of the property tax will reflect the short-run income-
elasticity of the property tax base.   
Because the budgeted levy is the difference between budgeted expenditures and 
expected receipts from other sources, the impact of growth in income on the size of the 
levy will depend on the income elasticity of demand for public expenditures (εBE,I) and 
the income-yield elasticity of non-property tax revenues (εNP,I).  The size of the change in 
the levy will be equal to the difference in expenditure growth and non-tax revenue 
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growth.    This occurs automatically through the local budgeting process.  The 
proportional change in the levy will also depend upon the share of total revenues derived 
from the property tax.   
In the following discussion I demonstrate how the interaction between income 
growth, expenditures and revenues operates under the budget balancing rule.  I first 
represent in Equation (3.2) the level of property tax in period 2 after an increase in 
income relative to period 1.  BE1 and NP1 represent budgeted expenditures and non-
property tax revenues, respectively, at period 1.  The percentage change in income from 
period 1 to period 2 is represented as %∆I1,2.  PT1 and PT2 represent the property tax levy 
in each period.  Equation 2 represents PT2 as the new difference between budgeted 
expenditures and non-property tax revenues after both quantities have adjusted to the new 
level of personal income.  This adjustment is given by multiplying each by one plus the 
product of their respective elasticities and the percent change in income over time.   
                                                 (3.2) 
To obtain the change in the property tax levy over time I subtract equation (3.1) from 
(3.2) to obtain: 
            
                                                  (3.3) 
Equation (3.3) simplifies to Equation (3.4) after noting that        
    
   
 and       
    
   
 
 
                                 (3.4) 
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I then convert to the percent change in the property tax from time period 1 by dividing 
       by    .   
 
      
   
 
                     
       
       (3.5) 
 
Dividing (3.5) by     allows us to obtain the revenue income elasticity of the 
property tax for jurisdictions adhering to the budget balancing rule, as expressed in (3.6).   
 
       
                     
            
 
  
                       
         
       (3.6) 
Another way of viewing Equation 3.6 is to convert the quantities to the proportion 
of revenues derived from the property tax. Let S represent the share of revenues derived 
from the property tax.   
  
       
   
 
Multiplying both the numerator and the denominator of (3.6) by  
 
   
 and substituting in 
for S yields the following form: 
      
                 
 
 
  
                     
 
 
  
             
 
            (3.7) 
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The property tax income elasticity described by (3.7) represents the variation in 
the property tax levy caused by public officials following the budget balancing rule.  The 
structure of (3.7) reveals that the degree of variation is determined by the relative income 
elasticities of expenditures and the non-property tax revenue.  The intuition behind this is 
that the relative magnitude of the elasticities determines whether the gap between 
budgeted expenditures and other revenues is growing or shrinking in response to a 
change in personal income.   Growth in the gap would be caused either by expenditures 
growing faster than the yield of non-property tax revenues, or, in the case of declining 
income, other revenues falling faster than expenditures.  If the gap is growing then the 
property tax rate will need to be raised in order to offset the gap.  The percent change in 
the property tax levy required to meet the budget requirement is dependent on the share 
of total revenues provided by the property tax.   
Equation (3.7) enables a comparison between the budget-driven volatility of the 
property tax with the stability of non-property tax revenues.  When             
officials‘ budget balancing behavior will cause the property tax levy to be more elastic 
than non-property tax revenues.  Alternatively, if             then the property tax will 
be less elastic than other revenues.  This latter case is interesting because it predicts that 
local governments would use the growth in their non-property tax revenues to reduce 
their reliance on the property tax.  This would partially negate the overall budgetary 
impact of the ―automatic‖ tax increases generated by the income elastic portion of the tax 
structure described by Oates (1975).  Expenditures would increase with an increase in 
income, but would do so according to the income elasticity of demand for public 
spending, rather than the income elasticity of the non-property tax revenue sources.   
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The direction of the effect of the property tax share of revenues (S) on       is 
inverse to the relationship between       and      .  Table 3.1 provides a summary of the 
effects.  If             then an increase in S reduces      .  In this case, an increase in 
income widens the gap between expenditures and non-property receipts.  Jurisdictions 
that rely on the property tax for a large share of their budget make a proportionally 
smaller adjustment to the property levy to compensate for the other slow-growing 
sources.  Governments that have diversified away from the property tax would need to 
make a larger percent change to the property levy to compensate for the drop in other 
revenues.  As  S approaches unity        converges on a lower limit of      .   
Table 3.1 Effect of the Tax Share (S) on       
 
Direction of Change in S (εE,I> εNP,I) (εE,I< εNP,I) (εE,I= εNP,I) 
Increase S Reduce εP,I Increase εP,I  Share is irrelevant 
Decrease S Increase εP,I Reduce εP,I Share is irrelevant 
 
Reversing the relationship to             causes an increase in S to raise the 
income elasticity of the property tax.  For values of S less than 1       will be less than 
     , but it will converge on the budgeted expenditure elasticity as S goes to 1.  More 
interestingly, as S decreases the income elasticity of the property tax declines and at a 
certain point can become negative.  In this case a drop in income may result in officials 
raising the property tax levy in order to compensate for a drop in other revenues.  For 
example, a school district that is highly dependent on state grants may need to 
significantly raise the property tax rate if the grants are drastically cut during a recession 
if it is to avoid major spending reductions.   
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 Lastly, if εE,I is equal to εNP,I then the property tax share falls out of Equation 3.7 
entirely.  In this case the other revenues grow in proportion to expenditures and the rate 
of the property tax is managed such that the revenue shares are held constant.   
This model of property tax determination describes how local officials would set 
the levy if they follow the budget-balancing rule.  The remainder of this paper seeks to 
test empirically whether there is any supporting evidence that this type of behavior 
actually exists.   
Preliminary Analysis 
The previous discussion outlined one possible model for determining the rate and 
the overall levy of the property tax.  The key feature of the budget-balancing model is 
that the level of the tax is set in response to budgeted expenditures and expected receipts 
from other revenue sources.  The alternative hypothesis that I consider in this analysis is 
that the property tax is set independently of other factors.  Instead, the primary factor in 
changing the millage rate is to offset a relatively income-inelastic property base.  
Williams et al. (1973) indicate that an income inelastic revenue source would require 
regular rate increases in order to maintain adequate yield in proportion to the long-run 
growth of the fiscal structure.  In contrast, the millage rate of the tax in a jurisdiction 
adhering to the budget-balancing rule would be expected to show a greater degree of 
variation as officials respond to short run shocks to income.   
A visual inspection of the pattern of property tax rate changes in Georgia shows a 
considerable variation in millage rates over time.  Figure 3.2 displays data from 185 
school districts  in Georgia from 1999-2007.  There are actually only 180 school districts 
in Georgia, but five independent school districts span two counties and assess different 
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property tax rates in each.  This graph is a histogram of the number of times each county 
changed its millage rate over the nine-year period.  Twenty-four school districts changed 
their millage rate all eight years over this period. Thirty-two districts changed the rate all 
but one of those years and another thirty districts changed their rate in all but two of these 
years.  Three districts kept their rates constant over the entire period.  Regular changes to 
the millage rate are not necessarily evidence that the property tax is used to adjust for 
expenditure growth if these changes are done merely to compensate for a slow growing 
base, as described by Joyce and Mullins (1991).  It would be expected, however, that if 
compensating for an inelastic base were the primary motivation for changing the rate then 
most rate changes would be positive.   
Figure 3.2 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 depicts the same millage rate changes listed in Figure 3.21, but they 
separate out the increases from the reductions in the rates.  Figure 3.3 shows that the 
positive and negative rate changes in the school districts are similarly distributed with a 
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left-skewed shape, though the reductions have a fatter right-side tail.  The overall change 
counts, however, show that, across all 185 districts, the tax rates were increased 386 
times and reduced 543 times.   These counts indicate that reductions to the property tax 
rate occur with similar, if not greater frequency as rate hikes.  This pattern does not 
appear consistent with the explanation that rate changes are primarily driven by the need 
to compensate for an inelastic property tax base.   
Figure 3.3 
 
One caveat to this analysis of the rate changes is that these numbers do not 
account for the size of the change, only the direction.  If the rate reductions are relatively 
small in comparison to the rate increases the overall pattern would fit a policy of 
adjustment for a lagging base.  Also, there are other factors that may cause a rate 
reduction other than adherence to the budget balancing rule.  In Georgia the adoption of 
the Local Option Sales Tax required the local governments to ‗roll back‘ their property 
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tax levies dollar for dollar for their sales tax receipts.  The Georgia Municipal 
Association summarized the manner that the rollback is computed:  
―…[E]ach jurisdiction‘s governing authority must calculate the millage 
rate necessary to produce property tax revenues which, combined with 
other local revenues, would generate sufficient funds to cover the 
jurisdiction‘s general fund expenditures for that year.  The millage rate is 
reduced by the amount that would produce an amount equal to that 
jurisdiction‘s LOST distribution from the previous year.   The remainder is 
the millage rate that is used to calculate property tax bills. ‖ (Georgia 
Municipal Association 2011 pp. 1)   
In practice, however, local governments can choose the initial millage rate for the year so 
that the post-rollback rate generates the desired level of property tax revenue.    Also, 
after the initial rollback has been implemented the future rollbacks will be much smaller; 
the first rollback adjusts for the entire new revenues stream while subsequent rollbacks 
adjust for growth in the existing revenue source.   
This basic analysis of property tax rate changes is not conclusive evidence that 
local officials are setting the rate according to the balanced budget rule, but they are 
suggestive that this type of behavior may be a factor in the determination of local levies.  
The following section presents a more thorough analytical approach to identifying this 
effect. 
Empirical Approach 
In order to test the validity of the budget-balancing property tax framework, I 
generate two sets of short-run income elasticites for the property tax.  The first will be 
calculated using the budget balancing model of property tax determination.  The second 
income elasticity is estimated using the comparison model in which local officials make 
no adjustments to the millage rate in order to compensate for short-run shocks to other 
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revenue sources.  Under this approach the tax rate is assumed to be held constant in the 
near term and the short-run variability of the property tax levy solely determined the 
variability of the property tax base.  Using both sets of elasticities I will generate 
forecasts of the property tax levy given actual changes of income and compare the two 
models on their predictive power.    
I will first estimate the key parameters of Equation (3.7) by performing separate 
estimates of εE,I and εNP,I for school districts in Georgia. These estimates will be taken 
over a subset of the panel data I possess.  I will then use the estimates of the elasticities 
along with the actual changes to personal income to generate predicted values for the 
property levy over the remainder of the time series.  I will then generate alternative 
predicted values for the property tax levy in which the levy is independent of other 
revenues and is dependent on changes in the property tax base and other economic 
characteristics.   
To estimate the elasticity parameters, I adapt the methodology employed by Sobel 
and Holcombe (1996) and Bruce et. al (2006), though with some key differences.  In both 
of these papers, the authors had access to long time series of data of approximately 40 
years for their respective tax bases.  Bruce et. al were able to estimate their model 
separately for each state, while Sobel and Holcombe only needed to estimate one model 
for their national aggregate of state tax bases.  The data available for this analysis covers 
a shorter time span (1998 – 2009) and it was therefore not be possible to run separate 
time-series models for each local jurisdiction.  On the other hand, the panel of school 
districts I have developed covers 159 separate districts.  A greater number of cross-
sectional units may compensate for the shorter period of observation. 
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Both Holcombe (1996) and Bruce et. al (2006) employ Error Corrected Models 
(ECM) to estimate short-run revenue-income elasticities.  An ECM model is employed 
when it is possible that the long-run effect of a change in income may not be fully 
realized on yield of a tax until after an adjustment period.  ―[S]tability between tax bases 
and personal income need not hold in the short run; any differences between short and 
long-run income elasticities create deviations between the long-run equilibrium base and 
the current period base.‖ (Bruce et. al 2006, pg 319) The difference between the current 
level of the tax base and its long-run value can be measured using the current-period error 
term from an estimate of the long run income elasticity.  It is therefore necessary to first 
estimate the long-run income-revenue elasticity and then use the residuals from that 
regression to inform the estimation of the short-run elasticity. 
The long-run revenue income elasticity was estimated by both Holcombe (1996) 
and Bruce et. al (2006) using Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares Models (DOLS) .  These 
models use leads and lags of changes to the explanatory variable to correct for serial 
correlation.  The structure of the DOLS model is shown below: 
  
         
              
    
     (3.8) 
I estimate equation (3.8) using both expenditures and non-property tax revenues as the 
dependent variable.  The   term represents district-level personal income.   The   
operator indicates the first difference over time.  Sobel and Holcombe indicate that 
typically five sets of leads and lags are used in DOLS, but due to the relatively shorter 
time series in this panel I only use two degrees of leads and lags.  At two degrees the 
second set of leads and lags were no longer statistically significant. 
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 After Equation (3.8) is estimated for both expenditures and non-property tax 
revenues the residuals are retained to create the error correction term.  The current period 
residual is given in Equation (3.9).   
       
 
   
            
               
    (3.9) 
The ECM model controls for the deviation from the long-run equilibrium that exists at 
the beginning of the period.  It does this by including the error term from the previous 
period,     
 , as shown below:  
  
      
       
      
         
    
  (3.10) 
The    term is the short-run revenue elasticity.  The    term represents the percent 
reduction in the deviation from the long-run equilibrium that occurs each period over 
time.   
An implicit assumption of the ECM model described by (10) is that the 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is a symmetric response whether the jurisdiction is 
currently above or below the long-term equilibrium.  Bruce et. al (2006) relax this 
assumption and allow asymmetric responses by introducing an indicator term (DB) that 
measures whether the deviation was positive or negative.  This asymmetric ECM model 
is given below.   
  
      
       
      
        
      
      
        
         
        
    
 
 (11) 
 Where    
    if   
    and 0 otherwise 
The first term,   , allows for a test of whether the short-run response to a change in 
income is more elastic when revenues are above their long-run equilibrium. 
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The final step in constructing a residual-rule revenue elasticity for the property tax 
is to take the short-run elasticity estimates for expenditures and non-property tax 
revenues and combine them with school district property tax shares to complete the 
formula given in Equation (3.7).     
 I also estimate the short-run revenue elasticity of the property tax bases using 
assessed property values as the dependent variable in equations (3.8) and (3.11).  This 
short-run elasticity represents the alternative model of property tax determination, in 
which the levy is expected to grow in proportion to assessed property value.    
Data 
 
This analysis is performed using data from Georgia school districts from 1998 
through 2009.  Each of the 159 counties in Georgia has a county school district.  There 
are also several other independent school districts in Georgia that align with municipal 
boundaries.  Because of the difficulty in obtaining comparable income data for the 
independent districts I have omitted them from this analysis.   
The data for this study were obtained from several sources.  Information on the 
actual receipts and expenditures of the school districts, as well as the property tax millage 
rates were obtained from the Georgia Department of Education.  Information on the 
assessed values of the property tax bases was obtained from the Georgia Department of 
Revenue.  Personal income data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis within the 
 107 
U.S. Department of Commerce
25
.  All dollar amounts were inflation adjusted to 1983-
1984 dollars with the Bureau of Labor Statistics South Region CPI Index.  
I measure expenditures using the total operating expenditures for each school 
district for the fiscal year.  Non-property tax revenue is all revenue coming from local, 
state or federal sources, minus ad-valorem property tax receipts.  The largest source of 
school funding is the Quality Basic Education (QBE) grant program.  This is a state aid 
program that is a combination of a foundation grant with an equalization grant.  For 
further explanation of the specifics of Georgia‘s education funding programs see 
Rubenstein and Sjoquist (2003).   The QBE program provides approximately one-third of 
primary and secondary education funding for county school districts over this period.   
The property tax is the second most prominent source of education funding.  It 
delivers approximately a quarter of school funds.  One potential concern for this analysis 
is that the State of Georgia has placed a statutory cap on school district millage rates of 
20 mills.  This cap can be overridden, however, with the approval of local voters.  If the 
cap were binding it would restrict the ability of local officials to apply the budget 
balancing rule.  In 2007 three school districts had property tax rates that were higher than 
20 mills and four counties had property tax rates that were at the limit.  Figure 3.4 is a 
histogram of property tax rates for 2007.  The average property tax rate for that year was 
14.88 mills and the median rate was 14.942 mills.  I therefore conclude that the statutory 
                                                 
 
 
25
 Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce 
  
CA1-3 Footnotes http://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/footnotes.cfm?tablename=CA1-3  
Regional Economic Information System 
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limit is not a significant enough deterrent to raise the tax rate above 20 mills that it 
significantly affects the distribution of the tax rates.   
Figure 3.4 
 
 Aside from the property tax and the QBE grants, school districts in Georgia rely 
on a variety of other revenue sources.  Additional local own-source funding comes from 
the Local Option Sales Tax, fees from the sale of breakfasts, lunches and textbooks, 
appropriations from city or county governments, tuition charges for students from outside 
the school district and local fundraisers.  Some local school districts also receive revenue 
from additional sales taxes on top of the LOST.  The State provides additional revenue on 
top of the QBE grants.  These funds come from lottery receipts, nutrition grants, and ‗on 
behalf‘ payments that go to employee benefit systems.   The federal government sends 
direct grants that fund nutrition programs as well as additional funding that is disbursed 
through the Georgia Department of Education.  The final revenue stream comes through 
miscellaneous financial sources such as the issuance of bonds and the sales of fixed 
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assets.  Figure 3.5 displays the aggregate revenue shares from each source from 1999-
2007.  
Figure 3.5.  
 
Long and Short Run Elasticity Estimates 
 
The discussion of the estimation results is divided into two sections.  The first part 
will present the estimation of the residual-rule elasticities.  The latter part discusses the 
naïve model of property tax determination in which the levy grows in proportion to the 
property tax base. 
Residual-Rule Elasticity Estimates 
In this section I will first discuss the income elasticity estimates for expenditures 
and non-property tax revenues.  I then discus the residual-rule computation of the income 
elasticity of the property tax.   
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Table 3.2 provides a summary of the long and short-run elasticity estimates 
obtained from Equations 3.8, 3.10 and 3.11.  This table displays the income elasticity 
estimates for expenditures and non-property tax revenues – the two sets of income 
elasticities needed to compute the budget-balancing version of the property tax income 
elasticity.  This table also displays the income elasticities for the property tax base which 
are used for the alternative model.  These estimates are average elasticities for all county 
school districts in Georgia.  Both expenditures and non-property tax revenues exhibit 
income elasticities close to unity, with expenditures being slightly more income sensitive 
than non-property revenues.  The value of 0.855 for the long-run non-property tax 
revenue revenue-income elasticity is close to similar long-run elasticity estimates for 
sales tax receipts reported by Holcombe and Sobel (0.691) and by Bruce et. al (0.811).  
Both of the long-run estimates are statistically significant.  I calculated 95% confidence 
intervals for both long-run elasticity estimates and found that the difference between the 
two estimates is statistically significant as well.  Table 3.3 presents greater detail on the 
estimated coefficients from the long-run regressions. 
I estimated both the symmetric and asymmetric specifications for the short-run 
elasticities.  These are given in Table 3.4.  The symmetric variant of the short-run 
expenditure-income elasticity yielded an estimate of 0.765.  This short-run expenditure 
elasticity is slightly lower than the long-run elasticity, suggesting that school district 
spending is less-sensitive to immediate income shocks than the overall growth trend, but 
the difference between the elasticities is not statistically significant.  Allowing for an 
asymmetric response, expenditures exhibit short-run income elasticities of 0.641 when 
below the long-run average and 1.008 when above the average.  Both the above and 
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below estimates are statistically significant and therefore are evidence of an asymmetric 
response.  Changes to the level of public school spending appear to be more responsive to 
changes in income in years that spending is above its long-run equilibrium.   
Table 3. 2  Summary of Estimated Income Elasticities 
  Equation Mean T Statistic 
Expenditures Elasticities 
Long-run Expenditures elasticity (8) 0.952* (40.24) 
Short-run Expenditures elasticity (symmetric) (10) 0.765* (3.74) 
Short-run Expenditures elasticity above equilibrium (11) 1.008* (3.54) 
Short-run Expenditures elasticity below equilibrium (11) 0.641** (2.59) 
Non-Property Tax Revenue Elasticities 
Long-run Non-Property Tax Revenue elasticity 
(8) 
0.855* (52.68) 
Short-run Non-Property tax elasticity (symmetric) 
(10) 
0.324+ (1.97) 
Short-run Non-Property tax Elasticity above 
equilibrium 
(11) 
0.173 (0.76) 
Short-run Non-Property tax Elasticity below 
equilibrium 
(11) 
0.412+ (1.823) 
Alternative Model – Property Tax Base Elasticities 
Long-run Property Tax Base elasticity 
(8) 
0.950* (53.41) 
Short-run Property tax elasticity  (symmetric) 
(10) 
0.377* (3.94) 
Short-run Property Tax Base elasticity above 
equilibrium 
(11) 
0.875* (6.41) 
Short-run Property Tax base elasticity below 
equilibrium 
(11) 
-0.234+ (-1.91) 
 
The short-run non-property tax revenue income elasticity is less-than half of the 
long-run elasticity.  The symmetric estimate is statistically significant and indicates that a 
one-percent increase in personal income is associated with a 0.324 percent increase in 
revenues.  The asymmetric elasticity is not statistically significant when revenues are 
above their long-run average.  One factor that may explain the short-run stability of non-
property tax revenues is the large portion of school funding that comes from the state 
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QBE program.  A portion of the grant program designed to provide a foundation level of 
funding that reflects the cost of providing an education.  Although this cost should only 
be affected by the long-run rate of income growth, the state legislature sets annually in 
the budget what the cost assumptions will be.  This allows legislators to take into account 
the budgetary impact of the cost assumptions and adjust the level of QBE funding 
according to economic conditions (Ross Rubenstein and Sjoquist 2003).   
Table 3.3 Long-Run Revenue Income Elasticity Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Expenditures 
Non-Property 
Tax Revenues 
Net Assessed 
Property Value 
        
Log of I 0.952* 0.855* 0.950* 
  (40.243) (52.688) (53.409) 
First Lag of ΔI -0.722+ -1.263* 0.460 
  (-1.792) (-5.021) (1.214) 
Second Lag of  ΔI -2.366* -0.843* -0.307 
  (-6.560) (-3.394) (-0.921) 
First Lead of  ΔI -0.237 -0.428+ 0.968* 
  (-0.710) (-1.836) (3.211) 
Second Lead of  ΔI -0.158 0.198 0.521 
  (-0.421) (0.778) (1.593) 
Constant 5.288* 5.988* 8.004* 
  (18.430) (29.964) (36.104) 
        
Observations 1,260 1,237 1,270 
R-squared 0.902 0.939 0.917 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses  
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1  
 
I have computed short-run property tax income elasticities using the estimates of 
the short-run income elasticities of school district expenditures and non-property tax 
revenues.  These are computed by applying Equation (3.7) to the estimates.   
It was necessary to make an adjustment to the calculation of the property tax share 
    due to an influential number of records with missing or erroneous data on property 
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tax receipts.  Rather than using the data on actual property tax receipts, I computed the 
statutory levy, which is the amount that the local officials legally obligate taxpayers to 
pay when they set the tax rate.  The statutory levy is calculated by multiplying the 
property tax rate by the net assessed property value.  The difference between the statutory 
levy and actual receipts is the uncollected property tax for the year less any receipts from 
previous years.  It could be argued that using the statutory levy is a superior measure for 
the tax share calculation as it is the actual policy target of local officials while actual 
receipts are an uncertain quantity. 
Table 3.4 Short-Run Revenue Income Elasticity Estimates 
  
Symmetric Error Correction 
Models 
Asymmetric Error Correction 
Models 
VARIABLES Expenditures 
Non Property 
Tax Revenue Expenditures 
Non-Property 
Tax Revenue 
          
ΔI 0.765* 0.324+ 0.641** 0.412+ 
  (3.747) (1.970) (2.599) (1.823) 
ECT -0.154* -0.260* -0.239* -0.212* 
  (-9.977) (-9.078) (-8.512) (-5.469) 
Above LR 
Average*ΔI     0.367 -0.238 
      (1.111) (-0.763) 
Above LR 
Average*ECT     0.150* -0.078 
      (4.618) (-1.402) 
Constant 0.091* 0.021* 0.078* 0.027* 
  (19.578) (3.631) (13.516) (4.095) 
          
Observations 1,259 1,234 1,259 1,234 
R-squared 0.081 0.130 0.094 0.133 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses  
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1  
 
For S I use the average ratio of the property tax levy to total revenues across the 
159 county school districts between 1999 through 2007.  In order to compute a measure 
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of central tendency for the computed property tax elasticity it is necessary to account for 
the algebraic properties of random variables.   
                   
                  
 
    
 
              
I treat the mean property tax share as a scalar since it is an observed characteristic of the 
population of counties over this period.  I assume that the estimates of the elasticities for 
expenditures and non-property tax revenues are independently distributed normal 
variables.  The mean of the calculated property tax elasticity is simply computed by 
substituting the value of S and the estimates of        and       in to Equation (3.7).  I 
calculated the variance by taking the variances of the estimates of       and       from 
the variance-covariance matrices of their respective regression equations and calculating 
the following value: 
       
  
 
       
  
         
Table 3.5 displays the results of the computations.  Two sets of elasticity 
computations were made using the symmetric and asymmetric elasticity estimates, 
respectively.  Four elasticities can be computed using the asymmetric results because 
there are four possible combinations of the expenditure and non-property tax revenue 
elasticities depending on whether each value was above or below its long-run average.  
Only a single computation is made using the symmetric estimates.   
The revenue-rule computations of the short-run income elasticity of the property 
tax are higher than the elasticity estimate for both expenditures and non-property tax 
revenues.  The symmetric estimates yield an elasticity of 2.44 while the values generated 
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from the asymmetric estimates range from 1.51 to 4.18.  The income elasticity 
computations are higher when either expenditures or non-property tax revenues are above 
their long-run averages.  This suggests that the most active ‗residual rule‘ adjustments to 
the rate tend to occur when revenues and spending are above their long-run trend and a 
downward adjustment is imminent.    
Table 3. 5  Short-Run Income Elasticity Computations for the Property Tax Using 
the Budget Balancing Rule 
Symmetric Short-Run Elasticities 
  Mean 2.44   
  Variance 1.61   
        
Asymmetric Short Run Elasticities 
    
Non-Property Tax Revenue 
  
Expenditures   Below Above 
Below Mean  1.51 2.42 
  Variance 2.62 2.65 
Above Mean  3.27 4.18 
  Variance 3.09 3.12 
 
Property Tax Base Elasticities 
I have estimated the long and short-run income elasticities of assessed net 
property values for all county school districts in Georgia and the results are displayed in 
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.6.  These estimates are used to generate a comparison set of 
property tax revenue projections in the following section.  The elasticity estimates 
themselves are of some interest, however.  The long-run income elasticity of assessed 
property values is nearly the same as the expenditure income elasticity and greater than 
the non-property tax revenue elasticity.  This result is contrary to the conventional 
understanding that growth in the assessed value of the property tax base is slower than 
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the rate of income growth.  If over the long run assessed values track income growth then 
there would be little need for regular rate adjustments to compensate for low long-run 
income-elasticities.   
Table 3.6  Short-Run Elasticity Estimates for Net Assessed Property Value 
  Property Tax Base 
VARIABLES Symmetric Asymmetric 
      
ΔI 0.377* -0.234+ 
  (3.937) (-1.912) 
ECT -0.013 -0.045** 
  (-1.558) (-2.531) 
Above LR Average*ΔI   1.109* 
    (6.819) 
Above LR 
Average*ECT   0.010 
    (0.348) 
Constant 0.060* 0.059* 
  (20.241) (14.118) 
      
Observations 1,111 1,111 
R-squared 0.016 0.051 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
The symmetric short-run elasticity appears to indicate that assessed values are 
relatively inelastic to immediate changes to income.  Allowing for an asymmetric 
response reveals, however that when assessed values are above their long-run equilibrium 
the short-run response is only slightly lower (0.875) than the long-run elasticity.  In 
contrast, when assessed values are below their long-run equilibrium they actually have an 
inverse relationship with income changes over the short-run.  This large divergence in the 
short-run elasticities is likely influenced by the highly volatile housing market over the 
most recent recession and a relatively long delay in adjusting assessments to falling 
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housing prices.  Assessments may have been just catching up with the rapid rise in 
property values over the middle of the first decade of the 2000‘s and were continuing to 
rise even as incomes were beginning to fall with the onset of the recession.  Table 3.5 
gives full details on the short-run estimates for the property tax assessments.   
Post-Estimation 
The objective of this post-estimation exercise is to generate two sets of 
predictions of the property tax levy and observe which model is more accurate.  If the set 
of projections generated using the residual rule of property tax determination is a better 
predictor then this will provide empirical support for the argument that county officials 
are setting their levies in response to receipts from other revenue sources and their 
budgeted expenditures.   
I calculate the revenue-rule elasticity         using Equation (3.7) for each school 
district/year record with the estimates of       and       and the counties‘ property tax 
revenue share for the year    .  This is in contrast to the aggregate calculation of       I 
performed in the previous section that used the average value of   across all districts and 
years.   After computing       for each county using Equation (3.7) I calculate the 
predicted property tax levy according to the residual rule using the following formula: 
                                                           (3.12) 
I then take the difference between the projected levy at time t with the actual levy for that 
time period.  I divide this difference by the current period levy to get the percent 
difference of the projection from the levy.  For the comparison, I generate a predicted 
levy using the assessed property tax base income elasticity as follows: 
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                                                          (3.13) 
I compute the percent difference of the comparison levy from the actual levy in the same 
fashion as I did for the residual-rule levy.   
 The projections were computed for the years 2000 through 2007.  Table 3.7 
presents the mean, median and confidence intervals for the percent differences of the 
projections from the actual levies.  The projections were computed using both the 
symmetric and the asymmetric sets of elasticity estimates.  The point-values for the 
average difference between the predicted value and the actual value are smaller for the 
residual-rule projections using both the symmetric and the asymmetric approaches. The 
difference in means is statistically significant; therefore on average the residual rule 
model provides a better fit to the actual levies than the comparison model. 
 Table 3.7 Years of Superior Fit Using the Residual Rule Model, by County 
    Count of Districts 
Years 
 
Symmetric Asymmetric 
0  3 3 
1   12 12 
2   22 26 
3   32 36 
4   25 22 
5   22 21 
6   20 24 
7   18 13 
8   5 2 
 
   Looking at the average difference across all counties obscures much of the unit-
level variation in the performance of the predictors.  Another way to look at the 
projections is to examine the frequency with which the residual-rule projection fares 
better than the assessment-driven model. Figure 3.5 displays the annual percentage of 
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school district levies that were more accurately predicted using the residual rule model.  
Over the eight years displayed the residual rule was a better predictor for more than half 
of the counties for only four years.  There appears to be a slight upward trend in the 
percentages, suggesting that the residual-rule approach to setting the property tax rate 
may have been more prevalent in the later half of the time series. 
Figure 3.6. 
 
 
One important piece of information that the annual percentages do not convey is 
whether it is the same districts every year following the residual rule, or whether having a 
superior fit is more randomly distributed across the district/year units of observation.  I 
investigate this issue by counting the number of years for each school district that the 
residual rule model gave a better fit and then examining the frequency of the counts 
across the population of school districts.  Table 3.8 gives a frequency of the year counts 
for both the symmetric and the asymmetric projections.  Looking at frequencies from the 
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symmetric set of estimations, I observe that 5 counties had a better fit with the residual 
rule model over all eight years of the projection period.  Nearly 41% of counties were 
more accurately fit by the residual rule model for five or more years of the period.  This 
suggests that these counties levy-setting behavior appears to be more accurately 
described by the residual rule model of property tax determination, rather than a income-
adjusted tax base model.  The projections from the asymmetric model depict a similar 
pattern, though those projections are also slightly less accurate predictors.   
Table 3.8 Comparison of Projection Accuracies 
  Mean Std 
Dev 
Median Lower 95% 
CL For 
Mean 
Upper 95% 
CL For 
Mean 
Symmetric Elasticities           
  Residual-Rule Projection 0.013 0.115 0.017 0.007 0.02 
  
Comparison Levy 
Projection 
0.064 0.074 0.052 0.06 0.068 
Asymmetric Elasticities           
  
Residual-Rule Projection -
0.002 
0.138 0.01 -0.009 0.006 
  
Comparison Levy 
Projection 
0.064 0.074 0.052 0.06 0.068 
 
The next question is whether the districts that receive a better fit through the 
residual rule model have different characteristics than the other districts.  Table 3.9 
provides summary statistics for all school districts both in aggregate and broken out by 
whether the model gave a superior fit for 5 or more years.  This table shows that those 
school districts with five or more years of superior fit have, on average, a higher income 
per capita and have a higher population density than the districts with a poorer fit.  
Additionally, the better fit districts also have larger property tax shares.  Returning to 
Table 3.1, which describes how changing S will affect      , helps describe what the 
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difference in the tax share means.  When the expenditure income elasticity is greater than 
the non-property tax revenue elasticity then a larger S will reduce the magnitude of the 
changes to the property tax needed to adhere to the residual rule.  So the districts with the 
largest tax shares would be making proportionally smaller changes to their levies in 
response to expenditures and other revenues.  For jurisdictions with a smaller S, the 
political cost of making the proportionally large changes to their levies needed to adhere 
to the rule may be too high.  It makes sense then that the districts with the lowest political 
cost of following the rule exhibit fiscal behavior that is better predicted by this model.   
Table 3.9  Demographics by Model Fit 
  N 
Obs 
Variable Mean Median Lower 
95% CL 
for Mean 
Upper 
95% CL 
for Mean 
All 
Districts 
159 Population 
Density 
189.4 63.35 129.07 249.72 
Income Per 
Capita 
$27,896 $27,034 $27,050 $28,741 
Property Tax 
Share 
23.0% 21.0% 22.0% 25.0% 
Four or 
Fewer 
Years 
94 Population 
Density 
85.71 37.63 42.72 128.69 
Income Per 
Capita 
$25,847 $25,127 $24,977 $26,717 
Property Tax 
Share 
19.0% 18.0% 18.0% 21.0% 
Five or 
More 
Years 
65 Population 
Density 
339.35 151.56 212.15 466.55 
Income Per 
Capita 
$30,859 $29,580 $29,487 $32,231 
Property Tax 
Share 
29.0% 27.0% 26.0% 33.0% 
Final Discussion 
The ability to identify empirically which local governments implement the 
residual rule of property tax determination raises other questions that should be the topic 
of future research.  The first step would be to move from identification of the policy to 
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evaluating its effectiveness and overall impact on local fiscal structures.  The underlying 
objective of following the residual rule is to balance the budget by offsetting cyclical 
shocks to other revenue sources.  It would be interesting to investigate whether local 
governments that follow this approach have a more stable fiscal structure in aggregate.  Is 
there a tradeoff between a more stable overall structure and a predictable property tax 
levy?  One way to address this would be to construct a panel over a longer time period so 
that the elasticities could be estimated for each jurisdiction individually.  Then the 
residual-rule property tax elasticity could be used in a second stage analysis as an 
explanatory variable for a regression on overall revenue stability.  This would be one 
potential approach to evaluating the policy's effectiveness in promoting local stability. 
 Another interesting question is how continued revenue diversification would 
affect the predictability of the property tax in jurisdictions that use this approach to 
setting their levies.  In the case of Georgia, where the short-run expenditure elasticity was 
higher than the non-property tax revenue elasticity, further reductions in S would increase 
the size of the changes in the levy needed to follow the residual rule.  This may lead 
jurisdictions to abandon the rule, potentially losing the ability to smooth the performance 
of their overall revenues, or continue with the rule and further reduce the predictability of 
the property tax at an unknown political cost.  On the other hand, there may be 
jurisdictions where non-property tax revenues are more income elastic than expenditures 
which could cause a reduction in S to actually stabilize the property tax levy.   
 It may also be interesting to further investigate how the tools of investment 
management may be used to account for characteristics of the property tax within a 
portfolio of revenue sources.  Gentry and Ladd‘s (1994) critique that the property tax 
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defies the traditional portfolio approach to modeling revenue stability may be weakened 
if the structure of the residual rule can be incorporated into the characteristics of the 
revenue portfolio.  The model presented in this paper provides an approach to predicting 
the pattern of rate changes enacted by local officials over economic cycles.  Incorporating 
this information into a portfolio model may produce revenue structure recommendations 
that improve the overall stability of local finances.   
 Within the context of public financial management, this essay also identifies a 
policy regime that local jurisdictions lose access to when they implement property tax 
limitations.  As discussed earlier, it is not possible to follow the residual rule when tax 
rates and overall levies are capped.  The residual rule is one of the channels that the 
tradeoff between predictability and stability may be made.  Future research on whether 
the residual rule increases overall stability will highlight exactly what tax-limited 
jurisdictions are giving up.  
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CHAPTER IV  
CONTRACT DESIGN FOR EXTREME OUTSOURCING: A CASE 
STUDY OF SANDY SPRINGS, GA 
 
Introduction 
The rise of the contract city as a new form of municipal governance presents 
many thorny issues for the theory and practice of public management.  The contract city 
model is an extreme form of municipal outsourcing in which the city enters into 
comprehensive private partnerships for the production of the majority of municipal 
functions.  On the practitioner side, cities adopting this model of service delivery see the 
role of the city manager shift from administering public resources to monitoring and 
enforcing contracts (Prager 2008).  For researchers interested in the theory of public 
contract management, this form of government challenges the conventional approach to 
studying internal vs. external production decisions.   The question shifts from whether a 
single service function is a candidate for external production (see for example Levin & 
Tadelis, 2007), to whether a large set of service delivery and managerial functions can be 
outsourced at once.  A key difference between the two models of governance is that 
rather than evaluating the economic merits of outsourcing each function individually, 
contract city managers choose the overall service delivery regime and contract for an 
array of services.  Additionally, limited competition in the market for the private 
production of municipal functions, forces contract city officials to evaluate bids from a 
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small set of potential service providers who are willing and able to undertake the 
production of the bulk of municipal functions.   
In this essay I investigate the implications that the contract city model of 
governance has for contract management.  It raises questions such as: does the scope of 
this type of public-private partnership facilitate interactions between outsourced functions 
that create greater contract management problems than would have otherwise existed if 
the services were provided by different partners?  Are there synergies among certain 
municipal functions that when they are outsourced together increase the difficulty of 
contract management by creating the potential for conflicts of interest?  Does the design 
of the actual contracts between contract cities and their private partners reflect the unique 
managerial challenges that could arise with this scale of outsourcing? 
I investigate these questions through a case study of the initial contracts signed by 
the city of Sandy Springs, Georgia with its primary contractor, the private firm CH2M 
Hill.  I identify three key categories of municipal functions that are interrelated and, when 
outsourced to a single private partner, create the potential for a conflict of interest.  These 
three functional categories are: 1) the production of direct services, 2) the creation of 
managerial and financial information and 3) administrative and control functions.  My 
analysis of the contract documents indicates that combining this broad scope of services 
in a single public-private partnership creates the potential for ―negative synergies‖ which 
raise the cost of monitoring and managing contractor performance above what would be 
required if the functions were individually outsourced to separate contractors.  I also 
identify beneficial structures that can counteract some of the adverse incentives created 
by the scope of the contracts.  These features would not be present in the contracts 
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associated with traditional municipal public-private partnerships that do not exhibit the 
same scope of outsourcing.  The identification of these interrelationships between 
municipal functions can inform the design of contracts, especially when determining how 
contract cities should allocate functions across various private partners.   
This essay begins with a review of the literature covering the local government 
outsourcing and the contract city model of public management.  Section III introduces the 
city of Sandy Springs and gives some background on how its public-private partnership 
with CH2M Hill was developed.  Section IV discusses the textual analysis approach that I 
employ to examine the contracts for services.  Section V presents the findings from my 
analysis and Section VI offers the conclusions and policy recommendations from my 
analysis. 
Before commencing I must emphasize that this analysis is confined to the 
incentives that are embedded within the contracts and the potential behaviors that they 
may encourage.  In no way does this study examine any actual behaviors on the part of 
CH2M Hill and does not imply that any action has at any time been taken in conflict of 
interest with respect to the City of Sandy Springs.  The objective of this analysis is to 
inform both public and private partners on some of the potential pitfalls in this new form 
of municipal administration.  I also hope to provide information of academic value on 
how the principal-agent relationship operates within the context of the contract city 
model of governance.  
The Contract City 
The contract city is an alternative model of municipal governance that is 
characterized by the outsourcing of nearly all city functions.  Services in contract cities 
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are either produced through arrangements with other nearby local governments, as in the 
case of Highlands, California (see Ni, 2010), or through public-private partnerships with 
for-profit firms and non-profit organizations.  Contracts may be secured with multiple 
partners or with a single firm that provides the bulk of services and may employ multiple 
sub-contractors.  The key distinction between a contract city and other municipalities 
which engage in outsourcing is the scale of this activity.  Bradbury and Waechter (2009) 
describe it as an ―all but the top‖ approach to outsourcing where merely a few key 
managerial positions and their support staff remain as direct city employees.   
Current research into contract cities has identified a variety of ways in which this 
form of service delivery challenges much of the framework for understanding contract 
management in cities which only outsource a small share of their functions.  One key 
difference is that the nature of the work involved in administering the operation of a city 
changes when all service production functions are performed externally.  Prager (2008) 
finds in his analysis of the city of Weston, Florida that the role of a contract city manager 
is ―monitoring contracts and taking measures in those instances when a contractor‘s 
performance fails to meet expectations.‖  In contrast, the city manager‘s role in a 
traditionally structured city primarily consists of the direct management of human and 
physical resources.   
Another key feature of many contract cities is that they adopted this model at the 
time of their incorporation, rather than shifting to it from a traditional own-source 
production regime.  The city of Highlands, CA was designed from its inception to obtain 
essentially all of its services through contracts with other nearby local governments (Ni 
2010).  Similarly, the cities of Sandy Springs, GA and Weston, FL contracted with 
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private firms and with other local governments for the entirety of their services at the 
time of their incorporations.   
The decision-making process for whether to pursue a self-producing or contract 
city service production regime is categorically different than the traditional make-or-buy 
decision that is studied in the existing contracting literature.  The traditional approach 
applies transaction cost economics to determine whether it would be efficient to 
outsource an individual city function (e.g. Brown & Potoski, 2003b).  Levin and Tadaelis 
(2007) follow this line of research as they test their hypothesis that there are economies 
of scope for contract management.  They estimate that ―a given service is 3-5% more 
likely to be privatized if a city privatizes one additional other service.‖  While scope 
economies may encourage cities to shift gradually into contract-intensive production 
regimes, this framework is based on a marginal analysis of each service function and 
does not explain why newly formed cities with no history of contract management 
experience would outsource essentially their entire operations to private partners.   
Bradbury and Waechter identify the role of ideology as an important factor behind 
the initial decision to employ a contract city model during the incorporation of Weston, 
Florida.  Rather than performing a rational analysis and calculating the relative costs of 
the make-or-buy alternatives for all service areas, the decision was influenced by an 
underlying belief that outsourcing would generate cost savings and improve operations.  
The authors report that after several years of operation some functions were eventually 
shifted to internal production, such as the negotiation and monitoring of existing 
contracts with other private partners.  By shifting these functions to in-house production, 
the city of Weston responded to the actual costs of contract management for these 
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administrative functions and found that it would be more efficient to make a slight 
movement away from their prior commitment to a pure contract city model.  While 
ideology may play a strong role during the period leading up to the creation of a contract 
city, efficiency and pragmatism can, over time, counterbalance ideological commitment 
to a single model of governance. 
A recent theme in the contract management literature been the tension between 
"hollow state" arguments and the finding that local governments can outsource contract 
administration to increase overall managerial capacity.  A dialogue has occurred between 
the leading authors behind both arguments, with Milward and Provan developing the 
former and Brown and Potoski pursuing the latter.  Milward and Provan (2000) 
summarize the key findings and insights they obtained from multiple studies they had 
performed during the prior decade.  Over the course of their research program they 
develop a concept of a ―hollow state‖ to indicate the ―degree of separation between a 
government and the service it provides.‖  Their research highlights the potential for 
principal-agent problems to arise between the government and its contractors and that the 
government faces the risk of losing legitimacy if it appears to be trying to shift the 
responsibility for adequate service provision to third parties.   
One of Milward and Provan's insights is that contract management is most 
successful when the principals are also engaged in the production of some services.  This 
allows the principal to obtain some independent information on the costs of service 
production and thus deters agents from colluding on pricing.  This insight appears to 
weigh against the viability of the contract city model as no direct production of services 
would occur internally.  Furthermore, as the contract city in most cases is implemented in 
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new municipalities, there would be no historical knowledge of service costs that would be 
carried over from the previous regime.   
The extent of outsourcing in a contract city introduce new problems that are not 
considered in the "hollow city" framework.  Milward and Provan describe an extreme 
case of a ―hollow state‖ as one that has contracted out ―all its production capability to 
third parties, perhaps retaining only a systems integration function that is responsible for 
negotiating, monitoring, and evaluating contracts" (p. 362).  The contract city, as it has 
been implemented in at least two cases, goes even further than Milward and Provan‘s 
extreme case, as the negotiating, monitoring and evaluating functions have either been 
outsourced, or the contractor gives support to these activities.   
While municipalities with contract city models of governance would appear to be 
at great risk of the governance issues associated with the ―hollow state‖, other research 
suggests that a key feature of local outsourcing has been omitted from Milward and 
Provan‘s studies that would allow local governments to increase their management 
capacity.  Brown and Potoski (2006; 2003a) respond to the "hollow state" by pointing out 
that studies up to that point had failed to acknowledge that municipalities can 
successfully outsource the functions of bidding for contracts, negotiating with and 
selecting vendors, and evaluating contractors‘ performance.  Brown and Potoski argue 
that studies that omit the managerial functions delivered through private partnerships 
obtain biased assessments of governments‘ total administrative capacity.  Their analysis 
of survey data from municipalities in Ohio finds that cities that outsource contract 
management services perform at least as many contract monitoring activities as those that 
perform all contract management functions internally.  The key issue for the contract city 
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raised by this research is whether it is feasible to design a contract or set of contracts that 
will include the appropriate contract management functions for all service production 
functions.  There is some reason to be skeptical that this is possible.  In their more recent 
paper Brown and Potoski (2006) note that their findings are restricted to waste 
management, a function with easily observable outcomes.  It is likely easier to design a 
contract for a private-partner to monitor another third party‘s delivery of this service.  It 
is not clear whether outsourcing contract management functions for less tangible services 
would result in similar success.   
This paper examines the consequences for contract cities of outsourcing less-
observable function areas such as forecasting economic conditions, advisement on capital 
project planning, procurement, contractor monitoring and accounting.  The outputs of 
these functions are intangibles such as providing information on the future service needs 
of the city or maintaining a well-operated fiscal management system.  It would likely be 
more difficult, therefore, to assess the quality of a third party‘s production of these 
services and even more so for the city to outsource the monitoring of these functions to 
another private partner.  Weak monitoring of these information-based functions creates 
another, potentially more serious problem -- the subversion of this information to create a 
conflict of interest.  As highlighted by Prager and by Bradbury and Waechter, contract 
cities may receive relatively few bidders for their contracts, resulting in some cases where 
the majority of city functions have been outsourced to a single principal contractor who 
then employs sub-contractors for individual functions.  If the city must make decisions 
based on information created by its own contractors, then there is potential for that 
information to be manipulated by the contractor in order to serve its own interests in the 
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service-production segments of the contract.  The subsequent sections of this paper 
analyze the structures of the contracts between the City of Sandy Springs and its primary 
contractor in order to identify these types of potential weaknesses.     
Sandy Springs, Georgia 
Prior to its incorporation on December 1, 2005, Sandy Springs consisted of the 
unincorporated region of Fulton County bordering immediately to the north of the city of 
Atlanta.  The county government provided municipal-type services.  These included Fire, 
Police, Parks and Recreation and Environment and Community Development activities.  
Fulton County operated a special service district fund through which it financed 
municipal services to unincorporated areas.  Revenues for the fund were obtained through 
an annual property tax levy on the unincorporated districts and through fees and charges 
for services
26
.  
Sandy Springs was primarily made up of commercial and residential properties 
and had an estimated population of less than 90,000 residents.  It covers an area of 
approximately 36 square miles on the northern tip of Fulton County and lies within the 
greater metropolitan region of Atlanta, GA.  Sandy Spring‘s racial composition is similar 
to national proportions, though in comparison to the rest of Fulton County it is relatively 
less diverse.  According to the 2009 ACS population estimates (2005-2009 American 
Community Survey, 2009), the population of Sandy Springs is 78.5% white, 13.0% Black 
or African American, 4.1% Asian and the remainder belonging to other racial groups.  
Also, 13.1% of the population is estimated to identify as Hispanic or Latino.  In contrast, 
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Fulton County as a whole is 47.8% White, 42.9% Black or African American, 4.1% 
Asian and the remainder identified as either other or two or more races. 
Sandy Springs is also more affluent than Fulton County as a whole.  The median 
household income of Sandy Springs is $76,477 and for Fulton County it is $58,573.  The 
ACS 2009 estimates also report that the median value of owner-occupied homes in Sandy 
Springs was $452,700 and $250,800 for the rest of the county.  The unemployment rate 
shows the same pattern with a 3.7% rate in Sandy Springs and 8.4% for the entire county.   
Several factors increased local support for incorporating the Sandy Springs area.   
In the early 1970‘s the city of Atlanta attempted to annex Sandy Springs.  A citizen‘s 
group called the Committee for Sandy Springs was formed to resist annexation and 
pursue incorporation as a means of maintaining local control over services and taxation.  
The primary obstacle to forming a new city, however, was a Georgia requirement that 
both houses of the state legislature must pass bills to authorize the creation of new 
municipalities.  Over a 30-year period the Democrat-controlled legislature resisted giving 
approval to form a new city in Sandy Springs.  The Committee for Sandy Springs acted 
as the key advocacy group supporting municipal incorporation over this entire period. 
While resisting annexation was the initial objective of the incorporation 
movement, over time another issue came to draw even more support to the side of 
incorporation. According Porter‘s account, the administration of municipal-type services 
to the Sandy Springs area by Fulton County was unresponsive and inefficient.  He 
describes a historical trend in which votes by the Fulton County Board of Commissioners 
consistently fell against the interest of the Sandy Springs area (Porter 2006, 109–111).  
He also claims that the Fulton County government neglected the traffic control and road 
 134 
maintenance needs of Sandy Springs (Porter 2006, 58).  Part of the rhetoric supporting a 
new city was that self-governance would be more responsive and efficient than 
administration through the county government.   
In 2004 control over the legislature shifted to the Republicans and soon a bill was 
passed and signed by the Governor giving authorization to form the new city. The bill 
gave Sandy Springs an extremely short time frame to develop and implement an 
incorporation plan.  The bill was signed into law in April of 2005 giving authorization to 
form the new city, subject to citizen approval, on December 1 of that same year.  On June 
6
th
 a local referendum for residents of the Sandy Springs area passed with 94% of the 
votes in support of incorporation.   
Once the legal authority to create the new city was given, the Committee for 
Sandy Springs transitioned into the key organizing body that planned the structure of the 
new city government.  The Committee appointed Oliver Porter as an ―Interim City 
Manager
27‖ on a volunteer basis and also formed several volunteer task forces to develop 
plans for the future city to perform its essential services and functions (Porter, 2006 p. 
38).  The key responsibility of each task force was to identify for its respective service 
area whether services should be produced through in-house production, contracts with 
Fulton County, contracts with other nearby local governments, or outsourced to a private 
partner.  Table 1 depicts which production alternatives were used for each functional 
area. 
                                                 
 
 
27
 The Interim City Manager was a volunteer position that existed prior to the incorporation of Sandy 
Springs.  Porter agreed not to run for office or accept a paid position in the city government upon 
incorporation upon accepting this voluntary appointment (Porter, 2006, p. 38) 
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Table 4.1  Initial Service Production Methods of Sandy Springs, GA 
Alternative Service/Function 
Internal Production  Mayor 
 City Council 
 City Manager 
 Courts 
 City Clerk 
 Clerk of Court 
 Office of City Attorney 
Contract with Current 
Government (Fulton County) 
 Police (6-month contract) 
 Fire     (6-month contract) 
 E911   (6-month contract) 
 Sewer 
Contract with other local 
governments 
 
City of Roswell, GA  Jails 
City of Smyrna, GA  Enhanced Library Service 
City of Atlanta, GA  Water 
Private Partnerships  Accounting 
 Finance 
 Information Technology 
 Administration 
 Human Resources 
 Administrative support of: 
Courts, Police and Fire. 
 Parks and Recreation 
 Community Development 
(Planning, Zoning and Permitting) 
 Public Works 
 Transportation 
 Solid Waste (one-year 
nonexclusive contract, evolving into 
franchises) 
(Porter 2006, 60, 116–118) 
The exact timeline for deciding to adopt the contract city model in Sandy Springs 
is not clear from Porter‘s book, though he does note that he first heard about the city of 
Weston, FL in early 2005.  As discussed earlier in this paper, Weston, FL is one of the 
earliest adopters of the contract city model of governance and was the subject of Prager‘s 
(2008) case study. Porter, as the Interim City Manager of Sandy Springs, made an 
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exploratory visit to Weston or order to learn about their implementation of the contract 
city model (Porter 2006, 10–11).  Following this visit the city manager of Weston and 
representatives from that city‘s two principal contractors travelled to Georgia to make a 
presentation to the Committee for Sandy Springs on the operation of a contract city.   
Soon after that presentation, Committee for Sandy Springs decided to pursue a 
contract city model of governance for the new municipality.  The committee members 
compiled a list of potential firms that might have the capacity to deliver services to the 
as-yet non-existent city.  They then sent these firms a ―Prequalification Letter‖ which 
asked two key questions.  First, it identified a variety of municipal service areas and 
asked firms to indicate whether they had the capacity to deliver any of them.  It also 
asked prospective firms to provide a reference from a similar city or other entity for 
which the firm was already providing a comparable service.  Second, it asked whether 
―the firm would consider making major implementation expenditures before a contract, 
or even a handshake, could be concluded‖ (Porter 2006, 124). This second requirement 
was necessary because the Committee had no authority to enter into a contract or 
informally commit to any binding agreement until the city had formally incorporated, 
which would not occur until December 1, 2005.  Therefore the processes of issuing 
requests for proposals and the subsequent bidding and negotiating of contract would 
occur without actual guarantees of the future city council agreeing to the contract after 
the city had formally incorporated.  This limited the number of firms that were interested 
in bidding for contracts once the requests were issued by the Committee. Based on the 
responses to the letter the Committee found that the interested firms could be split into 
those that could provide technical services and those offering administrative services.  
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The Committee therefore decided to issue two separate RFPs for technical and 
administrative services.  Table 2 depicts this division. 
Table 4.2  Contents of the Initial Requests for Proposals by the Commission 
for the City of Sandy Springs 
Services Included in Each Request For Proposal 
RFP #1 ―Administrative‖ Administrative, Financial Services, 
Emergency 911, Physical Plant, Motor 
Vehicle, Staffing, Purchasing, 
Procurement, and Contracting Services 
RFP #2 ―Technical‖ Public Works, Transportation, 
Streets, Right-of-Way, Facilities, Parks and 
Recreation, Capital Improvements, 
Planning and Zoning, Inspections, Code 
Enforcement, Permitting, Purchasing, 
Procurement, and Contracting Services 
  Source: Contract, RFP #1; Contract, FRP #2 
Although the Committee for Sandy Springs and its sub-committees were 
responsible for the design of the RFPs, the actual RFPs were issued by a separate entity: 
the Governor‘s Commission for Sandy Springs (GCSS).  This was a five-person 
appointed commission established on June 24, 2005.  This was done primarily because 
the volunteer Committee could have potentially been held liable for the costs of the 
companies responding to the RFP (Porter, 2006 pp. 134).  Porter indicates that four of the 
five commissioners appointed by the governor had not been active members of the 
Committee for Sandy Springs and that two of the members did not reside within the 
jurisdiction‘s boundaries.  The GCSS was, however, supportive of the Committee‘s work 
and agreed to sponsor the RFPs as initially prepared during their first meeting on July 29.  
By sponsoring the RFPs the GCSS became the entity responsible for evaluating the 
proposal submissions. 
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After sending out the prequalification letter, the Committee held a pre-proposal 
conference on August 14, 2005 so that firms interested in submitting proposals could 
obtain further information about the conditions of the agreement and the nature of 
services to be provided.  Porter reports that 41 firms attended the conference.  An 
additional feature of the conference was that it helped smaller firms unable to meet the 
full range of service requirement in either of the RFPs to match together in order to 
design collaborative proposals.  Ultimately only one firm, CH2M Hill, submitted a 
proposal for the RFP for Administrative services and only three firms submitted 
proposals for the Technical services RFP, one of which was also CH2M Hill (Porter, 
2006, p. 143-144).   
The RFPs were evaluated by a team selected by the GCSS.  Porter reports that 
―[f]ive members were residents of the community with experience in RFP procedure and 
in evaluation of bids.  The sixth member was the County Manager of an adjacent county‖ 
(Porter  p. 141).  The proposals were evaluated using composite scores that gave equal 
weight to the following criteria: (1) Qualifications and Experience, (2) Previous 
Experience with Similar Services and Duties, (3) Start-up and Implementation Plan, and 
(4) Cost.  The evaluation team received written proposals as well as oral presentations 
from all parties submitting proposals.  Because only one firm submitted a proposal for the 
Administrative RFP the evaluation team reviewed the proposal as either being 
Acceptable or Unacceptable.  The three submissions for the Technical RFP were 
evaluated and compared using the full set of scoring criteria.   
The contract evaluation process resulted in a single firm, CH2M Hill being 
selected as the principal contractor for both RFPs, but during the negotiation process 
 139 
CH2M Hill agreed to employ as a sub-contractor Optech Monette, LLC (Anon. 2008) 
which offered a proposal for providing public works services and had received a higher 
rating by the evaluation committee in that area (Porter 2006, 145).  The contracts were 
signed on December 20, 2005 which made the CH2M Hill firm the principal contractor 
responsible for the majority of city functions. One of the key criteria that Porter cites as 
having swayed the Committee in adopting a competitive contracting model was that it 
would lower costs.  The estimate received from CH2M Hill on the cost of servicing the 
new city was 25% lower than the Committee‘s own estimates of what it would cost to 
produce the same services internally (Porter 2006, 131). 
The initial compensation amounts for each agreement were specified in the 
contract documents.  Compensation for the Administrative contract was set at $11.2 
million and the Technical contract was set at $18.5 million.  The language in the 
agreements explicitly allows for a profit margin to be charged in association with each 
service provided.  This profit margin is discussed in sections allowing for an adjustment 
to the total compensation level following a reduction in services.  It stipulates that the 
reduction in compensation will be no ―less than the actual cost of said services, and the 
allocated overhead and profit for such services."
28
  The contract agreements do not define 
what this profit allocation would be, whether it is a constant percentage or if it is based on 
whether actual expenditures are less than predicted spending. 
Although this study focuses on the initial design of the partnership between Sandy 
Springs and CH2M Hill, one key adjustment to the structure of the agreement has since 
                                                 
 
 
28
 Agreement 1: Section 9.5 and Agreement 2: Section 8.5 
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been made.  In 2006 the City Council became concerned that CH2M Hill responsibility 
for the Financial Services function created the potential for a conflict of interest.  On 
October 10, 2006 the minutes to the City Council meeting state that the City Manager 
recommendation was to create a position to directly employ a Finance Director.  The 
following justification was given to create this position: 
Inherent problems exist from this type of arrangement over 
financial matters that involve city finances.  Financial considerations 
and issues can not always be considered separately given the nature of 
providing governmental services.   Reasons for separating the 
financial function from the CH2M Hill contract would be as follows: 
 Increase independence and impartiality with financial 
decisions. 
 Improve segregation of duties with authorization, custody 
and reconciliations functions. 
 Removes limited ability to make financial decisions and 
transactions. 
 Eliminates perceived conflict of interest where the interest 
of one job contradict another or when public and private 
interests collide over financial matters or interests. 
 Instills a sense of loyalty to the City.29 
 
The City Council subsequently authorized the creation of the new Finance 
Director position.  The office staff remain CH2M Hill contractors, though they are 
directly overseen by this public official.   
This partial adjustment to the contract agreement between Sandy Springs and 
CH2M Hill highlights the broader challenge of administering a contract city.  The broad 
scope of municipal functions in a single private partnership has little precedent in the 
history of public management.  The key interest in this paper is whether such a 
combination of functions can exacerbate public officials‘ challenge of administering the 
                                                 
 
 
29
 City of Sandy Springs Georgia. (October 10, 2006).  Work Session of the Sandy Springs City Council. 
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principal/agent relationship.  Porter argues that ―a sense of partnership‖ between the 
CH2M Hill firm and city officials prevents the firm from abusing any potential it may 
have for acting in its own interest at the expense of the city as it fulfills these contracts.  
However, on whether this mutual appreciation is sustainable, even Porter is uncertain: 
―Only time will tell whether the partnership will deteriorate into an owner/worker 
mentality‖ (Porter 2006, 151).  In this analysis I assess the structure of the contracts 
between Sandy Springs and CH2M Hill as they were initially designed and identify 
where the potential for conflicts of interest can be found.  This would allow the city to 
identify where it should focus its contract monitoring efforts should its relationship with 
its contractor deteriorate.  It also would also contribute to the literature an assessment of 
structures and incentives that can arise in this class of comprehensive service contracts.   
Theoretical Framework 
I approach this analysis of the structures that may exist in contract cities‘ private 
partnership agreements within the framework of principal-agent theory.  Principal-agent 
theory is a well-established component in several fields of social science.  The first 
formal discussion of the theory is by Ross (1973).  For a review of how principal-agent 
models have been applied in a variety of different settings see Eisenhardt (1989).  In the 
context of this essay, I describe public officials implementing a contract city as principals 
seeking private partners willing to serve as agents.  These agents would deliver services 
according to the terms defined in a contractual agreement.  I assume that agents are 
profit-motivated and that they possess superior information relative to the principals 
regarding the quality of the work actually performed.  By entering into a contract 
agreement the city unburdens itself of the task of directly producing services for the 
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public, but also acquires new risks associated with administering the contract and 
overseeing the agent‘s performance. 
Local officials that are aware of these risks may seek to place structures in the 
outsourcing contracts that are sdesigned to reduce the threats that are created by the 
contract city model.  As put by Gary Miller (1993, p. 2), ―The principal‘s job is to 
anticipate the rational responses of agents and to design a set of incentives such that the 
agents find it in their own interests (given the incentive system) to take the best possible 
set of actions (from the principal‘s perspective).‖  Alternatively, it is also possible that the 
contract documents contain loopholes or create adverse incentives that increase the 
potential for the agent to act against the interest of the principal.  After the contract has 
been signed the principal can engage in monitoring, which is costly, to observe actual 
agent performance in order to enforce the terms of the contract. 
The agent‘s objective is to maximize long-term profits from the agreement.  
Periodically the agreement must be renewed and the principal has the opportunity to 
select a different agent.  If the principal observes that the agent efficiently produces the 
contracted services, then the probability of retaining the agent for subsequent periods 
increases.  This induces the firm to operate efficiently.  On the other hand, opposing 
conditions can give the agent an incentive to shirk in its efforts in order to extract short-
term gains from the principal without damaging her long-run gains.  Weak competition 
for the contract reduces the likelihood that the city will select an alternative service 
provider when it is time to renew the contract.  A high degree of information asymmetry 
regarding the true costs of production and the quality of service output can also give an 
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incentive to the firm to reduce its efficiency.  The design of the agreement will reflect the 
efforts by both parties to secure their long-term interests.   
In this section I discuss how context of the contract city model of governance 
affects the principal-agent relationship.  My review of the literature highlights two 
important factors: the broad scope of services that are outsourced and the relative lack of 
competition among potential private partners. 
Scope 
The scope of outsourcing that occurs in a contract city increases the tension 
inherent to a principal-agent relationship.   On the one hand are the potential efficiency 
gains, particularly the economies of scale that may be gained from outsourcing the 
majority of public functions to a single private firm.  I assume that obtaining these gains 
is the city‘s primary purpose for becoming the principal in a contracting agreement. On 
the other hand, the city must overcome the twin challenges of designing a contract that 
can properly harness the contractor‘s incentives to the city‘s interest and then monitoring 
actual performance to ensure that the agent complies with the terms of the agreement 
The breadth of services outsourced under the contract city model may give rise to 
unique structures within the contracts that are not present in traditional relationships 
where only a single service or a relatively small share of total municipal functions are 
delivered  by a single private partner.  An example of the type of structure that would be 
expected to appear in contract city agreements would be features that facilitate the 
agent‘s capacity to achieve economies of scale.  As discussed in the previous literature 
review, a key objective for public officials pursuing the contract city model is that they 
expect to obtain efficiency gains through the private delivery of public functions.  
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Officials may therefore include elements in the contracts that discuss the private partner‘s 
allocation of funds and resources across functional areas within the city.  If the private 
partner is a large firm with other operations outside of the local jurisdiction there may 
also be contract elements that discuss the allocation of human and physical resources 
across the larger firm.  These elements of contract design would serve the principal‘s 
interest by helping to ensure that the promised efficiency gains actually materialize. 
Another way that the scope of outsourcing in a contract city may affect the 
principal-agent agreement is that it may exacerbate the information asymmetry problem. 
A key feature of the principal-agent relationship is that in most cases the agent possesses 
superior information regarding the costs of production and the quality of services 
delivered to the public.  Within the context of a contract city the agent is responsible for 
providing a mix of external services consumed by the public (e.g. road maintenance) and 
internal functions that provide information and administrative support to city officials 
(e.g. preparation of regular financial statements for the city and providing advice on 
capital investments).   The combination of these two types of functions in a single 
outsourcing agreement may increase the information asymmetry.  This is because public 
officials become dependent on the agent for the financial and managerial information that 
they receive regarding the quality of external service delivery.  This creates potential for 
what I describe as ―negative synergies‖ to arise in which the difficulty of the contract 
management task for the aggregate contract agreement is greater than the sum of the 
management costs that would be associated with each function individually.  The 
potential for the agent to suffer from a conflict of interest between its information 
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production role and its role as a producer of external services is a key factor in creating 
these synergies.   
Principal-agent theory predicts that public officials will respond to information 
asymmetry by engaging in monitoring activities.  Audits, quality of service reviews and 
direct service monitoring are a few of the types of functions that may be done by public 
officials to verify performance.  These functions incur a cost and are central to the 
function of contract management.  The scope of outsourcing in contract cities may 
increase the difficulty and costs of monitoring agent behavior.  Many functions 
outsourced are not easily monitored.  These include information and administrative 
functions that do not yield tangible outputs.  Also, when contract monitoring activities are 
also outsourced to other private partners it therefore becomes necessary to ensure that no 
collusion occurs among the various agents.  The concept of ―negative synergies‖ is 
manifest in contract monitoring because officials must not only monitor the performance 
of individual functions, but also investigate whether there is any action in conflict of 
interest  
These two issues, the potential efficiency gains from outsourcing and the costs of 
mitigating the information asymmetry, reflect part of the tradeoff that public officials 
face as they decide whether to make or buy public services.  Entering into a principal 
agent relationship with a private partner requires the city to allocate a certain amount of 
its resources to contract management.  On the other hand, outsourcing may allow the city 
to obtain services at a lower cost.  These costs and benefits must then be compared with 
the costs of producing internally.  Levin and Tadaelis (2007) explore this tradeoff in their 
formal transaction cost model of the make-or buy decision for U.S. cities.  The authors 
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find that high costs for monitoring performance, lack of competition in the market for 
private service production and high sensitivity among residents to changes in service 
quality are important factors that deter privatization.  Their analysis is conducted within 
the traditional framework of outsourcing in which the scope of privately produced 
activities is relatively small and managers are able to apply a rational analysis to each 
potentially outsourced function to identify whether it would be most efficiently produced 
internally or externally. 
The scope of outsourcing in the contract city context changes the way that make-
or-buy decisions are made.   In a small-scope context, managers marginally assess each 
municipal function and determine whether it should be produced internally or externally.  
In a large-scope context, officials assess the overall service delivery regime and decide 
whether the entire municipal enterprise can be administered through a private partnership.  
One factor in this comprehensive analysis is that the contract city model allows 
governments to escape some fixed costs, such as the administration of employee health 
and retirement plans.     
Bradbury and Waechter (2009) note that all of the cases of extreme contracting 
they review adopted that model during the formation of a new government.  Because the 
entity does not actually exist at the time that costs are being considered, the only 
information available comes from other governments that are currently delivering 
services and cost estimates from potential contractors.  The lack of information 
challenges the rational analysis that is assumed in the traditional contracting context and 
opens the door for ideology and generalized perceptions to play a role in determining the 
outcome.  It is these larger issues of what functions the city will play, the overall cost 
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efficiencies and the political implications of the new mode of governance that will 
dominate the discussion.  This occurs because the scope of outsourcing which occurs in a 
contract city raises broader issues that overcome the specific efficiencies of individual 
functions which are at the heart of make-or-buy decisions in a more traditional context. 
Lack of Competition   
Another challenge for contract cities is the thinness of the market for large-scale 
municipal service production.  Johnston and Seidenstat (2007, p. 239) argue that for 
successful outsourcing, ―the private sector should be structured such that alternative 
suppliers … can compete for contracts …  Without competition, privatization might 
simply consist of a private monopoly substituting for a government monopoly.‖ This is 
especially true for contract cities that require such a broad range of services that relatively 
few firms may emerge that are able to provide them.  In the case of Sandy Springs only a 
single firm submitted bids for both of the RFPs.   
Additionally, the level of competition in the public service markets contract cities 
purchase from are significantly weakened by the absence of the government as a potential 
public service provider.  In a conventional contracting environment the government can 
act as a competitor with private firms by reversing the decision to outsource a given 
function.  Bradbury and Waechter (2009 p. 245) argue that reversibility is a problem for 
contract cities ―because the adoption of the strategy at the time of incorporation means 
that, for many services and programs, there is no in-house expertise or infrastructure on 
which to fall back.‖  This gives potential agents an advantage at the initial stage of 
contract design and municipal incorporation because they can promise service delivery 
within the necessary time frame.  For subsequent renewals of the contract the initial 
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private partners possess a first-mover advantage relative to other potential bidders 
because they already possess infrastructure, human capital and direct knowledge of the 
true costs of production.   
The scope of outsourcing and the relative lack of competition in the market for 
services can impact the relationship between principal and agent in a variety of ways.  
For this analysis I focus on the contract agreements that govern the principal-agent 
relationship and explore how these agreements reflect the challenges associated with the 
contract city environment.  In the following section I discuss how I apply this theoretical 
framework to the actual elements of contract documents.   
Data and Research Strategy 
The purpose of this study is to examine how the contract city model of 
governance increases the complexity and challenge of contract management.  Within the 
framework of the principal-agent model, the principal and the agent develop an 
agreement that creates incentives that should theoretically harness the agent‘s self-interest 
towards the achievement of the principal‘s goals.  These incentives are established by 
designing specific structures in the contract documents.  The structures define the service 
requirements set rewards for good performance and define consequences for any breach 
of the agreement.  Additionally, individual structures also have the potential to create 
unintended effects that can increase the difficulty of contract management.   
I pursue my research objectives by analyzing the text of the contracts that were 
signed by City of Sandy Springs, GA and the private firm CH2M Hill at the time of the 
city‘s incorporation.  These documents reflect the incentive structures as they were 
initially developed between the two parties.  In this section I describe how this textual 
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analysis is conducted so that its output will provide useful information that will 
contribute to our understanding of the operation of contract cities.  To my knowledge, 
there are no other social science studies that have analyzed the elements of a contract 
within a comparable theoretical framework.  I have developed the following research 
strategy on my own.  I will first provide a brief description of the documents, then present 
how the elements of the contracts are coded for analysis, and then discuss how the coded 
elements are assessed under the theoretical framework presented in the previous section. 
Description of Documents 
The subjects of this analysis consist of two sets of documents that were provided 
to me directly by the City of Sandy Springs through the Office of the City Manager.  
Each set pertains to its respective RFP submission and consists of 1) the actual agreement 
between Sandy Springs and CH2M Hill and 2) an accompanying Scope of Services 
document that provides greater detail on the nature of services to be provided.  The 
services areas included in each contract follow the same grouping used for the RFPs, as 
was depicted in Table 2.   
The documents follow a legal format.  Paragraphs are numbered according to 
their respective sections and sub-sections and they each contain a single element of the 
contractual arrangement between the City and the Corporation.  From a research 
standpoint this is useful because it makes it possible to disassemble the document and 
consider each paragraph a data point for analysis.  I use spreadsheet software to manage 
the individual elements of the documents.  I have transferred each document into its own 
worksheet, with the paragraphs contained in separate rows.   
Data Framework 
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In order to be more precise regarding how the content of the contract documents 
influence agent behavior, I present the following data framework.  This framework 
describes the mechanism through which a contract transmits a signal that affects the 
behaviors of both the principal and the agent in the service relationship.  
The beginning of the path of influence from the contract to actual behavior is in 
the text of the documents
30
.  Each paragraph of the documents addresses a single 
component of the relationship between Sandy Springs and CH2M Hill.  These paragraphs 
are discussed within this framework as individual document elements.  The text of each 
paragraph is identified as a single data point for this analysis.   
These document elements combine in various ways to create conceptual structures 
that are understood in the minds of those that read them.  These conceptual structures 
define the parameters of the relationship between the principal and the agent.  They 
describe the nature of the work that is to be outsourced, the expected behavior that both 
parties will exhibit and the consequences for both complying with and/or violating the 
terms of the contract. There does not necessarily need to be a one-to-one relationship 
between document elements and conceptual structures.  Multiple elements can 
collectively generate a single conceptual structure, and a single element may be mapped 
to multiple structures.   
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 It could be argued that there is an earlier stage: the contract writing process where both principal and 
agent discuss what they want the relationship to be like and transmit those ideas into the contract.  There 
may be a filter at this point where the concepts in the minds of both parties are expressed in writing with 
varying degrees of accuracy.  A thorough analysis of that topic, however, would require venturing into the 
cognition and psychology of public administration which goes beyond the scope of this paper.   
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The conceptual structures create incentives that can then be analyzed within the 
principal agent framework.  These incentives work to either align the agent‘s interest with 
that of the principal or induce the agent to deviate from the principal‘s intent.  Incentives 
will interact with the agent‘s pursuit of profit maximization and lead to behavioral 
outcomes.  The principal will attempt to design a contract where the document elements 
create conceptual structures that reward good behavior and punish deviant behavior.  
There is room within this framework, however, for unintended incentives.  These may 
arise if the document elements combine in ways that were not expected by the principals, 
resulting in conceptual structures that create adverse incentives for the agent.   
To rephrase the research objective of this paper within this data framework, the 
contract city model creates a new context for document elements.   This new context 
arises because the principal-agent relationship in a contract city is burdened with the 
challenges of an increased scope of contracting and a lesser degree of competition.  As a 
result, new conceptual structures may be generated from the document elements that 
would not exist if the city operated within a traditional contracting environment.  These 
new conceptual structures may then create incentives that public officials would not have 
expected.  Also, agents may respond differently to contract elements that are found in 
traditional outsourcing agreements because the issues of scope and competition interact 
with those contract elements to create new incentive structures.  I do not observe actual 
behavior and so the analysis in this essay is confined to the top three elements of the data 
framework presented in Figure 1.  The empirical objective of this paper is to identify the 
ways that the context of the contract city impacts the incentives created by the contract 
documents. 
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This essay is a single case study rather than a multi-case study and so I do not 
directly compare the incentives created from contract city document elements with those 
from traditional city outsourcing agreements.  Instead, I assess which incentives are 
created as a direct result of either the scope of services provided by the contract 
agreement with CH2M Hill or the relative thinness of the market for comprehensive 
municipal service contracts.  If the incentive arising from a set of outsourced functions 
would disappear if the services had been outsourced to separate firms then it is identified 
as being scope-related.  Likewise, if an incentive is created due to the relative scarcity of 
market competition for the contract then it is considered competition-related. 
Figure 4.1 
Data Framework
Document Elements
Conceptual Structures
Incentives
Agent Behavior
 
Coding of Elements 
My approach to analyzing Sandy Springs contract documents begins with a 
careful reading of the texts and then coding the individual elements of the contracts 
according to several thematic categories.  These categories serve to group by functional 
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area the conceptual structures generated by the document elements.  These categories are 
displayed in Table 3.  Each category is derived from applying the principal-agent 
framework presented earlier.  Because a given document element may be associated with 
multiple conceptual structures, individual paragraphs may receive multiple codes.  All 
appropriate codes are assigned to each element.  I provide a description of each category 
below.   
Table 4.3 Classification Categories 
Category Description 
Scope Elements of the agreements that reflect the large scope of 
services provided by the private partner. 
Human Resources Elements of the agreements that relate to how human 
resources are managed by the private partner 
Information Elements of the agreements that outsource information 
production functions 
Direct Service Production Elements that provide for outsourcing direct service 
production that will be consumed by citizens 
Financial Control Elements that outsource financial control functions and 
contract management 
Further Expansion of 
Agreement 
Elements that provide for future expansion of the 
partnership  
Trust and Harmonious 
Relationship 
Elements that describe and require a trusting and 
harmonious relationship to exist between the City and the 
Corporation 
Capital Project Management Elements that provide for the Corporation to provide 
either support for or direct oversight of small-scale 
capital projects 
Null This label is applied to elements of the documents that do 
not appear to pose significant issues for the purposes of 
this study.   
 
Scope 
The scope category identifies the contract elements that either directly or 
indirectly address the scale of outsourcing activity that occurs in contract cities.  This is 
one of the broadest identifiers used in this study as the issue of scope is central to what 
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distinguishes the principal-agent relationships in contract cities from other contracting 
agreements.  I will therefore briefly discuss what features an individual contract element 
may have in order for it to receive the scope identifier. 
The issue of scope can be manifest in two ways: breadth and proportion.  Breadth 
refers to a contract agreement with a single partner outsourcing a large range of 
municipal functions.  Individual contract elements that refer to how resources may be 
allocated by the private partner across functional areas directly address the issue of 
breadth.  For example, contract language that discusses the sharing of resources across 
functional areas to obtain efficiencies of scale would be direct examples of breadth. 
Contract elements may also indirectly affect the breadth of the contract agreement if 
some set of elements outsources a combination of functional areas to the private partner 
that create incentives for the private partner to act against the interest of the principal.  An 
example would be contract elements that outsource both the provision of capital project 
planning and the actual production of the same projects.  The combination of these two 
functions creates the potential for a conflict of interest if the private partner adjusts the 
project recommendations it gives in order to increase its profits from the actual 
production of those projects.   
Contract elements that reflect the proportion of outsourcing activities contain 
language that reflects how the municipal government will be administered with few direct 
public employees.  The concept of ―hollowing out‖ in government due a share of 
municipal functions that are produced externally captures the issue of proportion.  
Elements of the contracts that either seek to mitigate the issues of hollowing out or that 
inadvertently increase the potential risks will fall into this category.   
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I code individual elements that associate with breadth and/or proportion with a 
single identifier because the issues are closely related and there may be substantial 
overlap if separate identifiers were used.  Also, as the other identifiers are more specific, 
it is interesting to view the overlap between this broader category and the more specific 
issues tied to other codes.   
Human Resources 
This code designates elements of the contracts that are associated with the 
disposition of the direct employees of the primary contractor and the other human 
resources that are obtained through the agreement.  Under the terms of both agreements, 
CH2M Hill ―shall be solely responsible for all compensation benefits, insurance and 
rights of the Corporation employees during the course or arising or accruing as a result of 
any employment…31‖   The human resource code highlights elements that discuss how 
contracted employees will represent the city to the citizens and the city‘s rights with 
regard to the retention of individual employees.  This designation also highlights areas of 
the agreement that relate to the risks associated with a workforce that is almost entirely 
contract labor.  These risks would include the loss of workforce and institutional 
knowledge in the event of severance of the contract and the possibility of employees 
being transferred elsewhere in the contracting firm‘s organization.  Another example is 
the outcome that the contractor set the pay and benefits levels for the majority of the 
employees producing public services.  
                                                 
 
 
31
 Agreement 1: Section 7.1 and Agreement 2: Section 5.1 
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Information 
Another notable feature of the contract city model is the private production of 
information used for managerial and financial decision-making.  This includes the 
generation of financial forecasts and the development of financial reports.  Even under a 
conventional service delivery framework, where the scope of outsourcing is relatively 
small, private production of financial and administrative information would face close 
scrutiny.  This is because the nature of the service does not align with the criteria found in 
the public administration literature to be predictors of whether a function is a good 
candidate for outsourcing.  Brown and Potoski find that ―[s]ervices that are difficult to 
monitor and prone to opportunism may be riskier candidates for transferring management 
responsibilities to vendors (2006 pp. 338).‖   
Assessing the quality of financial reports and economic data is a difficult task on 
its own because economic conditions change and the city manager likely does not possess 
all the technical accounting skills necessary to evaluate fully the accuracy and quality of 
financial information.  Although auditing firms are retained to validate the end-of-year 
financial statements, they are not involved in evaluating lesser financial reports that are 
produced regularly solely for the purpose of internal consumption.  Within the contract 
city framework there is the added challenge of the risk that the private partner may 
produce the information in such a way that serves its own interests.  One potential 
example may be presenting financial forecasts that project increased demand for services 
that the firm is also providing to the city.  This may result in expansion of the contract 
and additional profits for the firm.   
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Elements of the contracts that relate to the outsourcing of information production 
activities are classified with the information code.   
Direct Service Production 
This classification is used to identify elements of the agreements that relate to 
services that the contractor will provide directly to the citizens of Sandy Springs.  This 
includes descriptions of the nature of the services, performance measurement and 
compensation.   
Financial Control 
A broad range of financial control functions are also outsourced in contract cities.  
This designation is applied to segments of the agreements that contract for contract 
management services.  It also applies to functions such as procurement, revenue 
collection, account management, and advisement for investment activities.  This 
designation will at times overlap with the information production functions as the 
production of financial reports and the provision of advice on capital projects have both 
elements of control and information production.   
Further Expansion of Agreement 
In cases where the contract city is in a relationship with one primary contractor, as 
is the case in both Weston and Sandy Springs, it would be expected that the contract be 
designed with sufficient flexibility as to allow the city to request an expansion or a 
reduction in services from the contractor as needs arise.  This reflects both the city‘s 
dependence on its primary partner for essentially all service delivery and the uncertainty 
that all governments face when developing policies that will meet future service 
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requirements. This code designates the procedures for the city manager to request 
additional services both on a one-time and on an ongoing basis and the manner of 
compensation for these services.   
Trust and Harmonious Relationship 
This identifier is motivated by Oliver Porter‘s discussion of how trust and a 
positive relationship between the city of Sandy Springs and CH2M Hill is one of the 
essential elements in successfully implementing and maintaining a contract city approach 
to municipal governance.  If these positive personal relationships are so key to the 
success of the government, then the contract agreements between the two parties may 
include structures that are intended to foster this type of relationship and protect the city 
if the relationship begins to deteriorate.  Elements of the contracts that refer to the 
interpersonal relationships and the tone of the interactions between city officials and 
employees of the contracting firm are coded with this identifier. 
Capital Project Management 
In addition to providing services that are consumed immediately, contract cities 
also obtain planning, advisement, construction and maintenance services for capital 
projects.  This code is used to identify elements of the contracts that discuss the types of 
projects that the private partner is responsible for and how the firm is compensated for 
those projects.   
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Null 
This designation is applied to elements of the contracts that do not appear to 
change the task of managing a private contract for services within the contract city 
framework.  This would include language that would be included in typical contracts. 
Analysis 
The analytical portion of this research strategy consists of determining what types 
of incentives are created by the conceptual structures originating from the agreement 
documents.  More specifically, I seek to identify how the individual structures influence 
the task of contract management.  This assessment consists of considering two principal 
questions for each section.  First, does the specific contract element contribute to a 
structure that increases the city officials‘ capacity to manage the contract relationship?  
This could be manifested by structures that align the agent‘s incentives with the 
principal‘s or that increase the principal‘s capacity to monitor the agent‘s productivity.  
The second question I examine is whether the contract element creates openings for the 
agent to pursue its own interest at the expense of the principal.  For example, clauses in 
the contracts that give a single private partner responsibility for both providing consulting 
advise on which small-scale capital projects to pursue and a procurement contract for the 
same small-scale projects with a built-in profit margin for the latter may incentivize a 
firm to recommend that the city initiate more projects than what the actual service 
requirements of the city merit.   
Key Findings 
My discussion of the findings from my analysis will loosely be organized 
according to the coding classification groups that I used to organize the data.  However, 
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because many key findings involve issues that span multiple categorical areas it is not 
possible to strictly confine my discussion to single categories.  I also include in the 
discussion several recommendations I have developed as possible approaches to address 
the contract management challenges that are associated with the contract city model of 
governance.  I begin with the issues that involve the most crossovers and that I find to be 
the most significant and interesting.  I then move to the more narrow issues that can be 
grouped within single categories.   
Resource Shifting Increases Contract Management Complexity 
The agreement between CH2M Hill and the City of Sandy Springs is divided into 
two separate contracts for services.  The first
32
 contract is composed of administrative 
functions while the second covers primarily direct service production.  The payments for 
services were each specified in the initial contracts.  The first contract was funded in its 
first year for $11.2 million
33
 and the second contract was funded for $18.5 million
34
.  
There is language in both contracts, however, that grants CH2M Hill the right to shift 
resources and funds between the two agreements.  This resource shifting is permitted ―per 
the priorities agreed-to with the City Manager so long as such allocations do not 
adversely affect the City regarding either (1 ) cost of services under this Agreement, or 
                                                 
 
 
32
 The designation of ‗first‘ and ‗second‘ contract follows the designation from the RFP‘s which labeled 
RFP 1 and RFP 2.  The first contract refers to the agreement for the provision of Administrative, Financial 
Community Services, Motor Vehicle, Staffing, and Purchasing, Procurement and Contracting services.  The 
second contract is the agreement for the provision of Public Works, Transportation, Streets, Right-of-way, 
Facilities, Parks and Recreation, Capital Improvements, Planning and Zoning, Inspections, Code 
Enforcement, Permitting, Purchasing, Procurement, and Contracting Services. 
33
 Agreement 1: Section 9.1 
34
 Agreement 2: Section 8.1  
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(2) service quality to the public.‖ 35  So in effect, subject to these requirements, the 
contracting firm is able to move resources across the two agreements as if it were 
fulfilling a single contract.  This power of resource shifting can be viewed as being a 
reasonable way to achieve greater economies of scale that can exist from having a single 
firm provide such large proportion and range of city services. Because the outcome of the 
RFP process resulted in a single firm receiving both contracts it would appear to serve 
policymaker‘s objective of facilitating economies of scale by allowing funds to move 
across contracts. The city saves the cost of requiring the private partner to develop 
protocols that ensure funds from either contract are not comingled.  For example, if 
senior CH2M Hill managers are responsible for service areas under both agreements it 
would be necessary to keep track of the share of their services allocated to each contract.   
Allowing resource shifting may increase the cost of to the city of monitoring the 
true costs of providing services.  Within the context of a principal-agent framework, it 
would be expected that the principal allow the agent to achieve a certain rate of return 
and a normal level of profits for its services.  This would give the agent the incentive to 
reduce costs while maintaining the specified level of service in order to achieve profits 
and return value to its shareholders.  Periodically, however, the contract would be 
renegotiated and the city would have the chance to assess whether the agent has cut costs 
enough to receive a rate of return that exceeds the normal market rate.  If this is the case 
then the city should be able to rebid the contract and receive the services at a lower cost 
and the firm‘s return would return to the normal market rate.  Presumably, the normal 
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 Agreement 1: Section 2.3 and Agreement 2: Section 2.3 
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market rate would be determined by taking bids from other firms interested in competing 
for the contract.  This may not be feasible, however, if no other firms offer bids or if the 
incumbent firm is advantaged in the bidding process due the economies of scale it enjoys. 
Resource shifting in a contract city framework would allow the private partner to 
transfer resources from profitable areas to lower margin areas to achieve an average rate 
of return over the entire contract.  Because a contract city has such a broad range of 
services outsourced in a single contract, it may be difficult for the city officials to 
untangle the resource shifting that has occurred in order to assess which functional areas 
are yielding a higher than normal rate of return for the contractor.  Identifying these 
higher profit areas is important for the city so that it can negotiate for a lower 
compensation amount during contract renegotiations.  Under a conventional contracting 
framework each individual service area would likely have its own contract and multiple 
firms would provide the outsourced segment of government services.  Resource shifting 
potentially increases the difficulty of ensuring that the private partner is not achieving a 
higher than normal rate of return. 
Another issue associated with resource shifting is its implications for the city‘s 
compliance with Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) rules regarding the 
Statement of Activities.  Should contract cities that allow resource shifting present the 
allocation of funds within the Governmental Activities function before or after the private 
contractor shifts funds across functions?  For example, among the sub-categories that fall 
under Governmental Activities, two significant sub-categories are General Government 
and Public Works (City of Sandy Springs GA, 2007).  A shift of resources from 
Agreement 1 to Agreement 2 could result in funds that were initially allocated to General 
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Government functions providing support to Public Works.  The question then arises 
whether the city is reporting in the Statement of Activities how it allocated resources 
originally to its contractor or how the contractor ultimately allocated those funds.  The 
contract documents are silent on which method should be used.  The latter approach 
seems clearly preferable, however, so that the financial statements accurately account for 
the use of public resources.  The language in the contract documents that resource 
shifting is subject to the ―priorities agreed to with the City Manager‖ suggests that the 
City Manager, a public employee, approves reallocations.  There is no specific guidance 
in the contracts to detail when approval is needed and how it is granted.  There is also no 
language in the contracts regarding how such transfers would be documented or reported 
within the financial statements.  A review of Sandy Springs‘ Consolidated Annual 
Financial Report for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2006 shows that the document 
does not contain any mention of these types of transfers.  The interested reader can 
examine the Budget and Actuals statement from the Notes to the Financial Statements by 
opening the attached file. 
I make the following two recommendations for cities that allow resource shifting 
across multiple contracts awarded to a single service provider.   
Recommendation 1:  Cities that allow their contractors to engage in resource 
shifting across contracts should request documentation of the flow of funds so that the 
pre- and post-shifting resource allocations can be compared with actual spending.  This 
will provide city officials with better information on the true cost of service provision.   
Recommendation 2: Specify that the Statement of Activities reflects shifting of 
resources across contract agreements.  The Notes to the Financial Statements should 
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detail the size and nature of these allocations.  This would be supported by 
documentation of the City Manager‘s approval of these transfers.   
Potential Expansion of the Contract 
One of the challenges of contract design at this scale is ensuring that the 
agreement is adequately clear and focused so that the private partner‘s responsibilities are 
clear, yet flexible enough to be able to meet unforeseen or changing service needs.  It 
would be expected, therefore, that a contract city agreement would include structures that 
provide for the expansion of services when determined necessary by public officials.  The 
City Manager of Sandy Springs is the public official that is charged with administering 
the contract and, subject to authorization by the City Council, is responsible for 
requesting and negotiating for expansions of services. The contract documents contain 
multiple elements that develop a flexible framework for changing service requirements.   
Both contract documents
36
 contain elements that provide for written requests for 
services that are not included in the Scope of Services documents.  Within five days of 
receipt of the change order CH2M Hill agreed to provide a price to the additional 
services.  If that price is agreed upon the additional services will be invoiced in the next 
monthly payment cycle, unless otherwise specified.  If the change order requests an 
additional ongoing service rather a function provided on a one-time basis then the Scope 
of Service document will be adjusted and the monthly compensation amount will 
similarly reflect the new agreement.   
                                                 
 
 
36
 Agreement 1: Section 9.2 and Agreement 2: Section 8.2 
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What are the incentives associated with a structure that makes the future scope of 
services more flexible?  Having structures that facilitate the future expansion of services 
may not only lower the administrative cost to the city of changing the agreement, but it 
also may increase the likelihood that the firm will present projects to the city that would 
merit service expansion.  In other words, does the door swing both ways for allowing 
new service orders into the contracting agreement?  Because the contracting firm is 
allowed to include a normal rate of profit in the price it gives for change orders, it has a 
financial incentive to expand services when possible.  This creates one of the most 
challenging incentive problems for the contract city model.  Within this contract city 
framework, the private partner is also responsible for generating economic forecasts
37
, 
research on current and future trends for the city
38
, financial reports
39
, and developing the 
draft of the city budget for approval
40
.  The potential exists for the firm to structure these 
documents to present biased information to the city that would indicate that new services 
are required to meet the needs of the city.  Detecting this type of bias would be difficult 
because it would likely require an assessment of the technical details of the process for 
producing fiscal information.  The city manager, with a limited staff
41
 independent of the 
private contractor, may not have the capacity to perform this evaluation.  It may therefore 
be necessary to acquire services from other third party evaluators to validate fiscal 
information on a periodic basis.   
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 Scope of Services 1: Section 1.2.8 
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 Scope of Services 1: Section 1.1.2.1 
39
 Scope of Services 1: Section 1.2.1.4 
40
 Scope of Services 1: Section 1.2.7 
41
 At the time of incorporation the only direct employees of Sandy Spring were the Board, the Mayor, the 
City Manager and the City and Court Clerks.   
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An additional provision for the expansion of services is made for the event that 
Sandy Springs obtains additional services from third parties other than CH2M Hill and its 
subcontractors.  If those other third parties fail to meet their service obligations then ―any 
additional services performed or costs reasonably incurred by the Corporation in 
conjunction with compensating for the failure of the third party to fulfill its obligations 
shall be handled as a change to this Agreement...
 42‖  This structure is key because it 
reaffirms the CH2M Hill‘s role as the agent of last resort should other contractors fail to 
deliver services.  This structure is designed to protect the city from disruptions by 
ensuring a continuation of services. In a conventional contracting framework where the 
share of outsourced services is relatively small there would be other municipal employees 
that could be temporarily reassigned to provide services during a disruption.  That 
capacity is not present in contract cities and they must therefore ensure that one of its 
private service providers can act as the agent of last resort. 
There is the potential for an adverse incentive with this structure, however, 
because in the Sandy Springs/CH2M Hill relationship, the agent of last resort also 
provides the city with contract management services
43
 for third party contractors.  This 
creates a situation where the agent responsible for evaluating the other third party 
potentially could replace that party.  The potential threat would be that the primary firm 
takes advantage of its evaluator role in order to learn production techniques and business 
strategies of the third party firm and then uses its position to replace the third party in 
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 Agreement 1: Section 2.4 and Agreement 2: Section 2.4 
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 Scope of Services 1: Section 1.1.1.1- 1.1.1.4 
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providing that service.  The city may become liable to litigation if the third party firm 
sues the primary firm for this type of abuse.   
Another area where the potential for service expansion may cause a scope-related 
management challenge is the outsourcing of several financial functions.  CH2M Hill is 
responsible for administering the city‘s accounts payable and receivable.  This includes 
operating the purchase ordering system ―such that timely payments are made on behalf of 
the city…44‖ Additionally, Sandy Springs outsourced to CH2M Hill the collection of 
taxes and fees.  Thus, the firm‘s interaction with third-party firms delivering service to 
the City include contract management and assessment, payment, as well as serving as a 
possible replacement for the functions delivered by the third parties.  This combination 
has the potential to give the private partner significant leverage over third party firms.  It 
also provides access to confidential tax information of other private entities that could 
provide an advantage in bidding for future contracts with Sandy Springs or other local 
governments.  If these third parties are large firms, where services delivered to the City of 
Sandy Springs are a relatively small portion of their entire enterprise, then this leverage is 
likely to be small, but if Sandy Springs is employing small, locally controlled firms to 
provide services then it is possible that the primary firm may be able to exert influence 
over the private partner in order to serve its own interest.   
The contracts documents also task CH2M Hill with providing the city with a 
variety of procurement related services.  These include: 
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 Scope of Services 1: Section 1.2.5.1 
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 Making recommendations to develop procurement policies that are 
consistent with state and local law45 
 Assist in the selection of vendors46 
 Prepare requests for proposals to be distributed to vendors and 
suppliers47 
 Prepare and process purchase orders48 
Adding the ability to influence which vendors are selected to the previously 
mentioned administrative challenges would appear to strengthen the primary firm‘s 
position in negotiating with other firms that would try to do business with the city.   
Both contract documents include language that require the CH2M Hill firm to 
disclose any potential conflicts of interest
49
 arising from relationships with other entities.  
These statues also prohibit employees of the private partner to hold other employment 
that is ―antagonistic or hostile‖ to the City of Sandy Springs.   Also prohibited are 
kickbacks to employees of CH2M Hill for delivery of services and payments from CH2M 
Hill to persons associated with the City of Sandy Springs in order to form a contract for 
services.  One notable absence is that there is no explicit prohibition for employees of the 
city or members of the board to enter into the employ of CH2M Hill immediately after 
separating from public service.  This segment of the agreement may be strengthened by a 
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 Scope of Services 1: Section 1.2.12.1 
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 Scope of Services 1: Section 1.2.12.2 
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 Scope of Services 1: Section 1.2.12.4 
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 Scope of Services 1: Section 1.2.12.5 
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 Agreement 1: Section 17.1-17.5 and Agreement 2: Section 16.1-16.5 
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required waiting period between separation and new employment with the primary 
contractor in order to prevent jobs from being offered as replacement for kickbacks.   
Finally, there is language prohibiting collusion between CH2M Hill and other 
parties contracted to provide services to the City, or any joint business ventures with 
other contract providers without the approval of the City Manager.  These structures of 
the contracts set the expectations for the agreement and allow the City to take punitive 
action in the event that the private partner is found to have acted in conflict of interest.  
No explicit discussion appears in the contract documents regarding CH2M Hill providing 
services to other cities, though if a nearby municipality were both providing services to 
Sandy Springs and receiving services from CH2M Hill that would appear to fall under the 
disclosure requirement.   
Recommendation 3: Periodically obtain third-party validation of the financial and 
economic information produced by the primary contractor. 
Recommendation 4: Either separate the functions of agent of last resort and 
contract management for third-party firms, or maintain additional vigilance in the 
relationships among contractors. 
Recommendation 5: Give extra scrutiny to the relationships between the large 
primary contractor and smaller third party contractors, especially those where the 
preponderance of their business is with the city. 
Recommendation 6: Regulate the reemployment of city officials and employees 
by the primary contractor.  Consider requiring a waiting period between separation from 
the city and employment by the contractor.  Require city officials to disclose if they enter 
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into any discussion with the primary contractor regarding potential employment 
opportunities.   
Termination of the Agreement 
The degree of outsourcing in a contract city both in terms of breadth and 
proportion creates the risk of government failure should the relationship between the city 
and its primary private partners deteriorate.  Several elements of the contract agreements 
discuss the circumstances that would lead to a termination of the relationship between the 
City of Sandy Springs and CH2M Hill.  There are also contract elements that develop 
structures designed to protect the city from severe service disruptions.   
Two types of termination are discussed in the contract documents: termination of 
the entire agreement and partial termination of specific services.  Termination of the 
entire agreement may be initiated by either the City of Sandy Springs or CH2M Hill at 
either‘s discretion with or without cause50.  For both parties the termination of the 
agreement would go into effect one hundred and eighty days after written notice had been 
given to the other party.  The City of Sandy Springs is also given the ability to terminate 
the agreement in its entirety without any advanced notice in the event that ―a vote by the 
Board of Directors, officers or employees to transfer of a controlling interest in 
Corporation (which shall be defined to mean more than 50% of the ownership interest) to 
a non-related entity.
51‖  This structure protects the city from the event that ownership of 
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 Agreement 1: Section 12.1-12.2 and Agreement 2: Section 11.1-11.2 
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 Agreement 1: Section 12.2 and Agreement 2: Section 11.2 
 171 
its primary service provider transfers to an entity that may be hostile or antagonistic to 
the City of Sandy Springs.   
Complete termination of the agreement may also result from the City failing to 
appropriate sufficient funds through its annual budgetary process.  The contract 
documents state that the agreement is ―contingent upon sufficient appropriation and 
authorization being made annually by the City Council‖ at least 120 days prior to the 
renewal period
52
.  If the appropriation is not completed in this time frame then the 
agreement will be terminated following the City giving written notice to the CH2M Hill. 
This clause may increase the risks associated with the budget process in contract cities.  
Failure to appropriate funds on a timely basis in a conventionally governed city may lead 
to a continuing resolution with temporary funding or result in temporary layoffs and 
government shutdown.  Once the budgetary problems are resolved and an appropriation 
is made, however, it would be relatively straightforward to restart service delivery as the 
public bureaucracy and employees would presumably be available to return to duty.  In 
contrast, a contract city that fails to appropriate funds for the year may lose its ongoing 
relationship with its primary contractor and be required to go through the RFP process 
and review bids for new service providers before services can be reinstated.  Having 
established that budgetary failure may occur in that city, future contract negotiations may 
result in terms that are less favorable for the city.   
The high cost for contract cities of failing to adopt a budget potentially increases 
the likelihood of a holdout problem on the city council.  The last member of the council 
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needed to approve the appropriation may be able to extract concessions from other 
members in order to avert termination of the city contract.  The holdout problem cannot 
be addressed by adding structures to the contract because it is external to the principal-
agent relationship between the city manager and the private firm.  This problem would 
need to be addressed with changes to the rules regulating the appropriations process for 
the city council.  An assessment of how the contract city model may require changes to 
the political structure of the city itself is outside the scope of this paper, but it certainly is 
an important research question raised by this analysis. 
Partial termination of the agreement is also provided for as long as the City gives 
written notice to CH2M Hill at least 60 days in advance
53
.  In the event of a reduction or 
elimination of services the City Manager and CH2M Hill will come to an agreement on 
how much the compensation amount shall be reduced accordingly
54
.  These elements of 
the contracts would allow the city to make adjustments to changing economic conditions, 
such as rapidly declining revenue flows necessitating mid-year cuts to services.   
At an even smaller level, the City Manager has the right to require CH2M Hill to 
transfer any of its employees assigned to providing service to Sandy Springs to a different 
position within the city or to a position outside of the city.   This power is limited by 
language that requires the City Manager to use ―an objective standard based upon job 
performance‖ when making a transfer request55.  This language allows the City Manager 
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an approximation of the ability to dismiss individual employees for cause despite the city 
staff being actually employees of CH2M Hill. 
The issue of how the city budget affects the terms of the contract is further 
complicated because the preparation of the budget is outsourced to CH2M Hill.  The 
annual budget is prepared by the firm and submitted to the City Manager
56
.  Other City 
Departments not administered by CH2M Hill receive assistance in preparing their own 
departmental budgets from the contractor
57
.  Also, budget materials used in ―budget 
meetings, hearings, and agenda meetings‖ are provided under the agreement58.  The 
combination of these functions places considerable responsibility in the design of the 
budget in the hands of the private partner.  After submitting the budget to the City 
Manager, the Mayor‘s office will receive the budget for comment and review and it is 
then sent to the City Council for approval
59
.  So there are at least three reviews by public 
officials of the budget materials prepared by the private firm before it is voted upon by 
the council.  These reviews will help ensure that the content of the budget aligns with 
public interest.  Nonetheless, the work done by the private partner on the budget will 
certainly influence the budget process.   
The potential for a primary contractor to influence the city budgets for its own 
interest could be compared to the traditional model of budget maximizing bureaucrats 
introducing slack into their budget requests (see ) .  One key difference, however, is the 
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 City Charter of Sandy Springs GA. Section 5.03 and Section 5.04.  ONLINE: 
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scope of budget preparation performed across all departments of the local government.  
While individual departments are competing with each other for budget dollars, a single 
firm that administers multiple departments can collude with itself to generate a set of 
departmental budgets that serve its interest.   
Another element of the contracts dealing with contract termination is language 
that defines a default by the private partner on one of the agreements as a default on the 
other agreement
60
.  This structure would allow the City to sever its entire relationship 
with the private partner for cause should one element of the service agreement be 
violated.  This protects the city from having one segment of its relationship being 
discontinued under the no-fault termination rules, while the other being subject to the 
default rules.  This language does, however, come with some associated risk, as it may 
increase the risk to the entire service delivery enterprise of a break in service capacity 
should any of the segments of the agreement go into default.  Under a conventional 
contracting framework, the city may have multiple private partners and the default of one 
would not affect the city‘s relationship with any of the others.  The one caveat to this 
issue is that the city does not have to find both agreements in default, only that it may 
elect to do so.  Before exercising this clause the city officials would need to carefully 
weigh whether a default on a single service responsibility merits abandoning the entire 
relationship.  This appears to be part of the tradeoff for the gains to scale of having a 
single private partner – all the eggs are in one basket. 
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The contract documents also provide for a transition period should the agreement 
between Sandy Springs and CH2M Hill be terminated.  A transition period is provided 
for in both agreements that shall last the lesser of ninety days or the point at which the 
city is able to provide for a continuation of services on its own
61
.   More importantly, the 
contracts provide the city with the right to offer direct employment to employees of 
CH2M Hill if the agreement is terminated.  This would lower the city‘s cost of finding a 
qualified workforce and training new employees in their duties.  Although the 
corporation could presumably transfer members of its Sandy Springs workforce to other 
divisions, the loss of the contract‘s revenue stream would likely result in most employees 
losing their employment.      
In the event of breach of contract by either the city or the primary firm it is also 
likely that one party would bring a civil case against the other.  Several elements of the 
contract documents define the extent to which both parties can be held liable for 
damages.  The agreement states that CH2M Hill ―shall indemnify, defend and hold 
harmless the City … against any and all liability, suits, actions, damages, costs, losses 
and expenses … arising out of any errors, omissions, willful misconduct or negligent acts 
of Corporation, its officials, agents, employees or subcontractors…62‖ This places the 
contracting firm liable for service failures such as incorrect collection of taxes or fees or 
injuries.  Few firms would undertake such a risk without limitations and the Sandy 
Springs contract also includes a limitation on CH2M Hill‘s potential liability.  The 
aggregate fines and civil penalties that CH2M Hill can be liable for is capped at $150,000 
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per year across any federal, state or regulatory agency
63
.  This type of limitation may be 
necessary in order to entice a firm to provide such a broad scope of services, but it may 
also create adverse incentives for the firm if it reaches the liability cap.  At that point the 
city is financially responsible for any further damages assessed due to contractor 
negligence and the only policy option available would be to terminate the contract.   
Recommendation 7: Conduct a fiscal impact study of replacing the services 
provided by the primary contractor before determining to sever the agreement.   
Recommendation 8: If the primary contractor reaches the cap of financial liability 
for fines and penalties evaluate whether the city‘s potential liability for further damages 
outweighs the value of retaining the contractor. 
Financial Information 
The service agreements outsource to CH2M Hill the production of a variety of 
financial and economic information.  Among these responsibilities is assessing on behalf 
of the city changes in the cost of factors of production for municipal services.  City 
officials likely have limited resources to validate these cost estimates independently, 
though they could request that the firm explain the development of any cost figures 
presented.  These cost estimates are important to the contract agreement because they are 
used in periodic negotiations regarding adjustments to the rate that CH2M Hill is 
compensated for the services it provides
64
.  The compensation formula included in the 
contract does not automatically adjust for increases in the cost of production, but there is 
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language that allows CH2M Hill to renegotiate the compensation formula with the City 
Manager with any agreement subject to City Council approval.  The contract also 
stipulates that cost-related increases to the compensation formula cannot exceed 9% in a 
given year.  The cost of production estimates would likely play a significant role in 
determining whether an adjustment for the cost of production is warranted.   
The key issue with this arrangement is that in the contract city framework the city 
has little analytical capacity to validate this information on its own and is therefore in a 
compromised negotiating position for these cost adjustments.  In a traditional city there 
would be public employees of a city budget office that could validate the figures and 
conduct a comparison with third-party data.  Also, in a traditional contracting framework 
the private firm would have pressure from competition to provide accurate cost estimate 
data.  The thinness of the market for comprehensive municipal services, however, has the 
potential to lessen the pressure from competition.   
Recommendation 9: In the event that a contract city enters into negotiations with 
its primary contractor over the cost of factors of production the city should obtain a third-
party validation of the economic data used to justify the changes to the compensation 
formula.   
Capital Projects and Investment 
The City of Sandy Springs contracted with CH2M Hill to acquire a 
comprehensive set of services pertaining to cash investments and capital project planning 
and implementation.  The firm‘s capital project services consist of ―providing 
coordination and recommendation to the City on an annual basis as to the capital program 
requirements in future years, which includes the scheduling of capital program 
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projects
65.‖  The agreement stipulates that these services only pertain to small-scale 
capital projects of a value less than $50,000.  Capital project administration services for 
larger projects may be requested under the service change procedures.  The firm will also 
assist the city in obtaining financing for capital projects, maintain the capital projects 
fund in the city finances and make budgetary recommendations for financing projects 
over time
66
.  The investment-related functions outsourced through this agreement include 
developing procedures that will keep the city in compliance with Government Finance 
Officers Association practice and State law, selecting an investment firm, and producing 
reports, statements and cash flow analyses that will allow the city officers to evaluate the 
performance of the investment strategy
67
.  
These services introduce long-term planning issues that would not be present in 
most traditional service arrangements.  Assessing whether the agent has acted in the 
principal‘s interest with respect to these services requires determining whether 
performance has been acceptable in both the short and long term.  If the capital or 
investment planning horizon goes beyond the span of the contract renewal period, it is 
not clear that a contractor will have the correct incentives to maximize value over the 
correct time span.  For instance, if a firm is giving advice to a contract city regarding a 
debt service plan for an imminent bond issuance, will the firm‘s advice on the timing of 
the repayment plan be influenced by the contract renewal schedule?  The firm may have 
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an incentive to make the city‘s finances look their best during the season when its 
renewal will be assessed by the city manager and the city council.   
Possibly more troubling is the potential for conflict of interest if there is collusion 
between the primary contracting firm and the bond underwriter.  Rule G-23 of the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board stipulates that ―[n]o broker, dealer, or municipal 
securities dealer that has a financial advisory relationship with respect to a new issue of 
municipal securities shall acquire as principal either alone or as a participant in a 
syndicate or other similar account formed for the purpose of purchasing, directly or 
indirectly, from the issuer all or any portion of such issue, or act as agent for the issuer in 
arranging the placement of such issue…68‖ By combining the role of providing financial 
planning advice and playing matchmaker between the city and a financial institution there 
is potential for the primary contractor to enter into a relationship with the financial 
institution that may qualify as a ‗syndicate‘.  It is unclear what type of information and 
negotiations would pass between the primary contractor and the various financial firms it 
encounters in the market before a single firm is selected and recommended to the city.  
Although any collusion would violate the contract elements that require the disclosure of 
any outside relationships with third-party firms and potential conflicts of interest, it 
would be very difficult for city officials to actually monitor this behavior and determine 
whether to take action.   
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The task of selecting a bank creates another area where there is the potential for 
collusion.  Sandy Springs has contracted CH2M Hill to ―[a]ssist the City in selecting an 
investment firm that will invest City Funds at the direction of City Manager and in 
accordance with GFOA policies and State law.
69‖ If the primary contractor has a prior 
relationship with a financial firm it may steer the city to that firm in return for financial 
benefits.  The extreme reliance on the principal contractor for advice in obtaining 
financial services leaves city officials vulnerable.   
The threat of potential violations of rule G-23 has already been raised for the 
conventional contracting context.  Tamar Frankel (2007) raised the issue that some 
brokers have contracted with cities to provide financial advice and then have terminated 
the relationship to then subsequently begin a new relationship as bond underwriter.  
Frankel‘s point that while the rule only prohibits firms from providing both types of 
services simultaneously, serially providing both services to skirt the rule still allows for a 
significant conflict of interest because the firm has developed a relationship of trust with 
the issuer and could potentially capitalize on this trust.  On May 27, 2011 the MSRB 
approved amendments to rule G-23 that prohibited this practice (Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board, 2011).  The extreme dependence of a contract city on its primary 
service provider can create a similar degree of trust that may leave the city vulnerable to a 
conflict of interest.   
Recent changes to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) under the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act have expanded the 
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MSRB‘s role to include the protection of state and local bond issuers.  Part of the new 
regulations require that ―municipal advisors‖ register with the SEC.  The MSRB‘s has 
issued statements explaining that:  
Municipal advisors also include firms and individuals that solicit 
business from municipal entities on behalf of broker-dealers, banks, other 
municipal or investment advisers to secure certain types of investment 
banking, financial advisory or investment advisory work with municipal 
entities, such as public pension funds, 529 plans, local government 
investment pools and other state and local governmental entities or funds. 
These municipal advisors are sometimes referred as consultants, third-
party marketers, placement agents, solicitors or finders. 
The investment services that CH2M Hill provides to the City of Sandy Springs 
appear to qualify under this definition of municipal advisor.  These services are: 
1. ―Assist the City in the development of investment policies and 
procedures pursuant to Government Finance Officers Association of America 
(GFOA) and State law70.‖ 
2. ―Assist the City in selecting an investment firm that will invest 
City Funds at the direction of City Manager and in accordance with GFOA 
policies and State law71.‖ 
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3. ―Produce investment reports, including cash flow analysis and 
modeling stating the effectiveness of the chosen investment policy, on a quarterly 
basis72.‖ 
Recommendation 10:  Remove the role of selecting a bond underwriter from the 
firm responsible for providing capital finance advice.  Monitor any contact between firm 
providing advice and the underwriter.   
Recommendation 11: Evaluate the recommend bond repayment plan in light of 
the contract renewal schedule.   
Recommendation 12: Require that primary contractors offering CH2M Hill-type 
financial advisement services register with the SEC as Municipal Advisors.   
Recommendation 13: When contracting for advice on finding banking or other 
financial service providers, officials should request two or three potential providers that 
can then be compared on the basis of rates and service to mitigate the potential for 
collusion in the matchmaking process. 
A final consideration of the capital advisement role is that it is also combined with 
the procurement function.  This means that the private partner will receive a normal rate 
of profit on providing the resources for the capital improvements that it recommends to 
the city.  There is potential here for an additional conflict of interest if the firm begins to 
recommend that the city undertake more projects than is economically efficient.  Because 
of the information dependence of the city on its private partner, this is another area where 
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it may be necessary to conduct periodic third-party reviews of the economic merits of the 
capital investment strategy. 
Recommendation 14: Obtain periodic external evaluations of the economic merits 
of the capital investment plan recommended by the primary contractor in order to limit 
the potential for conflict of interest. 
Relationship of Trust 
Noted earlier in this paper, Oliver Porter acknowledged that the City of Sandy 
Springs is highly dependent on its private partner performing due diligence in fulfilling 
the service agreement, but that a relationship of trust existed between city officials and 
the corporation‘s representatives at the beginning of their relationship.  One of the key 
threats to the city, however, is that this harmonious relationship may erode at some point 
in the future as elected officials are replaced and the city and corporate workforces 
change over time.  The designers of the contract documents included elements that 
attempt to mandate that the harmonious relationship be maintained as an essential part of 
the service agreement.  There are also contract elements which are clearly designed as a 
reaction to the unsatisfactory relationship that previously existed between the citizens that 
formed the new city of Sandy Springs and the Fulton County government.   
Both contract documents include language specifying that the ―Corporation shall, 
at all times, foster and maintain harmonious relationships with the members of the City 
Council, all employees of the City, all employees of the City's contract services providers 
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and all City's residents, and shall represent the City in the best light possible
73.‖  This 
language is included prominently in the General Services section of the contracts.  It is 
not clear how this relationship would be assessed or what types of actions would be taken 
over time to maintain it.  It appears that this language is in place to allow the city to take 
action when it determines that the relationship has faltered.   
Other contract elements which specify specific behaviors shed further light on 
what is expected in a harmonious relationship.  One element which discusses the 
operation of phones during business hours specifies that all incoming calls will be 
answered by actual people and not through the use of automated attendants
74
.  Another 
requirement is that the code of conduct for corporate employees will emphasize that 
―rudeness and impoliteness toward any person is unacceptable conduct and will not be 
tolerated
75.‖  These elements of the contract documents reflect the historical context of 
the development of the City of Sandy Springs.  Because most contract cities are formed 
in the process of municipal incorporation it is likely that a similar history of antagonism 
between the preexisting government framework and the citizens groups that formed the 
city will be reflected in the contract documents.   
Discussion 
By assessing the features of the contracts between the City of Sandy Springs and 
the private firm CH2M Hill, I believe that I have identified multiple features of the 
principal-agent relationships in contract cities that are not present in traditional municipal 
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public-private partnerships.  The most notable of these features are those that are 
associated with interactions between outsourced functional areas.  I find in the contract 
structures the potential for ―negative synergies‖ to exist which raise the cost of 
monitoring and managing contractor performance above what would be required if the 
functions were individually outsourced to separate contractors.  I also observe beneficial 
structures placed in the contracts that are designed to prevent these additional costs and to 
achieve the efficiency gains that the contract city model promises.  
Another key feature that distinguishes outsourcing decisions in contract cities is 
that the traditional analytical assumption that cities evaluate the merits of outsourcing 
each function individually does not appear to hold in this governance context.  One cause 
of this is that the contract city model tends to be adopted by municipalities at the time of 
incorporation and it therefore necessarily involves a discrete shift to near 100% external 
production of municipal functions, rather than a gradual adjustment towards increased 
outsourcing.  The other key contributing factor is the role of ideology and the reliance on 
contractor cost projections for making the evaluative decision, rather than using historical 
cost estimates of internal production.  Because the contract city model is most often 
adopted by new cities there is no historical data to use and therefore the public officials 
are either making estimates based on the costs of other government units or using 
information that they receive from their potential contractors.  These factors suggest that 
the traditional framework used to study outsourcing may need to be reevaluated when it 
is applied to contract cities and that further research into this area of study is definitely 
called for.   
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The two key factors that I identify as being responsible for creating these new 
features are the scope of services outsourced by contract cities and the thinness of the 
private market for comprehensive municipal service delivery.  These two concepts were 
first identified in the literature on contract cities and in the historical documents 
describing the development of the City of Sandy Springs.  The textual analysis research 
methodology used in this case study has helped reveal how the influence of scope and 
market depth has manifested in the structures embedded in the contract documents.   
For practitioners in this field this research highlights several areas of contract 
management that merit special attention because of the increased potential for conflicts of 
interest.  I wish to reiterate that this paper is confined to the incentives and the potential 
behaviors that may be spurred on by them, but in no way does it reveal any actual 
behavior on the part of CH2M Hill in conflict of its interest to provide services to the 
City of Sandy Springs.  The findings and conclusions drawn from this research should be 
a guide to both public and private partners on how to design appropriate contract 
structures so as to protect both participants in contract agreements.   
This paper opens several doors to future research.  One potential avenue to extend 
this work would be to more formally develop the outsourcing decision contracting 
officials face within the principal-agent framework.  This may serve to clarify the 
distinction between a traditional contracting decision and this extreme case of 
outsourcing.  A key feature of such a model would be to explicitly model the monitoring 
cost interactions across individual functions within the contract.  The public officials 
would then weigh the cost of the contract net of these ―negative synergy‖ monitoring 
costs, but also including the potential scale efficiencies that a comprehensive contract for 
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services would provide.  Other options that the official may face would include internal 
production, but with imperfect information about the true costs of internal production, 
and multiple discrete contracts. 
Another potentially fruitful line of research would be to gather updated data on 
the prevalence of the contract city model across the country and more broadly assess their 
contract management practices.  There is a sense in the literature that the contract city is a 
new form of governance that may be adopted by many more cities.  Five years after the 
incorporation of Sandy Springs it would be interesting to see how many other 
communities have adopted this model and whether similar contract structures can be 
found in them.   
 The implications of these findings for the study of public financial management 
and regulation also raise a number of interesting questions for the study of local 
outsourcing at large.  How many local governments are receiving financial advice from 
private contractors who are also playing matchmaker between the governments and 
financial intuitions when it comes time to issue public debt?  Are these firms acting in 
response to the Dodd-Frank Act and registering as Financial Advisors?  If so, what has 
been the impact of registration on local government‘s financial activities?  The issue 
highlighted by this case study, how the combination of services in a single contract can 
increase the potential for conflict of interest, is very relevant for public financial services 
regulation.  
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